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Th« thealo presented a t Ul/^arh Ittalim tJijtlvei^aity, All£?ixh 
for th« f w'>rf"' of the de^pjta of Doctor of Fhlloaophy i n 
Tha present laidcrtakliv; aliaa a t t i a c t n ^ out th© grad^Kil 
developnait of rjussell 'a Ideas coiieeminit pmblf?'!! of pej?c*?ptlon. 
The thes la oomprtaeB four chapters beaidea the chapters on 
intTOduotlon and conclusion. In thes© four chapters ar^ -; diaci*-
BUfid four theor ies which %B3ell oueces^lvely de-^eloped t o 
solve t h i s prohleia. 
In the Introductory ch.aptar a diaouaalon I s m\d& ±n 
so'io d e t a i l about the probl'*ri of p'?rc»»ptlon and dir^prcnt theo-
r i e s which wea?o advanced before i^laaaell to solve t h i s pmaleia, 
i ' l r s t a 0tatem*snt of co-i'ionse-nae t h e o r / of perception l a nadc 
and I t l 3 ohown tha t I t involVf'3 ce r t a in inaupf-mbl*? d i f f i c u l t -
l e a , An attempt to overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s leads phllosop-
h«^rs to uphold tho theory which l a call-^d*feplBteiolo;?loal 
duallari^which l a a l s o , In t tu rn t found to be exposed to ohjr 'cti 
ona. "^o l o d o a l analyslo ot* tho prf '^alem ot perception 
veiy 
ij1.tlnat*»ly y ^sults in to th?^ n e ^ t l o n of th»»/poasi>)lllty of 
knotfleds'ce, ' I l o to r i ca l ly , !!uias waa ihe f i r s t philosopher to 
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a r r i ve a t t b t s cnnclusto;!^ I'^ince th'^ time of ?hrie ?-$:'iny pbllooo-
ph^ro t r l e t ! to r«?-conntnict imowled/je i^ proTldin,^^ I t new 'laaea, 
•"he nar^ea of Kant an^ : m i a]K> '^Bpeetally ^^iorth nentlonliv;, l a 
twent ie th cent«ry» the phtlosoph'-'ra of p'^rcoptinn uey^ ri;"iinly 
concerned to j^' .c'utr, idealicj^i. They bollfived a p r i o r i ths - 'xlyte-
nce of an extemal^^Ksrld, '?h©y thus fa i led tn co'S'^  to th~; -rip 
ot r-'al iaau?-^ while w.platnia.'^ the perceptual ph-^ aio-i^ -aia, 
B*:!rtrRnd i ^ sae l l i s one of thn few pfrllouoph ••n* <!io t l»ed 
to answer the 1!uf3oaji clvillfaiue to knowledi?©, l e dovf^loyod 
auccesijlvfily four theor?,aa ii^iely* the theory of erd"t-^ tolo;^oal 
dual i sn , thn r e l a t i ona l theory, the rK>i>»r«''latio«al theory and 
the causal theory of percept ion. The chapter io concluded by 
d e l i n ^ t l r i g aome '^laic ch;iraote;rl3tlcs of liUB el l* 9 phlloaophy 
of p-^rc-'ptlon. 
The naoon^ c5^»pt«»r conccraa with iunscll* s ear ly reflf^ction 
on th*> r>mhlifm aa contain»-d in h i s book Pmbleaa of PhilonoTihY 
liiflsell did not ap;>3Tioch the problen of p'^rcf^ptlon d i rec t ly} i t 
vr n ce r t a in consif^emtlona fro i h i s lofjlcal thenrloa which led 
Ind hl^i to for^iJlnte t h i a pwhlem. Due to th in f ac t , lort lcal 
consld<»ratlon3 det'''rr!ilno v(-'Ty nuch hin fnrinn.'n'^ntal .lotlan::? of 
• sonoo-data* , ' t h e knowledge by ae quaint p-noe *, ' t h e knowledj^e 
hy <!f»ucr1.ptloa* e t c , '^*^. the«ory :idvmiced in t h i s hook lo tha t 
of cplnt''"iolo;i:lcal fluallBri, Our d i rec t knowlcd^j'^ in knouledi^o 
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abnut annoir^f? . i t iali t iea from which .J« info^r the knowledge of 
ntsbatantial t^at^rtal th lnga . ?he lat t^i* b'^ ii3(<| Ijif^xperl -^ iicftd 
oaimnt, An r . t lc t Bf>rme, be asBijrtod, 'Ph?'^  belit^f i n thc-»n ii! 
nrounded in onr Inot inot lve fn l th in theri, ';!or'^ ov<-'r uhit are 
the:/ i ' i thmaolvea e^ m n*^v-^ r be known, '^ hrouj^h rM-^ noe-fl-ita we 
can know only atrnctwxnl pmp^^rtieo of the^i. 
'^.3 t h i r d c'lr^pt.'-r diacuua'-^a liiB^-ell's xiheuonenaliotic 
IKusition rf? ^aniijfig the pnt^blofa in question which he rulvance^ 
n l in ly m M B book Ojy: IW^^^^^l*? Si^ JSM fi^tH^'ai^I i i ad j i . In 
M s fArraei* |)oait ian -lufisell rji^poaed to i n f e r th-* «^>iat-^nc0 nf 
cxtptrii^X world iron the aenne-data. r^ t t h i s l*»tt a -i^lf 
\wt\teen the wf>rl«l of perception and the WOTVA of phyaioo, 
^ s a e l l thou fflit i t neceaaary to brldrte t h i a ^jiilf* 'e piv>3)oBOO 
to r--'f!iio<^ th'^ siifisteintlal mater ial th1ii«T in to i t a f-'-.trrnile 
function©. In a/^-r-'Cf^tc of ac tua l and hy:»t''>et1.oal awioa (ca l led 
by nusf>ell •senslV^lia*) i s t3"io\«i by -.lii^aell <ioinr^  a l l tho 
functions pr-'n'ioiJ3ly <ioiie iry aj :'^t--mti?%l t'^in^s* l-iv^vilQdr.e 
acoot'dlnr; to thiiv^ theory cons is t s iu 'iind*B cordng in r-1 ' i t ion 
to H^iioe-dfita, ''*he aenQo-data do not J'tjpr^---,.ait axiythini^ heyoiK'! 
thenaolV'^s i^ ut are tlje aole oi^joct;^ of knowledge* "ho theory 
i s a two t-vn th^^ry as ^..jatnot the d n a l i a t t c th-^ory which 
adni+tfd thre>* fac to id , 
"^v^ :*fowrth ch ip te r dei la vdth ,&a... o l l ' a pos i t ion in his 
ijook The, .^talvaio of !ind. Xn phcnonenaliari .^iusaell r^^dttced 
• 4 -
a a t ^ r l a l yui^stajic s liito t h e i r aeiisible fmictlons. In the 
pr-af^iit woR': he .iHves a Gl?3ilar tr<j!-tnent to tjilnd, :find and 
njatter mth aro shown to be non-exiatmit . Hnl^ ^ of^nsattone 
f»xlot aa they alone are Imow-n to <^xl3t, afuiScitloix':- nbi:sei^n/^ 
T-'hysjloal laws arc ca l led phyalcal thtnija, UHmi thev ar-- nul-jjcc-*-
to psycVilcj^enl lawa they a re ca l led nantal* l a t!i«n - i v e o 
they arcs ne i t he r physical nr>r mental ant a a u t r a l , "lio <»vent 
ca l led perceiving; occurs whiai a sensation coneo in to contact of 
^unrm 'i^aiiln where i t ;i.veB r i s e to 'inetalc phraion^aia, '- '-"uaH* 
t l on with l t 5 tmenilo aoaool'itea conatltuteQ p'^rception. 
In the rJ^fth o u'lpter iJusoell 's causal thmrj which i s 
hla f ina l theory aiiout the pro 111 em of perc -ption i a diBCUsaed, 
In hi9 aon- re la t lona l theory, ,Jn8:;ell hid droppo.-l th'i iiotlojis 
of •acqimiatance* and • B?»noo-data» alon/j with the antiona of 
taind and matter , '.ut he now s'fnaserta these no t ions , i'erceptloi; 
l a R^^ain shown to be a three tf*:ffm occurrence, rSusoell conoeiveB 
world to be a co l l ec t ion of wMt he ca l l ed ii'^uitB which nay 
rouf?hly be iinderotood aa • energy-unltfc*, Dxte na l t h i m ^ , 
ni*?n'a iio^^ioa and brains a r e a l l coraiwaitlon of a r^n t s , wh^n 
ixn evf»nt in the outalde ..orld fSilia within the exper ien t i a l 
f i e ld of a oraln a pmceso oi' event a t a r t s froa th--? sv^nt which 
place 
rf'aohe© Vw ixjdy of percf^lv^y ;t,j^ fron thrit/aiioth>^r pyoc^n;: ot 
•^ents r;*-.rtc '-v " :•" '-.c'v;:. t'^ ...^  a rs in whcr-* i t producer the event 
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ca l l ed 'percept* which i s the knowle<ige of the ex te rna l event , 
'HiTOUfih pf?3?cept3 w© can know only tho a t n i c t i i m l p?np*>rtle8 
of oxtprnal eV'THta; thelap i n t r i n a i o natuirc? cminot he kJiown rty 
pe rcep t s , ^e events . I n t r i n s i c a l l y * ar#> n e i t h e r ph^'slcfil nor 
nenta l j t h ^ ar** neutra l* *?hoy aro mental whe^ i thoy a re km>ym 
ntTiorwiae thftn try Inference l . e , when they ar* p re^ta, 3ut 
t.^icy arf? phyaleal wheji t h e i r kiiowlod -^^ e l.:,> infer red krv>wl9dfje, 
'••huo, Huooell a t th io atage becarje ^ i j i s tenolo/^cal ly a cnuoallnt 
whilr xiefjs./ii^i'jlomlly beln^ within the framevwark of n^Tutral 
rjonion. 
In thp ooncludliv^ chapter an ove ra l l aaaeestaent of 
f^ © l i ' s on t r l f t u t l on i n th*^ f i e ld of epiat««aolo?iy in n'A(i» 
I t I s found tha t ,^SB©ll*a fandeairoura met with gr T^^ t auoo*^o3©8 
a» well ao E^I? tailur*^. i ^ u u e l l ' s yhiloiJophy viftia a f a i lu re in 
the sense thA-^ . hs; CQ.ulcl .not liCriiare th<^ ijoal ha was a f t e r , f^e 
t r i e d to answer tha Huracan ohallange to knowled^. 3ut (Respite 
pe rs i s t ed e.^tortn auccftsa eluded him, Tht? loi j ioal destiny of 
• ennir2.Qi.3n -r :)i-.lm^ ;:'.oili)ataT3, The external world could he 
«?9tabli8hed only l^ aasuainii no3Ei»daioriatrativo infprenoes. On 
tho o the r hand xlusnell wna ahlo to s t a t e c l e a r l y what waa the 
na ture and extent of hurirm knnwl©f^o and w i^at were llBiJcope and 
I t s l i r a i t s . 
Bertrantl iusael l i s -aoat dl;;tt!i/^i3hed anon.: the 
phlloso ohens who have 6oalt with the problem of perceptual 
knowled|-^e In twentieth century. In the l a t e nineteenth and 
the oaTly (le(3a'les of twent ieth Of?ntnry, the ohtlo;jo ' i lea l 
atmoaphere in i n . t l sh ( and a lso in Vmerlcan'i u n i v e r s i t i e s waa 
dominated by Hetielian philosophy which was not only not in 
tune with the Bisltish t i u d i t i o n of e?iplrical phllosoohy but 
was alao a.talnBt the t a s t e and temperament of twontleth 
century western mind, 'jeins^ ao, a react ion af^alnst '^Oj^elianlBn 
waa bound to ejaerge, I-i B r i t a i n , i t vas Jiaosell who alon/i 
with G. S, "loore led the novemcmt of rm^olt and reac t ion find 
i t may ho noted tha t i t was the problen of percepttial knov/ledsie 
throu/^h which these philoso :>hcr3 combated the re:)r<»3entatl->'e3 
of ^fe/telianiSBi in t h e i r countiT-, 
Jusnel l wao a very v e r s a t i l e philosopher. He v^ nrote 
on a wldp v a r i e t y of subjec ts , Troblen of perception con ; t i -
tu ted h i s a'^cond nain i n t e r e s t a f t e r lo^^lc and riather^itlcs, 
After I9ln which wnu the year of completion of h i s Pr inci : j ia 
'latheskatica. he en.'^fjed hl^iself r^ainly to detei^al-ne the 
nature and extent of human knowledfje. Alraoat a l l of hlo 
worlcs in pure philosophy a f t e r t h i s year are concex^ied with 
t h i s problem. 
I t I s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to i i i sse l l t ha t he developed 
theo r i e s not a theory about the problem of perceptual knowledge, 
llo o ther philosopher oaa match him In beln^^ so a e l f - c r l t i c a l 
and 30 opffii to modify h i s views in the li j iht of new facts and 
new da ta . There are to h i s c r e d i t , broadly, four theor ies 
which he sfucceaaivoly developed to expl icate h ia problem^ 
no f i r s t advanced a theory but heijifi d leaa t la f ied with i t 
replaced i t by another theory and thon t h i s waa alao r^^olaced 
by some s t i l l another theory. In the early phase of hlo 
philosophical development, he was an eplnteniologlcal d u a l i s t . 
Then he became a phenoiMnallst fjmd then turned to neu t r a l 
raonlBm, In the l a s t staj^e he again rever ted to h i s o r ig ina l 
d u a l i s t i c pos i t ion while betrv? within the i'ra?aei>/03Sc of 
neu t ra l aonlsra. 
Despite the imiense importance tha t iJussell enjoys in 
the h i s to ry of philosophy of perception, there i s , I n a l l 
p robab i l i ty , no woiic which deals exclusively and coji 'rehen-
s ive ly with t h i s aspect of h i s philosophy, llo attempt has 
h i the r to been raade which can be said to cover the whole 
panorama of h i s vievis which he advajiced durin,!: the r a the r 
lon^ period of about f i f t y years . In present undertakln,T,an 
endeavour i s laade to t r ace the /gradual develor^ont of Bussell*s 
views oonceminiT t h i s pro hi era. Our treatment of the subject 
here i s nore expositary than c r i t i c a l pa r t ly because oMssell 
himself WIS the iireatest c r i t i q u e of h i s theor ies and - a r t l y 
because a detailed c r i t i ca l c"\raluatlon of his contriinitions 
maj constitute a separate thesis to be undertaken by some 
future researcher, 
I express here my deep sense of gratitude that I >^ve 
for my teacher and sui^orvlsor T)r, XahiQt ?lasan Sivcr, l'rof«?83or 
and Head, "Oepartment of Philosophy, A,!il,tJ, 411.?ii^ for the 
help, encouiu^'eraent and /^lidance that he gave me during the 
writing of th i s disser ta t ion. I ara also thankful to 
Ifisa tlukhtar i*atiiaB and 'Ir, tfohd, Wanif, the aeninar l ibrar ians 
of Philosophy and Theolo^^y Departnienta respectively for the i r 
l ibera l a t t i tude in providing ae with neoesairy books. 
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IHTaODOCTIOH 
(ProKLoa of Pereeptlon and an Introduction to Buasell's 
Phlloaophy of Perception) 
y^el^ iytt^ n^ iy Bey^ rf^ a 
Bertrond Bussell is raost diatin^ished anon^ the 
philosophers Who have d«»alt with the prohleci of our perceptual 
knowledge in the present century. He is one of the two 
philosophers ( the other being Gr.i5, itoore) who revolted a^iiwt 
the absolutiatic and idealistic philosophies of their elders 
who were dominating the philosophical aoene in the British 
unlveraltieo and thereby restored the continuity of British 
empirical tradition which weaa initiated by John Iiocke but was 
interrupted in the late nlnteenth and early twentieth centuries 
by Hegelian philosophers. The philosophies of Bradley, 
Bosanqpiet and T,H. Green were, in a sense, anaaolistic to 
British philosophical tradition and teiaperaraent and Ilissell 
(along with Moore) helped it to regain its original hue. 
i^ssell was a very versatile philosopher, "The range 
of his academic intereata has been prodi^jiously wide. He 
wrote on the subjects like logic, n^theiaatica, philosophy, 
ethics, politics, education, phyeics, psychology etc. with 
equal authority and an unusual ingenuity. The problem of 
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perception constituted his aecond raain iiiteirest after lo^c 
and n^thea&tics, This is the reason that we aee that moat of 
his philosophical wozics after 1910 -^ the yet^ r of the comple-
tion of Prinoipia m^ f^tm'<t1.<?ft ^ M concerned with this 
problem, ^T about fifty years he grapled with this problem 
and evolved suooeBaively a series of theories to explain it. 
In this introductory chapter an attempt has been made to trace 
out, in general terns, the denrelopra^ it of ^ssell*9 ideas 
concerning the pioblem of perception and to delineate some 
basic features of it. But before doing this it is worthwhile 
to discuss in some detail the problem of perception itself 
and differ«it theories which were developed by philosophers 
preceding Btissell to explain it. This will on the one hand 
serve as background to Bassell's own foz^ sulation of the 
problem and on the other, help us in understanding the disting-
uishing features of his theories. 
This disouasion is necessary for another reason ~ and 
a very important one, also. It lies in the peculiar nature of 
Hu8sell*8 problematic. Bussell's problem in the philosophy 
of perception, unlike many of his contemporaries, was to 
reconstruct knowledge and to provide science with philosophical 
bases and foundations. His successive theories were successive 
attempts to answer the challange of HUmeen skeptical philosopliy 
which had made the very possibility of knowledge doubtful. Tie 
was, infaot, the aecond philosophical giant after Iramanuel Kant 
- 3 • 
to be voken up from the dogmatic slumbers which the philoso-
and 
phers /sicientiete alike were entertaining about the knowledge 
of the world. Bussell's probleiaatio la peculiar in the sense 
that it is he alone who is fully conscious of the challenge 
posed by Tlumean skepticlsai most of hia contemporaries« as 
their writings witness, are only vaguelyt if at all, aware 
of it. Their discussions of the problem of perception are 
more prompted by their desire to get rid of the absolutistic 
and idealistic philosophies which they thought did not suit 
to the t(waper and taste of scientific man of twentieth century. 
They were merely concerned to "refute idealism" and to 
2 
"defend commox^ense" • 
Hussell, although shares much of this aocalled scienti-
fic taste with his conten^rariea, is, however, not naive enou^ -jh 
to be oontCTit v/ith accomplishing a ne/F.tive task. His philoso-
phy is, in a very real sense* a quest of truth* Resell, 
indeed, entered the domain of philosophy via his desire to 
find in it sosw impersonal and objective truths which religion 
was unable to give hin. In a very young age he rejected one 
by one almost all of the religious beliefs and precepts* His 
search of truth drove him to mathwiatios which supposedly 
contained the eternal and self-evident truths, %ere were at 
the time two kinds of theories to justify the truth of ta^ .the-
matical propositions. One was Kantian theory which treated 
them as •synthetic apriori* and the other was Mlll*s theory 
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accordln/5 to which they were * empirical ^jeneraliantions *, 
Bussell was dlaaatlfled with and rejected tooth of 
these theories and tried in his own way to provide th«a a 
philosophical justification. He aou^t to reduce mathematics 
into logic so that the former may have the same kind of 
certainty which the latter posseso. He wrote a number of 
books including Prinoiuia Math«y^tioa (in collaboration with 
Whitehead^ on this subject. But at a time v^en his work was 
almost completed In this field, his own pupil Wittgenstein 
shown thera to be tautologies quite devoid of any Informative 
and cognitive content, l^saell found this theory logically 
irrefutable and consequently abondoned raatheaatica. 
3elnii; disappointed with aatheaatics, he turned to 
science. But science in its existing form was exposed to 
Humean criticism. The two fundamental notions which under-
lied the aoienoe were the notions of 'induction* and 'causality* 
But both of these two were shown by Hume to be logically incre-
dible. The problem in Ibsaell'a own words was this: 
"The gr«»t scandals in the philosophy of 
adenoo ever since the time of Hume have been 
causality and induction. We all believe in both 
but Hume made it appear that our belief is a 
blind faith for which no rational ground can be 
assigned " 
••Science as it exists at present Is partly 
agreeable and partlv disagreeabla If we 
emphasize the fact that our belief in causality 
la irasational, we must Infer that we do not know 
science to be true, "3 
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But what Is exactly and precisely the nature of 
Humean challenge? How did he deny ofiusallty and Induction 
and rendered thereby the aclentific knowledge foundation!ess? 
The answers to these questions can be found only if we under-
stand the paradoxical nature of the phenomena of perception 
and how our ooomonscBisical notions about perceptual knowled^, 
when philosophically analysed, result into the ne^^tlon of 
the very possiMlity of knowledge. We may start with the 
statement of commons&aae theory of perceptual knov^ed^e and 
the various difficulties to Which It is exposed, 
Conuaonsense 'meoiy of Perception and ita Difficulties 
Wo all believe that we live in a world vhlch is 
Inhabited by trees, anliaals, sky, river, ;other persons etc. 
Our belief in all of these objects is s3?ounded in our thinking 
that they are perceived by us, The question arises what do 
we mean vftien we say •%« perceive "t That is, what it is that 
perceives and what It la that la perceived? And also what is 
the nature of relationship between the perceiving subject and 
the perceived object? The answers expected of these questions 
from a plain man are simple enough. According to him the 
percelver Is a human person having a mind and the objects 
perceived are extended, substantial material things. Percep-
tion is a direct confrontation of mind with its object through 
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which the latter reveals Itself to the former or the former 
beeoiaea aware of the latter. These answers appear priiaa 
fade to be plain and obvious. But a little reflection laakes 
It clear that they Involve some very intricate and not easily 
sumountable difficulties, 
Commonsense treats perceptual knowledge as a simple 
presentation of the objects to the perceiving mind. Two 
important corollaries follow from it. Firstly, that the 
objects perceived are public or interpei:»3onal and not merely 
one's own subjective data; and secondly that they are numeri-
cally same with the perceived objects, Fublloity of the 
objects of perception means that more than one person can 
apprehend them airaultaneously, 15iey can be photographed or 
recorded. They are outthere* in the vrarld, existing in their 
own rl^t and utterly independent to the percepient's mind. 
Not only that dlffer«it persons do or can perceive them atonce, 
but different senses of the same person share their knowledge 
at the same time. We rap a table and entertain the visual, 
auditory and tactual experiences simultaneously, in the last, 
they are In sharp contrast with dreams, feelings of pleasure 
and pain, mental pictures and like phenomena Which are exclu-
sively one's personal possessions unshared by others. 
In asserting the second proposition, people assume 
that knowledge through seises stands for a direct, unmediated 
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and stial^tforward acquaintance with \/hat there really is. 
Mind is like a torch which illuiainatea the things that are 
thM^, And that the procwae involved in causes no difference 
on the part of subject or object, peroeiver or object 
perceived. 
Philosophers have challenged either fii^t proposition 
or the second or both, They contend that all data presented 
to the senses are private to the perceiver and that it can 
never occur that one person enjoy data exactly and precisely 
same with that of other person. 15iey also assert that in 
sense-perception, mind n&ver comes across the "thing itself; 
our knowledge of external things is alvmys inferential, 
indirect and laediated. What is immediately given to the 
senses is 'ideas* or (sense') - 'inpressions* or 'swise-data' 
or 'sense-contents*• liocie oven go to the extent to identify 
the experience with existence. That is to say,they deny the 
existence of any material world external to and independent 
of mind. World, according to these philosophers, is nothing 
but a "construction" out of aense-dataj it is a fancy or 
figment conjectured Ijy mind, n&ver really existing. 
The argument philosophers invoke as to refute the 
commonaens© —>.„ or technically speaking, naive-realistic 
theoiy Is known as *argument from illusion*, taken loosely 
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to mean a oaae of sense-deooption. If the assumption that 
l»y means of a ens e-expert ioice true oharaoterlstloa of objects 
are revealed, then, so they contend, illuBlona, hallucinations 
and other eommonplace phenomena like dreams feelings etc. can 
not be explained. We often err in identifying^ the position 
and properties of objects presented to the senses. We, in 
a desert, see water while there is no vrater? a colour blind 
person fails to differentiate the red colour from green; a 
straight stick half imaersed in water looks bent» a man with 
double vision sees two candles thougji. Infect, there is only 
one? sirnllarly trees and poles appear to be moving in revera 
direction When the i>erceiver is at a aovin^ train and the 
train itself seems to be static. 
Then there are complete hallucinations. Here the 
mistake is not about the position, property or the identity 
of some object. The case here rather is that wo perceive 
something while there is nothing of that kind to be perceived. 
For examplSf a drunkard treats the snakes crawling up bed post 
as if they are real or a bean of llo^t in darkness of ni/j^ t 
is mistaken to be a person. In like manner, a drug-induced 
person sees everywhere pinkrats. While there is no such thing 
existing. Besides visual - there are hallucinations pertaining 
to other sense organs tactual, audi to rj' etc. Lord Brain, 
a noted neurophysiologist. In his book The Nature of Kacperienoe. 
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has mentioned a number of cases In which people were halluci-
A 
nated by smell and sound. In one such case a person expe-
rienced the smell of rubber burning. He woke up at nif^ ht 
and smelt burning. He then woke his wife inorder to inform 
her that soiMthing was on fire. But some later observations 
made him convinced that something was wrong with his ownself. 
In another case the patient said» "she would hear music at 
beginlng of her seizure and the music was always the samot a 
lullaby her mother sung Hushabye my bal^",' 
... 5 
Apart from illusions and hallucinations, there is 
another consideration relativity of perception which 
leads a philosopher to reject oommonsense theory of knowledge. 
It is a fact that the qualities of objects perceived vary with 
the changing positions and subjective states — m«ital or 
physical — — of the peroeiver, ibr example* the round coin 
seen from a specific angle appears to be elliptical. TVK> 
parallel railway lines seem to be converging upon one another. 
The same water produces cool and hot experiences to two hands 
when the one is hot and other is cold. A person suffering 
from jaundice sees every thing yellow while the other suffer-
ing from cold fails to smell the odours conspicuous enough 
when he is in noznal state. 
There is yet another scientific ooi^ideration which 
supports the view that objects experienced oanjoot be identical 
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with experienced ob;jects. And this is the argumceat from 
•time lag'. It Is well known that ll^t travels at a finite 
speed, so that when we look at star sirlus for examplef we 
are seeing it as it was nearly nine years ago, the light 
that strikes our eyes haTlng taken all the time to reach 
us. Hence it is quite possible that thou^ we see airius 
tonl^t, it actually disintergrated in 1969. We are not 
having hallucinations and yet we see what no longer exists, 
Biioilarlyteven If the sun exploded five minutes ago, we 
shoiild not yet see the catastrophe but should still see the 
sun unimpaired. Or again, one may hear the sound of a distant 
gun being fired long after one sees the flash, Thus, we 
see that there is time lag in the actual occurrence of an 
ev«mt and our experiencing of it. This makes It impoasible 
to have a genuine knowledge of what is really there. 
Science, although it presupposes the objectivity of 
things, is, as a matter of fact, most hasardous for oommoiv 
sense. It tells us that the material things whom we ^Ink 
solid, extended and substaatlal are, in reality, composed 
of Invisible atoms and these atoms themselves are made up of 
some subpartioles like elect2t>n, proton and neutron. It 
tells us that small penny slae looking stars are, Infact, 
biggne* than our own planet, Similarly,our blood that seeroa 
as a uniform red when seen from sointlfle instruments, become 
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composed of yellovdLsh par t ic les in a neutral colour fliild, 
g 
And l i k e . 
The Theory of BBlBt«Bologioal Pualiam 
In all the cases a>»ve mentioned there exists a 
peroaiient discrepancy between the thing real and thing 
apparent. What is there is not perceived and \^at is per^ 
oeived is not actually there. But, after all, something is 
perceived _ •something^ other than the object itself. 
The term now in vogue to designate this •something* is 
*8Gn3e->datum*, meaning what is given or presented to the 
senses. ]^ r example, take the case of straight stick 
refracted in water which appears to be croodced. Here we 
find two appearaaces of the same object — one strai^t 
and the other b«tit. How, clearly, one of these must be 
flase, for, the same thing can not be stral^ h^t and croooked 
at the same time. Nor can it be said that stick changed its 
shape when placed in \rater. Being so, the question arises 
that what, other than the thing itself we are aware of, Ihe 
answer vouchsafed/that it is *saise-datum*. 
Philosophers who uphold the theory of sense-data apply 
it not only in the cases where there are two contradictory 
appearances of the same object but in noznal cases of peroep» 
tion too. They cont^id that in all oases of perception 
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vrtiether veridical or iMJiwveridioal, we corae across the sense-
data and for this reason the knowledge of real object (if 
there is one) is always inferred and indirect. The aris^ umenta 
they generally adduce to justify it are as follows: 
In the first place* they point out that there is no 
instrinsic difference between veridical and non-veridical 
pwweptiona; qualitatively they are quite indistinguislable. 
The iM)inent we corae across any delusive phenoaenont say a 
oroooked stick, the event itself never indicates in any way 
its faulty character! it is because of some other considers^ 
tions that we realize that we are deceived. A child nenrer 
can differentiate between hia genuine experiences and wrong 
ones. Similarly, take the example of dreans. It is fairly 
clear that vftiile dreaming our belief in objects and things 
of dreott is as perfect as in the objects and things of actual 
world. It is only when we wake up, that we come to know that 
they were unreal, There is no qualitative difference between 
the perceptions of croocked stick and straif^t one, between 
the objects and things of dx^aa and those of actual world, 
(or, in the words of Price, between normal and alxiormal sense-
datuii- 'His point is that if on the basis of their intrinsic 
character, we are unable to distinguish a nonveridical percep-
tion from the veridical one and if we admit that in the cases 
of noiweridical perceptions we corae across only sense-data, 
then there is no ground to assert that in veridical cases 
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we know the raate2rlal thing it self, This argument is known as 
"argument from dlfferraitial oertainty". 
Another argument developed by H.H, Price and reiterated 
by Ayer is based upon the fact that veridical perception of 
an object and nonveridical of the same fonas a continuous 
series I no leap stands between the two. ^ e point can well 
be illustrated by taking an example. Supposing we stand at a 
two yard distance from a cricket ball and the ball is appearing 
in its normal shape l.e.t it is lokklng bulgy. Now we start 
moving backward slowly but looking incessently on the ball. 
After c3ov«ring a certain di8tance» say a twenty yards off 
from the object, we find the appearance of the ball changed 
i.e. it now loolES flattened. In other vtoi*s, wo can say that 
a norrasl aanse-datura is replaced by an abnormal one. "There 
is all the difference**, says Price, "in the world of these two 
sense^data, if the th«ory (naive-realistic) is correct. The 
first is a physical entity v^ich continues to exist whether 
my body is present or not, the second is a mere cerebral 
produdT. "We should have", he oontlnuea, " a jerk or a flicker 
as the one is replaced by other. Bat in point of fact we 
find nothing of the sort. There la a soisibly continuous 
transition from the bright bulgy patch soised from two yards 
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off to the faint, small flat one sensed from twenty yards offt 
wlt}K>ut any br<yak at all, l4oreover, if the last nonaal memher 
of the series be taken (and according to the theory there must 
be a last one)» then It will be possible to find an abnormal 
member which differs from It as little as you please. In SIE©, 
colour and bulginess. Now it seesas most extraordinary that so 
radical a replaceaaent should be Ixrou^t about 1^ an Infinite-
slmal backward moTement of the olMierverB* body". 
The thesis that our knowledge of the external thln^ is 
always mediated by something other than what It is per sq. is 
supported by a number of considerations derived from physios, 
physiology and psychology. We have already seen that physios 
which is generally supposed to be on the aide of coixaonsense, 
is,lnfsottT!io3t pemlcioua to it; it rather puts oommonsense 
in a total peril. Tb repeat one example, it tells us that the 
material objects Which we regard as solid, extended and 
enduring aitities, are, in reality, composed of invisible atorat 
and these atoms themselves are reducible into subparticles 
like electrons, protons and neutrons, (Quanta physios goes 
still further. It deo^ Lares that these electrons and protons 
are reducible into what may be called the *energy-units' whlok 
are more or less unlniaginable anA inconceivable for our plain 
thinking. As a natter of fact, physics chall«nges all what 
we take for granted and its claims are most repugnant to 
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oosiEtionsenaQ, 
The neuTO-physiology along with physios t e l l s us that 
an act of sense-experience Involves a la ther very complicated 
process} a \*K)le nexus or concatenation of events occur In 
timet s tar t ing from event in the object perceived and 
terminating in the cerebral cortex of the subject 's brain* 
Per examplet when a person sees a circular object, "light waves 
in t he i r grouping maintain a circular relat ionship, t ravel from 
the object to the eyes of observer. On a ciaxsular area on 
each of his two retina disturbances are set up which excite 
nervous Impulses which travel through his optic nerves t rac t s 
and radiate the visual areas of cerebral cortex. Only wh<BX 
the nervous impulses reach the cortex does the obseirver see 
Q 
the circle*. The Point la that throu^^ this complicated 
process, it is quite imprr>bable for an object to be perceived 
in its •pristine purity*. Physiology, moreover, tells that 
our eyes are so made that almost all of us are red blind; the 
result is that all red colours appear much less daijcer than 
they really are. Again we are said that the middle of the 
retina just around the central pit is yellow* This makes all 
blue light appear somewhat daiker in the centre of the field 
of sight. 
What is nwBt striking to note is that for a neuro-physi 
legist, it is not at all necessary that in a case of percepti 
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an object should be there to be perceived, "Ihe only 
Indepimdently necessary conditions for the awareness of s^ siae-
data •••• is thus an evraitin the cerebral cortex". 
The cortical neurones are nomally excited in the way just 
described, but if they should exceptionally be excited in some 
other way — - « for example by electrical stimulations or by 
an epileptic discharge — — the appropriate sense-data would 
still be experiaiced", 15ie gmeral conclusion that a neuro-
physiologist derives frora his investigations is that the sense-
data are really "located" either in the oarebral cortex, or in 
the luind of observer (in other words they are not a part and 
parcel of and related in some extraordinary way with the 
object), "'Hie colour is 'really* in lay brain, but I'project* 
12 
it in some way on to the table." 
From above, it is fiairly clear that the moment the 
phenomena of illusions, hallucinations etc. together with 
other physical, phfeiolo^oal and psychological considerations 
are taken care of, the naive-roalistio assumptions about 
the knowledge of exteinal world become entirely implausible. 
The theory that results out of these considerations is known 
as •Bpistemologioal 1>uali8m* which, as the term itself sugges 
stands for a duality between the objects directly known and 
those known only indirectly. The objects we are directly 
conscious of, are sensible qualities like colour, sound smell 
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e t o . , and the th ings alx>ut which our knowledge i s i nd i r ec t 
a re e n t i t l e s t ha t subs i s t o r bear theia. For example when we 
claim to know a t a b l e , i t i s not the t a b l e per se tha t we a re 
d i r e c t l y confronted with, but a mere senae-datuia, to wi t , a 
patch of Ixrown c»lour of such and such length and breadth which 
represents o r s ign i f i e s to a th ing we narae • fable*, 
As such t h i s dua l i s t i o theory of knowledge faces , 
priraa f ac i e , a twofold d i f f i cu l t y , F i r s t l y , i f sense-data or 
sens* aedia te between the laind and n a t e r i a l body, then what 
i s the na ture of re la t ionsh ip between the forraer and the 
l a t t » r » And secondly, i f our whole knowledge i s confined to 
sensa which obviously per ta ins to riind, then what j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
we have for our be l ie f in the existence of raaterial objects 
outs ide a indt tiae general tendency i s to r e jec t the bel ief 
i n ob jec t iv i ty and Independence of things and for t h a t raatter 
to confine knowledge simply to the sensa or sense-data which 
i s the possession of mind. But again i f the sensa a re 
exclusively our own pr iva te possessions, nmer object ive and 
publ ic , then the question i s wherefrora these data ccae to 
our mindt Here the paradoxical na ture of the problem of 
pwroeption becomes apparent , A host of theor ies have been 
forged to solve these problems only occasionaly tenable in 
the face of counter arguments. 
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I t 18 ol«ar fpora above t h a t the be l ie f In an external 
woild oonaist lng of subs tan t i a l a a t a r i a l ob jec t s , i s l og i ca l l y 
inc red ib le • Our mind i s presented vdth b i t s of experiences 
and t h i s i s a l l what we nay claim to know to e x i s t . But what 
about the mind i t s e l f which i s supposed to be aware of s«nB»-
data? Do we perceive i t as something subs tan t i a l which inheres 
d i f fe ren t data? Obviously, no t . The be l ie f i n mind as a 
permanent and p e r s i s t i n g substance i s a s incred ib le as incredible 
i s the be l i e f i n subs tan t ia l ohjrsical t h ings . Both are equally 
inexperienced and therefore non-exis ten t . But i f both mind 
and matter a re non-exititent what i s l e f t to u s . Obviously, we 
a re l e f t only with the raomoitary data which occur to us in 
successive moments. To be sure , no two data can be i n t e r r e l a t e d . 
At one moment only one datum occur and any bel ief i n the datum 
of preceding moment or tha t of moment to come would imderly 
the assumption of a p e r s i s t i n g mind which i s untenable . Ilius 
our whole cosmos, a t a given moment, i s confined only to the 
datura t ha t occur to me a t t ha t moment and nothin*^ beyond. 
H i s to r i c a l l y , t h i s a o l i p s i s t i c conclusion, as i t i s ca l led , 
was f i r s t drawn by B r i t i s h philosopher David Hume who followed 
Locke and Bexiceley, Locke was the tlTBt philosopher who b r o u ^ t 
t he epistenwlogy in general and problem of perception in 
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particular into the front rank of philosophical disouaaions 
(and hence rightly, is regarded as the father of nodem empl-
riolsm). He contended the dominant C&rtesian theory of 
knowledge which admitted the possibility of a T^ ariorl or innate 
knowledge* His contention, on the other hand, was that all 
knowledge io a twateriorl i.e., it is derived from exiperiiaice 
(internal and external). Ite extAmal experience he gives tha 
name 'sensation* and internal experience is called by him 
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•reflection'. 
As is well known, Locke conceived mind as a white paper 
or tabula yasa upon which the ideas coming from outside are 
imprinted. The objects df external world are represented by 
the ideas of sensible qualities like yellow, white, hot,cold, 
soft etc, which come through appropriate sense-organs to the 
mind which thereby becomes aware of them. This source of 
knowldege Loc^e calls 'sensation*. 
The ideas thus fuzTiished to the mind are perceived and 
reflected upon by mind within itself. Mind's reflection of 
its own operations is such that it produces another set of 
ideas which could not be had from without. Theae operations 
are perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, 
knowing, willing and like. This source of ideas, Locke 
proposes to call 'internal-sense' or 'reflection'. 
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Locke in hlB discussion on the nature of ideas, pre-
Bupposes the existence of things outthere to produce these 
ideas. He distinguishes the ideas from qualities. Ideas 
according to him belong to mind while the qualities pertain to 
material bodies. Ideas, liioreover, are not the iraaf;es of what 
the things possess; they are in the mind and for that reason 
independent to the bodies while the qualities oeaae to exist 
if there is no body to subsist them. 
Qualities arc also of two types. There are qualities 
called primary or real, \diich are utterly inseparable from the 
body. They sustain themselves out of All the forces used 
upon them. A grain of wheat having a particular bulk, size and 
figure can be divided infinitely and yet it will retain its 
original qualities in one v®y or the other. Besides priraaryi 
there is another set of cfualitles, secondary qualities, 
"Which, in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but 
powez^ to produce various sensations in us by primary qualities 
i.e., t^ the bulk, figure, texture and raotlon of their 
14 insensible parts". Colourfp, sounds, tastes etc. are ejsmples 
of these secondary qualities. 
These two types of qualities produce their ideas in 
their own way in the mind. But since secondary qualities 
are not "reaHy" there in the body, their ideas do not 
resemble to them in any way, while ideas of primary qualities 
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do res^raMe to then as they '*3?eally'* are in the 1»dy, This 
observation leads Iiooke to mke a oontradlstlaotlon betweoi 
the primary and secondary qualitios In point of the i r ess«i t ia l 
character. He says tlmt while the feraer i s a part of the body 
independwit of mind, the la t ter» for I t a existazuse, depends 
ux^ on i t s holng perodTod or senaed by some seE^a* Flaae 
p m ^ o e s the ideas of l i ^ t and hotn«S8« 8now» of whit^iuias and 
onldnesa and I t la fsenerally noppoaad tlmt th»«a anat hacira 
t h a i r counterparta in the i r raapeotlYa hodiaa that eauaa thara. 
But the r ^ l i t y , acoordins to Lofdce la aoaavhat otherwiaet tha 
secondary qual i t iaa, in sharp contrast with real or primary 
ones, are <pite sep ra te from the body. The argument he 
adduces to prove th i s i s that i f quali t ies l ike 'white* and •cold» 
were in the body i »• say, in snow, then the sane enow c^uld 
never have piodueed two different Ideaa of pain when touched 
15 the surface m^d of cold when tend la kept a t some dlataxiBa. 
Locjke was too prejudiced in his belief int tha independant 
existence of material bodies to see the logical flaw inherent 
in his thoujs^t. True i t i s , that quali t ies l ike colour, sound 
etc* can not exist unless they are sensed Is^ some aenaa* But 
what about the priiaary quall t iaat Can't the saae l ine of 
arfiiumraat be ext^aded further to cover the l a t t e r as well« A 
jaundiced person aees everything yellow, a man with blue 
apectalas on his eyes sees t h i n ^ blue and so on. Therefore, 
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It Is concluded that the qualities of colour cannot be in the 
thing itself. But isn't the case that prirmxy qualities too 
behave in the same mannei^ Things look big wh«a we are near 
to them and small when we are far off, A drug addie ted person 
treats small objects as if they are of enonaoua siae. These 
facts are sufficieit enou{]^ to juxtapose the primary qualities 
with secondary onesi there is ao logical conta?adiction in 
supposing that qualities like shape* siae and figure ef things 
are as dependent on perceiving minds as the colour, sound 
taste etc* are. 
This line of argwaeat was developed by Bez^eley who 
followed Io6ke» Beikeley declared that seoondai^/ as well as 
primary qualities are dependent upon mind and are, therefore, 
mentel. Existence of anything is dependent upon its being 
experienced. Nothing can be said to be existing which is not 
experienced or which it is inpossible to experience, Berkeley's 
famous dictum esse est percipi stood for the reduction of 
existence of things into their experiences and to make the two 
teznas synonimous. The doctrine he developed is called 
•subjective idealism', 
ileiiceley's Bain argument moved around the analysis of 
the teiras like sensible things, sensibles or ideas, A 
sensible thing is obHiously what is sensed by some sense. Idlings 
that are knownmediately or not without the interventions of 
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others cannot be included in oenaiblea, "In reading a book", 
aays Philonoua in one of the Dialogues, "What I ianiediately 
perceive are the l e t t e r f ,bttt mediately or l?y means of these are 
su^es ted to ray mind the notions of Ood, Virtua, Truth e t c . " , 
"Now tho l e t t e r s are truely sensible thinjEss or perceived by 
sense, there i s no doubt; but I would know", he askea to Hylas, 
"whether you take the ttiinits suggested by theia to be so too". 
"No, certainly", replies Hylas, " i t were absurd to think God 
or Virtue sensible things, though they may be simplified and 
suggested to the mind lay sa is ih ie laarks with which they have 
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an arMtrary connections". 
Now if the things inferred are not included in the 
things iiraediately perceived, then, obivously em>u^, fornier 
will fall short of certitude the latter entertain ; even the 
possibility of their being objects of knowledge is considerably 
diminished. We see one part of sky red atid another blfm , but 
we do not see the sky Itself which supposedly inheres these 
colours and similarly we hear a variety of sounds but do not 
hear the causes of these sounds and so on and so forth. The 
case with primary qualities too is no better, sltice they are 
as dep<mdent upon senses (i.e., are sensible) as the secondary 
qualities are. The argument that we must distinguish between 
the SQiaation and the object of which it is sensation, is of 
little help here. IPor if we admit that sensible things are 
what are given to the senses, or in other words, if they are 
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posaeosions of thlnklngjaiiid, then to aay they" should exist In 
an unthinking, or exterior to all lainds, is in: itself an evident 
contradiction". « 17 
3ut a ren ' t there a great many things in the world un-
peroeived or unable to be perceived about whicflu we are certain 
that they exist? Can we aay that the chair before ne will 
cease to exist i f we shut our eyes or turn back from i t , 
Bezkeley was certainly unwilling to reject th i s obvious fact , 
f^  the other Hide, h is own thoughts pressed hin to disbelieve 
in the exlst^ioe of unperoolved things. This v^s the paradoxi-
cal s i tuat ion for Bericeley to f&ee t o . Butt God (th isiost helper) 
came a t his rescue. God, the oisnl«-present mind peroeiveB 
and thus laakea sure the existence of the things that are 
unaooeseed or inaccessible to human lainds. Bat for one who i s 
not faithful enougti, as 3ezkeley was, in assuming God as 
guaranteer of existence of unpercelved, the si tuation i s 
ra ther very odd. Iloreover, l ^ z k e l ^ was, to be sure inconsistent 
in supposing the existence of perceiving minds oth*xp than his 
own. For they are as out of the drcumfrence of immediate 
knowledge, in^erwid, as the socalled material substances a re . 
And worst, for th i s reason, was h is postulation of God , an 
all-perceiving mind. 
i3ut the trouble d o ^ not mid here^ Our assertion about 
out own mind as subsisting the ideas we receive from outside 
can well be called in question. For we never come across I t i 
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I t I s never presented to us as th« senslbles a re , and If so, 
the vrtiole possibi l i ty of knowledge comes to an end. Our 
beliefs in the eadstence of God, worldly things and ©von of our 
own alnds i s l l legitliaate* We are eorapelled to plunge in"te 
ooraplete skeptloisra and solipsism. 
Historical ly, t h i s position I s ascribed to Hume who 
followed Berkeley and, as i s generally said, carried the 
eopiriolsia to i t s logical conclusion* 
Hume too, along with h is predecessors believed in 
senslbles as objects of direct knowledge a lbe i t he called '^ lem 
Impressions besides ideas. "All the perceptions of huB^n mind 
resolve themselTei into two dist inct kinds which X shall ca l l 
*8ense-irapression8* and • ideas ' " , says Home in the opening of 
the second chapter of his msam OSS^* Xv^Xlm m Mam i^JUttfi-
Oup whole knowledge consists In irapreaaions and ideas vAiich 
we rf^ceive by means of sensing the s^aslKLes t h r o u ^ the swnoes 
— ' inner or outer. The difference between impresaions and 
ideas la that of quantity, not of ({uallty* The impressions 
are t>rose which toter into mind with most force and vAilence 
and include "al l our seneationa, passions and emotions**, while 
the 'ideas* are taken to m^in "the fsalnt images of these in 
thinking and reasoning". ' 
But i f merely impressions and lAmm a re a l l what we know 
then our belief in material bodies camwt be substantiated. 
19 
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We believe in them beoause we think that they are the underlying 
causes of impressions and ideas. In other words* w© think that 
ideas and iiapr^sions stand in a oausal relation to material 
things. But this relation is inexperienced. And hence the 
belief in material substances itself is question begging, But 
as we have no impression of causality and fbr that natter of 
material objects, we also do not have the impression of self 
or mind and therefore, no knowledge of it. Mind escapes our 
access in the same manner as the physical things. 
In this manner,Hume, as 3, aussell once said, "banished 
the conception of •substance' txom psychology as Bizkelay had 
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banished i t tmm physics", ^ HUao f i r s t siade us cut off from 
external universe and trapped into our own mental world and 
th®i remove* even the l a t t e r poss ibi l i ty , therery leaving us 
into complete darkness. 
But i f the logical conclusion of Sfflpiriciam was skepticism 
about physical as well as mental world, science i s also out off 
from i t s zcots, Sci^atif lc method consists in explaining the 
oocurraiee of an event in terms of the preceding event of v^ich 
i t i s supposed to be an effect, TJtla underlies the assumption 
that a oause->event i s linked with i t s effect ev^it in the 
re la t ion of necessary raitailraent, But according to "fume no 
such linking i s possible, Ihe feeling of pain nnd the experience 
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of being prieked by needle are two altogether different and 
independent events and no logical connection can be sought 
between the tvo« It is true that, as we reraeaber, the expezw 
ienoe of being pri6ked by the neddle is alv^^ys in the past 
followed by the pain. But firstly,the reoollection itself is 
of inferred and ther«fo3Pe, precarious nature. *nd secondly, 
from the fact that two events are associated in pe^t, it does 
not logically follow that in future also they will be aaaooiated. 
Science, infect, bases itself upon the inductive method 
in which one generalises a conclusion which is drawn from a 
liiBited set of observed phenomena. It is thexvforv, logically 
incredible. 
Huae auiamarised his conclusions in followizig wordst 
"My intention then.*... is only to wke reader 
sensible of the truth of ray hypothesis that all our 
reasonings concerning causes and effects, are derived 
tron nothing bat ouatomi and that belief is sior* pro* 
perly an act of sensitive than eo^idtive part of our 
natures. I have proved tlAt the vex^ saae principles 
which aake us fozm a decision upon any subject and 
correct the decision by Hhm consideration of our genious 
OP capacity.....when cariled ffcurther and applied to 
every new reflex judgnmit, oust by continually dlntini-
shing the original evidence, atlast reduce it to 
nothing and uttexly subvert all belief and opinion. 
If belief, therefore, were a simple act of though, 
without any peculiar manner of conception, or the 
addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly 
deatioy itself and in veiry case t«pralnate in a total 
suspense of judgment* "21 
^23'' 
Soaa Atfnptad Soltttlons 
The denial of oauaallty and induotlon» thus not only 
shakened the foundation of solentiflo knowledge ^ t of knowled^ 
as such. At this juncture a jMloeoidiy which could reconstruct 
the bases of knowledge beoams the need of hour* The philosopher 
who attempted this task was Iioaanuel ICant of Gertaany who, In 
his own words was awaken from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume. 
Kant*s reconstruction consisted In synthesis jug rationa-
lism with ttaplrlelsm and developing a metaphysics on the basis 
of what we call our moral sense. He agreed with aaplrlclst's 
contention that what we can know of things are merely their 
apparent fonssi their real nature remains hidden behind these 
appearances. But the apparatus through which we perceive 
them are such that the order in which things are armnged 
is genuinely revealed to us. This apparatus comprises space, 
time and different logical categories such as quantity, quality, 
relation etc. Just as a person wearing Mue spectacles sees 
everything blue in the same way, our all knowledge is determined 
by our subjective constitution. And precisely for this reason 
we can be sure that all of our experiaioes are universally true. 
Aside from this, we all possess a nioral sense i.e. we all 
believe that there are certain moral laws which are universally 
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true and -valid e.g. "truth speaking is good", "stealing is 
bad" etc. Now the presence of these moral laws demands justice 
which la that a person should toe given happiness or torment 
proportionate to his virtue or vice. It is clear that only 
Providence can ensure this justice. It is also clear that 
justice, in most of cases, is not affected in this life. There 
should, therefore, toe another life after death in this world. 
Besides, Grod must have also endowed man with freedom of will 
since otherwise there would be no ouch things as virtuous or 
wicked action, God, freedom of will and future life are, thus, 
three toasic assumptions or postulates that are needed in explain-
ing the moral phenomena. 
The first kind of argument pertained to v^at liant called 
•pure reason* and the second, to what he said: 'practical reason!• 
But, as Bussell at one place said, the pure reason was reason 
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and the practical reason was prejudice. The latter was iraplau-
aitole on its face value and the former was found bristled with 
some insurmountable difficulties. It was for example asked that 
what makes a peroelver see things precisely in that order in 
which he sees it and not otherwise? Why, for example, we always 
see the people's eyes above their mouths and not below them? 
Kant said that eyes and nwuth cause separate percepts in us but 
the order in which they are seen belongs not to them as they are 
in themselves, but to our own subjective perceptions of them. 
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Science, on the other hand, tells that CUP different percepts, 
in their arrangement, must reflect and represent the arrange-
ment outthere in the world between things of which they are 
percepts. Tw) colour percepts, for exaaple, must correspond 
to two different %ravelength8. If Kant is ri^t, all the spatial 
and tasiporal relations in otir percepts cmst he artoitcary, not 
reflecting the real order in the oosraos. 
In a word, Kant*8 reconstructive philosophy, althougjh 
profound and sublime as it v^s, could not be treated as adequately 
satisfactory* In Germany, Kant*s successors carried the subjeot-
ivlstic elements in his philosophy to its extreme and became 
idealists* Ihe problem of the reoonstruotion of knowledge, 
from an empirical point of view, was thus thro%m into background* 
However, in Britain, in the late nlnteenthe century John Ctuart 
Mill took up this question and tried to solve it in his own way. 
We i^all discuss. Mill's philosophy of perception in some 
detail, in our chapter on Doctrine of Phenomenalism. Here, it 
suffices to point out that Mill reduced the material •things* 
into i«*flt he called the permanent possibilities of sensation". 
A physical thing, according to him, was an ass^nblaga of the 
actual •fOMtlons which a peroelver has at a given moment of 
that thing and those which he had in past and will have In future 
together with those innumerable sensations which different people 
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might have a t dlffer»^»nt times and also those which oamiot be 
experienced a t a l l . The pe rce ive r ' s knowledge of a th ing a t 
any tuomaat i s only a f ia ,^entary par t of the t o t a l aspects 
i n which i t mif^ht be sensed, 
Mill by reducing the mater ial th ing in to i t o functions 
saved h i s philosophy from i^ing untenable a t l e a s t in re^prd 
t o the mater ia l bodies, Het hovi€fver, believed in nlnd which* 
by the aarne l o g i c , could ne proved non-exis ten t . Moreover, 
he was also incons is ten t in believinf^ in the hypothet ical and 
unpercalved aoisa t ions which, he s a id , a th ing i s <sipable of 
producinfj besides ac tua l sensat ions which occur to a percelver 
a t any rjoment, 
??r9^^") 9t ¥^^^v^lm\ P\ '^m'%X9%U cen t ra 
The c r i t i c i sm of Berkeley and Huae rendered Lockian 
dualism l o g i c a l l y implausible, Stat the conclusions t h a t 
Hurae drew were hardly palatal:a.e for the philosophers of 
twent ie th century viho had a robust f&ith in sciceioe and 
scientist!!. In 1912 some American philosophers forraed a 
^roup vd.th the o'ljective to dispel the Influrmce of nec?-
''^egelian philosophy of which Josia itoyce and others wore 
advocates in t h e i r country. They produced a jo in t woaSc 
e n t i t l e d New Healiara in which they t r i e d to ju s t i fy the 
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eofiimonamise assumptions about the knowledge of vforld by 
rejecting the dualis t lc and idea l i s t i c theories , 
•JSiey were followed by another group of philosophers who 
accused the i r predecessora for being uncri t ical and naive In 
t he i r approach and developed another syateia In which they 
made — - such was the i r claim — - reallasi more consistent and 
safe by avoiding the incoherencies of naive realism. Accord-
in^ly they called themselves as ' c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t s ' and the i r 
cooperative woilc was also enti t led Bssays in Crltica;^^ iteallsn 
which was published in 1920» The viewpoint of c r i t i c a l 
r e a l i s t s was dualist lc l«e,» they believed in mediated and 
Indirect knowledge of the external world. 
The Kiain task before naive-real is ts was to reject 
dualism and Beikellyan subjective Idealsm and to affirm the 
cojnnonsfsnse, tod the c r i t i c a l r ea l i s t s aimed a t c r i t i c i s ing 
the imlve-realists and subjectlvists while establishing the 
cplateiaologloal dualism. Thus* they joint ly opposed the 
i d ^ l i s a but, at the same time, opposed each other in the i r 
respective standpoints ao to the question whether ioiowledge 
of external world i s ;nedlated and inferred or umedlated 
and direct . 
The task the naive and c r i t i ca l r ea l i s t s set before 
themselves was, In the laaln, a negative one, iiubjective 
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idealism of Bei&eley, as just said, was the main target of 
their attaick. In this, they were greatly benefitted from the 
writings of G,E. Moore, a British champion of the same cause. 
In one of his articles entitled "The Refutation of 
Idealism" which, inspite of all its ambiguous and blurring 
character, exerted a lasting impact upon his time and helped 
dispel the influences of British neo-Hegelians, he proposes 
to discuss the Berkeliyan proposition esse eat percipi as 
considering it 'essential to idealism* i,e,, such that if it 
could be shown wrong, the idealism will, ipso facto be refuted, 
Moore maintaJLns that the main argument which idealists 
adduce in order to prove their thesis is that the object is 
inseparable from the sensation of which it is an object, Bven 
if they admit the possibility of distinction, they make a 
particular case of sensation, a whole such that the part, the 
object cannot be abstracted from the whole. Blue cannot 
exist unless there is some sense to sense it, or, in other 
case, blue cannot be abstracted from sensation of blue as the 
former is a part meant by the latter, Moore rejects both of 
these arguments. If we take for example, he says, the sensa-
tion of blue and sensation of green then, it is obvious, tha 
both being nevertheless sensations, they must have some thin 
common between them; this Moore proposes to call oonsciousn« 
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Then the re l a something by v i r t ue of which one a^ryia^tlon 
d i f f e r s froia other — - t h i s i s the object of consclousneas* 
Thus we have two d i s t i n c t tena in each ease of aensatlon » 
the object and the consciousness. And the re i s every reason 
to think the former conceivable apar t fron the l a t t e r , 'fore-
over , i f we aay tha t colour , the part»cannot be abs t rac ted 
from the whole rjeant hy •emisation of colour*, we wi l l coiaaiit 
the fa l lacy of ident i fy ing the par t with whole. 
iTiere i s much to be c r i t i c i s e d l a t h i s a r t i c l e of tloore. 
But as we have not enough time a t our d isposa l , i t would 
auffice to say tha t Berkeley whose proposit ion Hoore clained 
to r e fu te , np^er ta lked of a th ing meaning substance; he 
r a t h e r ta lked about th ing having such and such q u a l i t i e s . We 
iraraedlatelyperceive aone qua l i t i e s of a thlJig not the thing 
i t s e l f and theae q t ia l i t ies oaiinot ex i s t without bein^ sensed 
o r experienced. Knowledge of the th ing i s alaffliys i n f e r e n t i a l 
find t h i s inference can well be ca l l ed in quest ion, Moore 
could not r e a l i s e t h i s d i s t i nc t i on and allowed hln to be led 
a s t r a y , 
Perry , one of the preeralncnt neo - roa l i a t s t r i e d to 
refute idea l sii by pointing to what he ca l led "the fa l lacy 
of ar/i!uraent from ego-centr ic predicament•*, Perry saya tha t 
the fact tha t we generally a s s e r t only those things which a r e 
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or can be experienced i s far frog aufficiant to establish the 
Idea l i s t s •contention. Unless we do not p3rovc that the things 
un-experlenoed are non-existent (which ia impossible) the 
argument G&n do nothing. Mother fellacy of auajectiviata 
according to r e a l i s t s , oonaiste in the i r auppoaitloa that 
since sensuia i s what i s given tc sstises i t i s exclusive poss-
ession of them and i t cannot exiat independently, although 
there I s every possihll i ty that a thin/? i s related to the laind 
and at the sarae t i ae exists independently in the external 
world. Iloreovert say r e a l i s t s , idea l i s t s are ri^iht in the i r 
preraiBB that a l l things perceived to exis t , e:;ist, but they 
are wrong in concluding from th i s that only perceived things 
can exis t . All that can be concluded i s that thinga perceived 
to exist are existent • 
On the posit ive, naive-real is ts have hardly any thing 
important to say. In order to prove t he i r contention a >out 
independent exlst«nce of laaterial things they simply invoked 
fian's inst inct ive belief in the exteinall ty of things. And 
i t I s r t ^ l ly surprising that no philosopher except Ifolt and 
Montague attempted clearly to explain the phenomena of I l l u -
sions and hallucinations so important to the au >ject concerned,^ 
Cri t ical r ea l i s t s a^baltted i l lusions and therefore confined 
direct knowledge to the appearances. But as re^^rds the 
belief in independent existence of physical things, they too 
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took recourse to aooalled 'animal fa i th* . 
The aoi i l s t lc and d u a l l s t l c tendencies of twent ie th 
century American thou/jht found an echo in the contemporaneous 
B r i t i s h philoso hy, although in a raore mature, sophis t ica ted 
and consis tent forra» Several iconoclasts eHierf^ ed in order 
to conilmt the i d e a l i s t i c philosophiea of t h e i r teachers "whom 
they respected raosf*, 6 . S , Moore championed the cause of 
comonaenae. He t h o u ^ t he can prove the existence of e r t e r -
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na l th ings simply by holding h i s hands. In a perceptual 
experience, aocordin/^ to hi^j, what we d i r e c t l y oorae across 
13 the upper surface of the th ing , the sense datuTi, which 
i s r e l a t ed to i t . But in r e ^ r d to the question t h a t In 
.hat manner the two were r e l a t e d , Iloore was ad ' i i t ted ly unclear 
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and "extrenely puzzled about". 
Besides Bertrand Hussell whose philosophy we have to 
discuss in present undertaking, the re was a lso A,J, Ayer, 
another empirical en thus ias t , who accept cl the theory of 
aense-data givin^^ h i s own colour t o i t . He refused to 
acknowled(je the s^ise-datu'n as a na tura l e n t i t y aa iloore, 
I ^ s s e l l mid o thers did; he ra ther declard t ha t i t s use i s 
merely a t rot ter of l in;T^lst io expediency. We, inratead of 
us ing the rath^^'r len/^thy and cumbursorae expression, "Ve aoe 
the upper onrfac^ of the object o r a par t thereof", may say 
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simply t h a t we see a sonae-datum, l>ome other sense-data 
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philoaophera of ropute were C,I). Broad and H.H, Pr ice who 
advocated the same d u a l i a t l c theory of knowled-Te In one way 
o r t h e r . 
Development of i^sse l l*o Ideas Conoexnlng 
Ons th ing tha t I s qui te c l ea r from the forej'5olng d i s -
cussion i s t h a t the tw^ i t l e th century philosophers of percep-
t i o n were, speaking* genera l ly , not aware of t h e i r protolera In 
a l l I t s depth and complexity. They do not aeera to be ftilly 
sr^nsitive to the Huraean chall«stige to knowledge in a l l I t s 
f ine d e t a i l s and de l i cac ies and the neM to resolve i t , %ey 
were onan loonoclos t ic miaslon t o d ispel and distriantle the 
influence of i d e a l i s t i c philosophy which they thou;?ht to he 
outmoded and outdated. I f the n«w-real is ta opposed the repre -
sen ta t ive theory besides idealism* i t was due to t h e i r fear 
t h a t the forraer would l6i*4 t o the l a t t e r , Sirul lar ly, i f the 
c r i t l o a l r e a l i s t s opposed new-realism i t was because they 
r ea l i sed t h a t a support of comnionsense asouaptions which i s 
doomed t o be a f a i l u r e , nay render t h e i r own defense of 
real ism doubtful. I t i s t r u e t h a t they were, by and l a r g e , 
successful i n t h e i r task of refut ing IdQal lsa , ]3ut,a8 fa r as 
i t went, i t was a nec^tive aocompllshraent, The r e a l task of 
r-^constmcting knowled^'te by providin,^ i t new foundation was 
not touched upon by thea , Husael l ' s unlqtjoness among h i s 
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contemporarica l i e s In the *act t h a t he vfaa iiot only fu l ly 
oonsolous of the giaveness of the probleiji but a lso t r i e d to 
resolve i t by employing a l l hia a b i l i t i e s as an e rud i t e scholar 
and igeraxous philosopher. How ser ious ly he took t h i s problem 
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can be imagined from the fact t ha t for about f i f t y years ' he 
inccssen t ly gxapled with t h i s problem and developed, one a f t e r 
o the r ia s e r i e s of theor ies to t adc le i t . He formulated one 
theory but finding i t inadequate and miaat iafactory replaced 
i t by o ther which i t a e l f was, in tu rn , rep laced by s t i l l another, 
3u8sell*s career aa phl loaipher of perception can be 
divided in to four s t ages . In h i s f i r s t s t age , he was an 
Ingeneous dua l i s t bel ieving the peree ip t ion as a confrontation 
between mind and matte? through sense->data. His f i r s t ph i lo -
sophical woik y.m^ f^fisja ^ PhilosQBlyy (published in 1912) 
represents h i s ideas of t h i s s t age . His second stage i s tha t 
of Phenom^iallsa in which he explains perception in terras of 
mind*s encounter with what he <^l ls • s ^ i s i o i l i a* which da not 
reiaresgnt but g^fl^tJW? ^^^ physical ob jec t . This pos i t ion 
i s discussed i n h i s Oias ?fi>9,va?dg^ Q^ ^ 3 ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ H9Jl^ ond some 
a r t i c l e s writtcsn in the same year. His philosophy of t h i r d 
s tage i s represented in h i s Analysis QX ^^'^^'^ ^^ which he , 
under the influence of James* doctr ine of nou t ia l moniSTa, 
propounds a non- re la t iona l theory of percept ion. In Analysis 
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o t Hat te r and suboequent woikSf he a/sain a l t e i ^ d h i s views 
xadK^l ly and reverted to hl9 o r i ^ n a l d u a l l s t l c and oausal-
I s t l c pos i t ion although in a more refined and sophis t ica ted 
fOVIfi» 
I t raay be noticed here t ha t iJussell did not approach 
the question of knowledge - — and of philosophy i n general—-
d i r e c t l y . His e a r l i e s t foxnulation of the problem of perce-
ptual knowledge was based upon h i s l og ica l theor ies which he 
had developed in the years preceding 1910, In h i s own words, 
"I came to philosophy through laathesaatics o r r a t h e r throug^i 
the wish to find some reason to believe in the t r u t h of 
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mathematics* • • • • • •*. 
In h i s ' t h e o i y of types'which \«ia prl?Tiarily f*volv^^d to 
resolve the contradic t ion with which Hussell waa confronted 
in h i s theory of c l a s se s , he conceived a hierarchy of types 
cons is t ing of pioposi t ions of d i f ferent order such t h a t a 
proposi t ion be lon^ng to a c s r t a in type had, an i t a v a r i a b l e s , 
the proposi t ions of i t s lower order which themselves, i n t u m , 
had as t h e i r var iab les the se t of prox)03itions of t h o i r lower 
order and halongins; to lower type . The type tha t l i e d a t the 
bottoni of the hierarchy consisted of lo^jlcal •simples* o r 
' indlvlfluals* whldh were the arguments of f i r s t order proposi* 
t iorubelonging to second type . These •simples* or •individuals* 
were lof^lcal proper natnes as was shown by the* theory of 
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Description*, Aecordln^^ to t h i s t h e o r / , a lofcically leaiiln/?-
ful pitjpoaitiou oould be diatjLngulahed from the raoaatngleSB 
one, not by Beelnn: t h e i r a tn ic tu re t but hy naklng l og i aa l 
ana lys t s of thsfa* All th<? complex proposi t ions boin/5 oontinu-
a l l y analysed r e su l t u l t imate ly in to the proposi t ions which 
a re not ft ir ther analyaable» Theao 'atoado* proposi t ions have, 
a s t h e i r subjects and p red ica tes , what Ajssell ca l led l o / ^ c a l 
a inp l e s , Tliey were a l so l o s l e a l prop«?r na^nes and being ao 
nan^A only o^^jeots which were imrely e x i s t o i t , 'lut what cxiata 
in a pur" and abBolute sense i a what we a re d i r ec t l y avmre 
of i . e . the s^ i s ib l e oua l l t i e s lilce red, white, ho t , cold e t c , . 
These sens ib le q u a l i t i e s a r e ca l led by Hussell aa •sense-data" . 
The knowledge of sensible qua l i t i e s or sense-data was 
ca l led by Russell ao '^lowledge h;/ acquaintance", Knowledi^ 
of things o ther than aaiae-data v^s ca l led "knowledge by 
desertption** as th« names which stood for then were not lo/yical 
names8 they were deaoriptiong (of the from*the so-and-so* mid 
•a so-and-so*> cc ip r i s i ng , in t h e i r l a s t ana lys i s , of 10,'^cal 
names, "The knowledge of sense-data , bein/5 d i rec t and imraedla-
t e d , vKis the Tiost ce r t a in knowled^je t ha t we could posoeas. 
But the knowledfte of things other than sense-data, beini» d e r i -
ved from and dependent upon i t , was precar ious . We experience 
a cer tn in colour with cer tainshape and s ize and aay tha t i t 
ia QX ^ t a b l e . The t ao i e I t s e l f we do not see ; we in f e r i t s 
exis tence fron the experience of a c e r t a i n patch of colour . 
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Thus, being Ineacperlenoed, our be l ief In i t reoains question 
begging, 
'Phe existence of physical th ings a l thou;^ not experien-
olble» must never theless be admitted because otherwise we 
Vould be unable to explain our i n s t i n c t i v e and spontaneous 
f&lth in t f» th ings as p e r s i s t e n t and peraanent subataiices, 
We see a t a b l e and we do not see a table* We say the t ab l e 
e x i s t s when we sec i t hut we do not say tha t i t ceases to 
ex i s t when we shut our eyes and reappears WhfiHi we oofm them. 
Things must remain there whether o r not we see thera, Ofoourse, 
we do not aeo t he t ab l e when our eyes are shut but we believe 
tha t i t i s o r may be seen by ojrae o ther person o r pei^ons. 
Thus, ay personal experiencing and not experleneing of a th ing 
does not fjiake i t accordingly exla tent and non-exi3tent . One 
may* ofcourse, argue tha t our knowledge of otht?r'8 ralnds and 
t h e i r experiences i s as inferred as the knowledf^e of th ing 
I t s e l f and I s therefore as nuch in need of e x p e r l e n d a l 
oonflrfaation as I s the former, dussel l does not d«iy the 
force of t h i s object ion. But he says t ha t I f a i ^ e d t h i s way 
we can never be ab]p to es tab l i sh an Independent external 
world about which we have a sor t of i n s t i n c t i v e bel ief , 
Sense^data comprise not only sensible gua l i t i e s j they 
include the nemory objects unlversa ls and a l so possibly our 
bare selves or n lnds . For, i n memory, although the event 
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recollected occurred In the past* yet we are directly auar« 
of It, Similarly when I say I see an objectt It not merely 
see the object, taut I know that I see the oijeot, Thia 
l!!iplies that in perceiving anytlng we come across two thingsi 
one, our self and the other,the object of perception. As 
regards unlv^^rsals. It is clear, that we claim to know a 
proposition dlr^ c^tly and every proposition contains atleast 
one tena which is concept oX* universal. 
Hussell, like other realists, haoed the knowledge of 
material things on •animal instinct'. But this was by no 
means a satisfactory solution. There waa created by it a 
gulf botwe€Bi the world of physics smd the world of experience, 
Bassell thougjit it irapeiative to bridge this gulf. He thought 
that if he could abondonthe notion of inexperienotble material 
substances by replacing it by its functional substitutes 
which nay he purely experiential and have the same properties 
of objectivity and poaslbly of peanaanenc© too, then the puaale 
can be resolved and rcnoved. This he did by evolving hia 
notion of •sraislbllia*' which oonprised a person's experience 
of a ,<5rlven thing at a given moment plus those which althoui^ 
he is not experiencing presently, could experieaioe in suitable 
clrcumstunoos. An asoemblage of all the data which a thing 
was capable of presenting to a peroeiver constituted the 
physical thing. There ig^ iot a physical thing independently 
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existing and causing the data» but the aoislble qual i t ies , 
both actual and hypothetical, themselTes constituted the thing. 
Perception consiats in the mind'a coming? in relat ion 
of saiae-data and the physical world can be constr«JCted by 
raaking groups having similar sensibi l ia , Husaell makes i t 
clear that his saying that sense-data are related to niind does 
not imply that thay are mental. He points out the fallacy 
which underlied the I^dke's and Berkeley's t reat ing of id«as 
aa mental. He says that they could not distinguish the act 
of sensation f!ro?a the object of i t . when we penroeive a thing, 
our perceiving i . e . the act i s one thing and what we perceive 
i , o , the object i s another thing, l^e fact that senaa are 
something presented to or giv«i to sense proves beyond doubt 
that they are d is t inc t , 'i^us, the asaini lat ion of act of 
sensation which i s mental and tho object of sensation which 
i s phyaloal i s fallacious and Id^illsm was therefore a fl^se 
doctrine being a victim of th i s f&llacy. 
But there vma one diff icul ty . How could we just ly claim 
to know the aensa which we are not perc;^iving nt a given 
'loraentt I s not the inference of inexperienced sensa frora the 
experienced oncfc aa question ocji^lni^ aa the inference from 
i t of physical things? ^ s s e l l f^cea the question squairly. 
He ffeiirly admits that in a s t r i c t lo/^cal sense, the inference 
i s quite i l legi t i iaate . But theire are grounds to believe that 
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our knowledge of thinga txanscGnda and cannot be confined 
to OUT "preseatit experleiKse? To t h i s Eiuascll a l so adda tha t 
the Inff^r^nco of sens lb l l a fro?!i the s^iseCd'J-data and tha t of 
physical subatanoe frora I t cannot be juxtaposed, Becnuae a 
hypothet ical seneura i s qui te s imi la r In I t s na ture and 3t3!T i^Gture 
with the ac tua l aenaum while the qua l i t i e s and c^iaracter is t ics 
of raaterial substances ar© r ad i ca l l y d i f f e ren t . 
Already in h i s yroblema ot Phlloaoohy. Huasell \«a3 
hesiteait In t r e a t i n g the imowled^e of se l f a s the kno^^ledge by 
acquaintance. At t h i s s tage he completely r e j e c t s and ru les 
out t h i s po33li>illty, »>^t we. In our Inward r e f l ec t ion come 
across are b i t s of thou{jhts, not the bare s e l f which i s sa id 
t o be sul^lstlnf; then . The knowledge of our bare selves I s , 
t he re fo re , l i k e the knowledge of mater ia l substance, knowledge 
t h r o u ^ descr l i ' t lona, 3ut i f so, v*iy to r e t a i n be l ie f In i t v 
Can I t not be laade amenable to ^me t r ^ t i a o n t which we e a r l i e r 
meted to thlngsY Can we not reduce I t too to the b i t s of 
experiences which i t was thou^sht to subsia t? Can we not explain 
as . l l l l a i i Jamea did , the knowledge purely In teisaa of experiences 
without rmktm^, any reference to mind or matter? James* theory 
of neu t r a l laonlsn which laade knowledge aa cons is t ing in 
extMsrlence's comlnf^  In r e l a t i o n to each other r a the r than as 
caused by some mater ial thin/^ and perceived liy a mind, was. In 
many re spec t s , qui te lurin^j to iitussell, i l r s t l y because I t 
conformed to h i s maxim of Ocean's raaor w?iich stood for the 
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reduction of inferred e n t i t i e s and secondly because i t s e ^ e d 
to be in keeping; with the r e su l t a of new theor ies in jhyiiics 
and psychology. 
These plus pointa a p a r t , Hussell s t i l l refused to 
bel ieve i n i t , thanicB to h i s o^oeeaaion with the r e l a t i o n a l 
na ture of experience. Mind ia an indispenaasile tertn i n 
explaining any case of experience. IMa i a shown 1^ the fac t 
t>^t an experience occurring to me l a niy pr iva te possession. 
The sarae object may be experienced by another perceiver but 
my expert«*noe of the object ommot «titer in to h i s mind, Kven 
I f the perception ia explained the phenomena of mOTiory, the 
thouffhts of non«terapoTQl ob jec t s , raathejnatical t r u t h s , ?md more 
important ly, the ' b e l i e f s ' could not be explained without taking; 
recourse to rfitnd. In a l l such cases we know something a l thou/^ 
no presenta t ion of any kind i s involved, 3i?nilarly the re i s 
the conaidersation of what Busseell c a l l s "emphatic l a r t i c u l a r s " 
vlss, 'now', ' t h i s ' , "Phis ' which i s the immediate object of 
ay present experience i s so intlra^tely and immediately r e l a t ed 
to me tha t I cannot but t r e a t i t as my object of consciousness. 
On these grounds, Bussell re jec ted the neu t ra l jnonistic 
theory of knowledge as inc red ib le . But gradually he ^ave vent 
t o i t , becorainc susoicious of the force of object ions he made 
against I t , He disposed off h i s object ion derived from 
•en^hatlc p a r t i c u l a r s ' , not by (^vinr, any spec i f ic ^tround but 
by merely sayint^t t ha t i t i s too abs t r ac t to a t t e s t the t r u t h 
o r otherwise of any thoe iy . The privacy of be l i e f s and other 
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l i k e n « i t a l phenomena were explained lay takiri,:; reGoxxrae 
t o phystologloal psychology I . e . by aayin?; t h a t they a re 
p r iva te only In the sense tha t they were connected to the 
pe rce lve r ' s phyoioio^^oal orjfsanlsm. 
Once these object ions rersoved Hsussell became a ftillfled-^e 
n-^nityal *aonlst, •"'ollowim^ James, he declared the sensat ions 
t o he the sole mater ia l s which construct the universe , tiensa-
t l ons have a twofold loca t ion —— i n one aspect they raay toe 
sa id to belon/T to what Bussell ca l l s* biography* and in o ther 
they a r e the meiahera of group which c o n s t i t u t e a t h ing , iiensa-
t i o n s in the context of biography a re altmya accompanied by soiae 
fanealc phenoraena which they th^aaelvea produce. I t l a the 
corapresenoe of s a i s a t i o n and i t s mental asisoelate t h a t c o n s t i -
t u t e a case of percept ion. A sensation of red patch with 
c e r t a i n shape c f c r - ' o -j- biography and I t becomes associated 
with ray past experi<»ices of the same and I say that I am seeing'; 
a t a b l e . 
This was e s sen t i a l l y a non- re la t iona l theory in the 
sense tha t i t did not ex:>lain the perception aa the objects* 
Qominn: i n r e l a t i o n to some mind. But Jn3Sf»ll*s co i i l t tment 
t o t h i s theory proved temporary, ^tn r e l a t i o n a l and c a u s a l l s -
t l c blaa r©a;)serted I t s e l f and when he wrote h i s truilvsis of 
m t t e r . he was no nore a neu t ra l monist in h i s epistemolOiiy 
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Mlthmuth metaphysically he roraalned believiiif^ in the n e u t r a l i t y 
of world atuff . He f e l t t ha t in the l i g h t of t h i s thoory we 
coTild not r e t a i n our be l ie f in the oausal l a *s of sciesice. The 
eff icacy of causal laws den^nded t h a t there must be an ac tua l 
cause to produce an e f f ec t . But according; to the non- re la t iona l 
theory of neu t ra l aonia??!, the re rai/^ht be occasions when we would 
be f a i r l y ab le t o explain a causal ac t ion \«rithout the re beinrr 
a cause, An object nay be 3l?iult?meously perceived by a hufiKm 
observer and a camera auch tha t the observer i s not Beein/j the 
caaiera. Later he 'aay cotapare h i s own perceptions to the p l^ to -
^rapha taken by the camera. He finds then to be c lose ly re3eral>. 
l i n g . Now hA wo'Jld n a t u r a l l y i n f e r t ha t t h e i r did exis t a 
not 
caraera photographing the object which he hirasolf was/pei^ceivirv?. 
But according to non- re la t iona l theory the caiaera bein/^ inexpe-
rienced by the perceiver a t the moment i t was taking photo/^raphs 
did not ex i s t or at, 'K?a-l, i t existed only i dea l l y or hypothet i -
ca l l y . But since there i s a palpable difference in the pla te 
before and a f t e r the experience of object in quest ion, i t laust 
be aupposed tha t i t a c tua l l y exis ted t h e r e . 
On t h i s ground and others l i k e i t Husaell r^^jected the 
non-r-i lat ional theory of perception propounded by neutral-raonist! 
He came to believe in a oausal theory of knowledge which adraittei 
t h ree tenas in any case of perception. He a/iain case to believe 
i n ex terna l physical thixif^ which cause inpreaaion:a to the 
physiological or/rrmisii of a person and these impressions a re 
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corjveyed through af ferent nervea to the b ra in . The occurrences 
In the brain era ca l led the expertenoljv^ of those thini^s. The 
th ree terras of knowlecl^e were a l l ae taphyalcal ly of the same 
s tuf f . In fec t , Hussell , a t th la stage* propounds hlo event-
ontology which he had developed in the l i g h t of -^lanta pTiy^ica 
and theory of He la t iv i ty , 
He said t h a t our world l a very ftall of ' e v a n t a ' . There 
a r e se ta of events grouped i n an order ly way on the loasis of 
a in i i l a r i ty of s t r u c t u r e s . That i s to say a ce r t a in number of 
events which a r« airai lar or sea i -a l ra t la r s t r u c t u r a l l y a r« 
ordered about a cen t r e , A human ox^anism or a camera or a 
dictaphone which themselves are co l l ec t ions of ervents come i n 
contact of a c e r t a in group. There s t a r t s then a process from 
the group of events outs ide the perceplfflit 's body t h a t reaches 
( fo r exaiaple) the eyes of the perceiver . There i t a l t e r s i t s 
charac te r and through af ferent nerves i t reaches to brain a^^in 
chan^n^j i t s charac te r . The event occurred in the brain wi l l 
be the 'seeln?? of tha t object* which accompanied by i t *a mneaic 
a s soc ia t e s would cons t i t u t e the *perceivini^ of t h a t object*. 
There i s no mind and there i s no raatter. There are only events 
qui te neu t ra l raetai^hysicallyt which when outside the human 
oi^anism are subject matter of phj^ics and when ins ide i t a re 
s tudied 1:^  physiology and paycholoi^y. Thus we see that al thou 'h 
Husaell remained metaphysically a neu t ra l taonist, episteniolojjrfL-
c a l l y he re jec ted the non- re la t iona l theory which was aaaoclate^ 
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with neutral monism in James* philosophy and in ausse l l ' s own 
philosophy in hie Analysis qf Mind. 
Some Basic Peatares of liuasell's Philosoiahy of X'eroeDtion 
Although, as i s evident fpoa above, iluasell 's ideas 
concerning problem of perception underuHat constant chiJi^e and 
modifications, there were certain ideas to which liussell clung 
t i l l the l a s t of his philosophical career. For one thing, he 
wan never a naive-real is t or an i dea l i s t . About naive-realism 
he said that only a l i t t l e amount of c r i t i c a l reflection 
to/?<?ther with considerations from science i s needed to show i t 
Iraplaueible, Scientific considerations are perhaps more hazar-
dous, althoui^h science s t a r t s i t s e l f with the naive-real is t ic 
assuraptions, Hussell aayei 
"We a l l s t a r t from •Vialve-pealism'' i , e , the 
doctrine that things are what they seem. We think 
that gzass i s gre^Ht that atones are hard, and that 
snow ia cold. But physics assures us that the 
greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the 
ooldnesa of snow, are not the greenness, hardness 
and ooldnesa that we know in our own experience, 
but something very different. The observer when 
he seems to himself to be observing a atone, i s 
real ly , i f physics i s to be believed, observlni?; 
the effects of stone upon hii^elf. Thus science 
seems to be at war with i tself" when i t most means 
to be objective, i t finds i t s e l f plunged into 
subjectivity af^inst I tp wi l l . Naive realism leads 
to physics, and physics, i f t rue , shows that naive 
realism i s fa lse . Therefore naive realism, i f t rue, 
i s fnlse; therefore i t i s fa l se . . . . "29 
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About Idealisra, Juaaell's opinion t i l l I9l4twa3 that 
I t was a product of faulty reoBoning on the part of ideal la ta . 
Berkeley conraitted a fallacy when he identified the act of 
a^isatlon with the object of I t , Berkeley argued that since 
an ohjeot i s known to exist only by vir tue of i t s being 
experienced by mind, therefore, i t must be m&ntBl, Sussell, 
on the other hand aaidf mind's experiencing? of the object i s 
mental no doubt, but the object I t se l f <^nnot be raental, 
because i t i s an object that we comt to know. I t i s b^ i t s 
nature external to us and therefore a proper subjeot-iaatter 
of physics. Indeed, h is prefer^mce for the noiaenclature of 
* sense-data* had behind i t the purpose of glvin,^ s t ress to 
the '/^Yen* and •presented* character of the object. 
Ti l l 1914, aasaell believed that 'alnd i s an Indispen-
sable tern in explaining the phenomena of perceptual knowledge. 
But \Aien around 1920, he came to hold the neutral nonlstlc 
theory of knowledge, the notion of mind aa substance, l ike 
that of aa t t e r , became for hlia redundant. I t was replaced by 
a logical construction out of differ«it b i t s of ser: i t lons. 
Like naive-reallaia and Idealism, iiussell, a l l thou^jh 
his philosophical career, entertained a peculiar opinion about 
sollpslsia. On the one hand he re^rded i t to be lo/rlcally 
i r refutable , Brnpirlcistlo analysis of knowledge, due to and 
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thi^ough i t s oim inner 10£»loal dynamics, leads to so l iys is r i . 
We t r y to l a s e our be l ie f In physical imd mental worlds on 
earperiencot but both a r e experlraiclally e lu s ive . Bven two 
sensat ions of successive moments cannot be affljnaed In t h e i r 
I n t e r r e l a t e d formt ^or t h i s r e l a t i o n too I s not experienced. 
Thus our whole knowledge a t a moment, i s l o g i c a l l y , confined 
to the sensat ion tha t i s occurrinfi to me a t t h a t moment. 
But on the oth*3r hand, auasel l always thought t h i s 
doctr ine as p r a c t i c a l l y '«)arren and for t h a t reason inadmissible 
Bassell \«i3 a man Who had f a i t h in sciwioe and solipsism laade 
i t out off from i t s r o o t s . His endeavour In philosophy of 
perception was thus to protec t science from the onslau/^hts 
of sol ips ism. He always soUi'^t for the grounds which can 
enable hlra to disp<wise with ao l lp s i aa . But i t vrais admittedly 
uiwssai lable l e x i c a l l y , f^ls impelled i ^ s s e l l to make oompro-
a i s e s . Indeed, as we sha l l s ee , ; i u s se l l ' s whole philosophy of 
perception i s a s tory of compromise, 
ki important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i U s s e l l ' s philosophy of 
perception i s t ha t althoufjh i t i s in the t r a d i t i o n of B r i t i sh 
empirical philosophy of which Locke, Hume and Mill were main 
r ep re sen t a t i ve s , h i s method i s quite d i f ferent from t h a t of 
t h e i r s . The method of these philosophers waa l a rge ly psycho-
l o g i c a l in t rospec t ive ; iwt , on the o ther hand, a u a s e l l ' s 
method i s loii^cal a n a l y t i c a l , Locke, i n f a c t , aa 4.J, 4yer has 
. 52 « 
sa id , "^8 I f he were en^ged in compiling a natuzol h i s to ry 
30 
of nlndj and i n t h i s he was followed both by Hume and Mi l l " . 
Locke ta lked of experience as source of a l l our i deas , ibcpe-
r ience consis ted of sensatione and r e f l ec t ions which gave the 
Ideas of yellow, so f t , hea t , b i t t e r e t c . on the one h£ind and 
of perceivinii , th inking , wi l l ing e t c , on the o the r . How a l l 
t h e s e , i f taken on t h e i r face , va lue , were simple paychclogioal 
hypotheses, '^o the extent they were t r u e they were t r i v i a and 
to the extent they were not t r i v i a l they were not t r u e . I t 
was for example not t rue to say tha t the ideas of colour , sweet, 
sof t e t c , a re psycholoi^ically the orii^lnal r;iat«rlal of our 
knowledge, ^ e r e a l i t y i s qui te o th«r way around. I t i s the 
ideas of • table* or •ball» t h a t i s psychologically our pr indt lve 
da t a . Only When we analyse these ideas we reach the simples l i k e 
colour , hardness e t c . 
i i i s s e l l ' s approach to the problcKa, on the contrary, i s 
through and through lo^rlcf^ and anfi lyt loal . His ear ly d i s t i n c -
t i o n between knowledge by acquaintance and knowled|;e by descr ip-
t i o n , as l a already aa ld , waa prompted by the considerat ions of 
l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s . All complex proposit ions when analysed to 
the l a s t , accrued simple propoait ions whose subjects and 
predica tes were l o^ loa l l y proper names which being purely 
demonstrative, stood for the objects which we d i r ec t l y expe-
rienced i . e . sense-data . Ordinary namea were descript ions which 
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hetnr^ so re fer red to the objects which we could know only 
i n d i r e c t l y i . e . through descriptioius which applied to theia, 
4noth"?r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Busaell*s theory of percep-
t i o n , which d i o t l n ^ i s h e a i t from the theor ies of h i s contera-
porar ies as well as predeoesaora, consiata in h i s propensity 
to make use of and updating h i s ideas according to the current 
developments in d i f ferent sc iences , 'this i a tnoat d i scemable 
i n h i s l a t e r philosophy of neu t r a l aonlsa . Heal ia t ic phi loso-
phers of twent ie th century, for example, by and l a r g e , ta lked 
of mind and ruaterlal bodies aa I f t h e i r notiona were quite 
straightforwt'ird, something already given. They could not 
r e a l i z e the iraraeaiae implicationa which for example theory of 
quantum mechanios had on the problem of knowledge. I t was 
Huaaell alone who not only took coif^iiziance of t h i s theory but 
a lao t r i e d to make h i s philoaophy i n accordance with i t . 
I t may be added in the l a a t t ha t liussell not only laade 
uae of a c i en t i f i o knowledge i n formulating h i s problem, he was 
alao " s c i e n t i s t l c " in h i s method, l ^ t i s , he showed a sena i -
t ivcneas a l l through h i s philosophical endeavour, t o the 
p r tnc ip l e of CKJonoiay v;hich was embodied in h i s maxim of 
"Occam's raaor" defined as "whsrsver posaible Bubsti tute cona-
t r u c t i o n s in place of inferred e n t i t l e s " , Soientism t e l l s us 
to avoid the asaumption of superfluous e n t i t i e s , l i i s se l l 
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followed this principle In his phenomenalism and neutral 
monism* In the former, he rejected the supposition of 
material suhatanoea and replaced it l?y a construction made 
out of •senslbilia*. In the latter, he rejected mental 
substance too adtwi making the same •senaiirfLlia* doin,fj the 
function of mind as well. 
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Chapter II 
(The Theory of Kplatomologlcal Dualism) 
Bertrand l^aaell's early foimulatloa of the problem 
of perception oonaisted In makln*^  a distinction between what 
he called •knowledge oy acqtiaintanoe* and 'knowledge by 
description* aeanlnf^  by the former a direct and unaediated 
€uad by the latter an Indirect and mediated awareness with 
the objects known, Husaell asserted that whenever we claim 
to know a thing, what we come in direct contact with, what 
we ^ otnally know is something other than what we claim we 
know. The knowled^ie of the thing we claim to know is 
alvaya through I.e. mediated by certain other things with 
which we are immediately acquainted. To put the same In 
other words, we know the former j ^ terms of latter not 
directly, luaselian way of saying tlM same would be that 
their knowledge is descriptive as a^mlnst the knowledge by 
apnualntance which we have of things im'^ aediately presented 
to us and which actually describe the things indirectly 
known. 
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The con t rad i s t inc t ion of •knowledge by acquaintance ' 
and 'knowledge by descript ion* stems from a very simple and 
pr imi t ive feet vhlch we in our unref lec t lve l i f e tend to 
I s a o r e . In oomraon parlance we Ident i fy the r e a l i t y of a 
th ing with the appearance of I t notwlthstandln^j the fact 
t h a t While t he former I s s t a t i c and permanent the l a t t e r I s 
f a i r l y changeable. I f we a re asked to describe a t^KLe 
what we wi l l do I s to point to I t a q u a l i t i e s , say, brown 
colour , aqua lmess , smoothness or roufjhneas e t c , t ha t I t 
seefas to have a t a given tlrae. We think t h a t these qua l i -
t i e s belong:; to an objec t ive ly ex is t ing tat t le which they 
represf3it# But t h i s i s f a l s e , 
In fac t , no q i ^ l l t y of an object can be said to be 
the qual i ty of t h a t ob jec t . Observln,? from a place where 
t he r e i s enoiigh l l ^ t , the t ab le looks brown and shiny. 
But i f we move t o a sli,'5htly darker p lace , i t changes i t s 
colour; i t s t a r t s looking daric brown. And i f we move 
fur ther to a place where there i s no l if jht , t he t a b l e s 
a l toge ther ceases to give any appearance. Similar ly the 
t a b l e looks bluish when the observer has blue spectacles on 
h i s eyes and yellowish when he i s sufferin/; from jaundice. 
It is clear that a thing changes its appearances — — 
to same person In different conditions and to different 
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persons in same condition — - while Itself P'saainlng same 
and static. How fiwa the fact thftt one appenpaace Is quali-
tatively indistingulahable from other, it is also clear 
that all appearances of a thing are equally genuine and no 
one of then can be said to be lllualory. It follows there-
fore that appearance of a thlmr aad the thing itself aare 
two altogether different things and can In no caae be 
Identified. 
It alao followo that the appearance of a thin^; has 
a dual reference beinf; related with the experiencing sub-
ject on the one hand and with the reality of the object on 
the other. In other words, appearance mediates between the 
subject and the object, This impllea that the perceiving 
subject never comes In direct contact with the r-^ al object. 
His Iranedlate encounter is only with the appearance k^ iich 
coraprises sensible qualities like colour, taste, smell, etc. 
In liussellan teminology these qualities are called *8i?noe-
data* i,e, the things /^ven or presented to senses. 
Our direct knowled;:e io knowledge of sensible quali-
ties i,e, sense-data, aussell calls this direct knowledge 
as 'knowledge ^ acqitaintance'. Things in themselves are 
known. If at all, only in virtue of their being Inferred from 
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or beln^: described In terras of aa i se -da ta . I l i ls Inferred 
knowledge i s 'knowledge by descr ipt ion*, •AcquaintJinoe* 
and •description* a r e , t h u s , two fimdamental ca tegor ies 
upon which c^sse l l bui lds the e n t i r e s t ruc tu re of h i s 
ea r ly episteraology, ^ d for t h i s reason i t i s necessary 
to go i n sorae d e t a i l as to ho\i a i a s e l l a r r ived a t these 
two oate / tor ies . ProMn^ into t h e i r sources i s a l l the 
sore necesaary because i t throws a flood of l i g h t upon the 
na ture and l og i ca l s t a tu s of sense-data which i s so funda-
raontal to t he understancdng of J S U S M I I ' S ^liloaophy of 
perception of t h i s stage and of sul^emient s t ages . 
logjoal s t a t u s of ^enae-data 
i iwsaell 's d i s t i n c t i o n of 'acquaintance* and 'desc r ip t ion 
i s an outcome of h i s two celeberated l og i ca l t h e o r i e s , nmaely: 
•theory of Tapes' and ' theory of Descr ipt ion ' which he deve-
loped in the realm of i?»thematical l og ic i n o r i e r to dispense 
with some super s t i t i ous and iigrthical e n t i t i e s (such a s , 
golden mountain, round sqtiair , unicorn, numbers e t c , e t c . ) 
i n which he was obliged to believe due to h i s cosaraitraeit 
t o the Melnonglan ontologlcal theory, 
Meinong had held the view t h a t evQTy terra or phrase 
which can be a subject of a l og i ca l l y meaninfff^il proposit ion 
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has al-vays i t s extraverbal coiinterp'irt in the physical 
world which cons t i t u t e s i t nieanin^^. In o ther words, 
meaning of a tena or phiase la Iden t i ca l with the object 
I t denotes. "Thus, unicorn, nti-^bers, ^ Iden-no imta ln , 
ro\m^ squa i r a re a l l e n t i t i e s of some kind for they can 
he meantnj^fully used as aubjects i n lop;loal propoal t lona. 
••Golden nountaln does not exiat** o r "round aqualr i a a 
f i c t i t i o u s e n t i t y " a re t r u e proposit ions which i r ipl ies 
t h a t ' / ^ Iden i^oimtain' or 'round squair* ^aust subaiat i f 
not e x i s t . In some other world I f not In t h i s world, 
because goldeoi mountain ^ something which i a non-exis tent 
o r round squai r j ^ an e n t i t y which l a f i c t i t i o u s . 
But t h i s theory . I f t r u e , oar r iea with i t , aa 
Hussell l a t e r pointed out , ce r t a in Insuperable d i lYicul -
t l e s . One such d i f f i c u l t y l a with r e ^ r d t o George IV»s 
Btat«a«it i n which he wiahed to know whether t>cot was the 
author of iaver ley, Tlie point i s t ha t i f !einonglan 
theory i s t r u e , t h e term *'3cot' and the phrase *author of 
yaveafliey* must be a u b s t l t u t l b l e to each o the r , since they 
r e f e r to same e n t i t y v i a , the person iicot. But i f we 
replace the phrase 'awthor of Waverley* wit>^ ".icot* then 
what Georgia IV wished to know becomes whether iicot was 
Boot w^ i^oh i s absurd. 
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The another difficulty la this* If the law of 
excluded middle holds then one of the tyo statements 
•^reBant King of France la bald" and "Present King of 
Prance la not bald" must be true* 3Cet if we <3numerate 
all the thini£?a that are bald and then that are not bald, 
we will not find In either of the lists any such thing 
as •present King of France*, "Tlegelians", Hussell charac-
teristically says," who love 8;/nthesls will probably 
conclude that he woara a wig", iil'iilarly, compare the 
two propositions "the tallest building of America exists* 
and "the ^ Iden mountain exists". Both the propoaitions 
are of same logical form but whereas the i-onaar is quite 
meaniii'Tful, the saunae caimot be said about the latter. It 
also cannot be said to be meaningless for its opposite 
"the golden uwuntain does not exist" is true and !:^ kes per-
fect sense. 
Hussell*8 solution of these difficulties in his 
theory of ')escrliytion oon3l3ted in the elimination of the 
descriptive phrases by analysing the propositions In which 
they occur. His conviction Is that denotln^ j phrases (the 
so- Mid- 30, a so- and- so) have no meaning in isolation; 
their meaningfulneas is determined by the sentences of 
which they are ln^edi«its. Thus, "if I say"t ^seell /»oes 
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on, "•Soot was a man*, that is a statement of the form 
*X was a man* and It has Scot for Its subject* But if I 
say 'the author of Waverley wis a man*, that Is not a state-
ment of the form •? v;a3 a man', and does not !«ve Hhe 
2 
author of i^iverley* for I t s subjec t" , 
To a sce r t a in whether a given proposi t ion containing 
a «1e8crlptive phrase of the Zorm *the so-and>-so' i a meaningful 
or othf^rwiae, we a re required to make a correc t ai ialysis of 
tha t proposi t ion. The ana lys i s would m such tha t the sura 
t o t a l of analyaans muat foe equivalent to the auaalysandura 
i , e , the proposi t ion being aiialyaed, Tb uae a :lu8sollian 
termi the l a t t e r rauat be a t r u t h function of the former which 
means tha t what i a being followed by th« analysed proposi t ions 
should be same with whnt was asser ted i n the unanalysed 
orirr lnal propos i t ion . 
Thus, the proposi t ion "the author of Waverley was 
licot " i s a neanin/5ful proposi t ion, for when r i g h t l y analy-
sed, i t becomes "one and only en t i ty wrote Waverley and 
ticot . i s t ha t one". Or, nore ful ly " i t l a sometiiaes t rue 
of X tha t X wrote Waverley and X i s Iden t i ca l v;lth ^cot t 
and in any case of Y i f Y wrolte waverley, Y must be i d e n t i -
ca l with X", But the proposit ion "gold«i-rK>untain does not 
e x i s t " i s a meaniagleas proposi t ion, for , when t ra j i s la ted . 
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It becomes "there ia no ^itity C such that 'X is gold^i 
and mountaneoua* Is true when X is C tout not otherwiBo*** « 3 
The relevence of theory of deacilption to our 
pjwblea io that It eaphaaisea analysis. We analyse (»>aplex 
propositions Into simpler propositions and thai Into still 
slrnpler propositions. And this process continues upto the 
sta/^ e where the pjropooitiona at hand a:?c further un-analy-
alble. These are, in iiussellian terms, atomic propositions 
and have for their subjects and predicates what .%i33cll 
calls 'slnples*. And whit in the context of theory of 
descriptions Sussell calls 'simples*, he, in the context 
of theory of Types, calls •individuals', 
Bussell had ^id in his theory of Types that different 
propositions stand in a vertical relation to ench other. 
They are ordered in a heirarchy such that the proposition 
of a hi/iher order, or as he hlcwelf would put, of a higher 
•type', prr^supposes or has as its varla iles the propositions 
of a lower type which theraselves, in turn, presuppose the 
propositions of their lower typc» Besendini? in this way 
downward, we roach the lowest type Which has no propooitlons 
as its variables. These are the propositions v^o have as 
their tor?n3 •individuals* which are opposed to the proposi-
tions in that while they are unanalysable simple teras, the 
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l a t t e r a r e alv«ys complex. 
Tlie concept of loglcsal 'simplea* (o r ' i nd iv idua l s ' ) 
must be d ^ r l y understood for i t l a of ^ e a t inportance 
m the system of B^rtrand Bu8sell*s theory of perception 
and i t i s one tha t i t s ralsunderatanding has led raany phi lo-
sophers such as tJrmson lataraiy. I t s importance l a fur ther 
increasf^d hy the ^ c t tha t i t cons t i tu tes the conflux of 
Husse l l ' s mathematical philosophy and hia eplstemolosy. 
According to ^iusaell " i t l a not a t a l l necessary 
to know what objects belong to lowest type o r even whether 
the lowest type of variaii lea oocuring in a gXvexi context 
4 i s t h a t of Individuals o r some o the r s " . In p r a c t i c e , 
"bnly the i l l a t i v e type of va r iab le a r e role^rant. Thus the 
lowest type occurlng in a ^ v e n context Riay be ca l l ed t h a t 
5 
of ind iv idua l s , so fer as t h a t context i s concerned". At 
another p lace . In the context of theory of Descript ion, 
I b a s e l l , answerin/^ the objection ra i sed by Urrason tha t we 
cannot reach slfaples >K)w«ver f a r the r we carry our a n a l y s i s , 
saysi "as regards s l ap lea , I see no r'sason t o e i t h e r a s s e r t 
o r deny tha t they aay be reached by a n a l y s i s " , Moreover, 
"I think i t i s per fec t ly possible to stippose t h a t complex 
th ings a re capable of aiialyais j ^ i i i f in l tun; and tha t you 
7 * 
nerer reach the simple ,«••••**• 
tm SA •* 
I t l a o l ea r from the above theory of Description 
tha t according to Buasell the descr ip t ive phrases did not 
name any objeotj they, r a t h e r , denoted the ob jec t . In 
o ther words, they stood for the objects with which we have 
only Ind i rec t acquaintance. The word 'STOt* stands for 
an object which we can d i r e c t l y see or touch. But the 
phrases l i k e a taan, some man, any nan, every man, the p re -
sent King of j?rance, the cent re of aass of the so l a r system 
a t the f i r s t Ins t an t of the twentieth century e t c . denote 
objects ( ex i s t en t o r non-ex i s ta i t ) which we do not d i r ec t l y 
perceive. Their knowledge la knowledge Jj joai something of 
which only sorae c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a re known. They simply 
daaorlbe the object they stand fo r . 
1?he d i s t i nc t i on between naming an object and deocr i -
binpt an object i s fundamental not only In logic m\A raathe-
^natics but a l so in theory of knowledge. A l thou^ , for the 
sake of understanding we have spoken as i f the words l i k e 
•Scot* name an objec t , but, in fao t , they too a r e descr ip t ive 
phiBses. They a r e najaes only in the sa iae of our ordinary 
usage; they a re not nanea In log ica l sense. A log i ca l l y 
proper name a l w a ^ strands for a purely ex is ten t object i . e . 
•simple* or • individual*, Th« person iicot i s a complex 
object which l a known through h i s ce r t a in q u a l i t i e s . What 
i s purely ex i s t ing i s what we d i r ec t l y come across 1,©, whose 
- 65 -
knowledge i s induoitaKLa In an absolute sense. The kind 
of knowledge which l a anaolutely Indubi table i s knowledge 
of sensible q u a l i t i e s o r •sense-data* as % s s e l l c a l l s i t . 
All the ordinay objects l i k e Johnf t a b l e , t r e e e t c , a re 
only deso i lp t ive ly known in tha t t h e i r knowledge l a depen-
dent upon the knowledfTe of st-aise-data. In t h i s way we see 
tha t .%jssell'3 log ica l theor ies are qui te integimted with 
Q 
h i s theory of laiowledge, 
gomula t ion of the Problem 
As Juat se-m, liussell emT«iked on the realm of 
epistamology throu^^ the considerat ions of h i s loif^ical 
t h e o r i e s , Al thou^ he began to s^eflect upon the epiatenio-
log ica l nrobleas af t - ' r 1010 which i s the year of conpletlon 
of t h i s Pj^ncip^a. I^a^hematlea he appears to be bnasy i n 
e s t a b l i s ling sorae r e l a t ionsh ip between hia lo?jic find queutioj* 
pejrtainlng to human knowled;5e even in 1905 when he was 
working on h i s theory of descr ip t ions , '?hls i s indicated 
by the following passage which i s given i n the beginning 
of h i s a r t i c l e "On denoting" (published in 1905"), ^e says* 
T»ie subject of denoting i s of very great 
iriportanoe not only in Idglc arid mathematics, but 
a lso i n th«>ry of knowledge, For exa^iple, we 
kno« the centre of the mass of the so l a r aystem 
a t a de f in i t e Ins tan t in some de f in i t e point and 
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we can affirta a nuaber of proposi t ions about i t , 
but we have ao immediate acguaintajaoe with 
t h i s point which l a only known to us by des-
c r i p t i o n . The d i s t i nc t i on betwe^^i acquaint-
ance and knowledge about l a the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the th ings we have presenta t ions of 
^nd the th ings we only reach by means of 
such phrases . I t often happens t h a t we know 
t h a t a c e r t a in phraae denotes unambtguously. 
a l t h o u ^ we have no acqaintanoc with t h a t i t 
denotes; t h i s occurs in the above case of the 
centre of oasa. In perception we have acqain-
tanoe with the object of perception and in 
t h o u ^ t we have ac(jaintance with objects of a 
more abs t r ac t l og ica l charac ter , but we do 
not necessa r i ly have aoqaintanoe with the 
objects denoted by phrases oonposed of words 
with whose meaning we a re acquainted. To 
take a very important instances the re se^as 
no reason to bel ieve tha t we a r e acquainted 
with o ther people ' s minds* seeing t h a t these 
a re not d i r e c t l y perceived} hence what we 
know about them l a obtained t h r o u ^ denoting. 
All thinking has to s t a r t frora a acquaintance; 
but i t succeeds in thinking about i ^ y thlixga 
with which we have no acquaintance **»" 
I t i s , however, jDairly oiwioua tha t a t tha t time* due 
to h i s overabound preoccupations in I r i n c i p i a Mathematloa. 
he scarcely had time to digress frora h i s raaln taak and to 
cont r ibute any th ing in t h i s area of burgeoning I n t e r e s t . 
But In the subsequent years a f t e r I9l0t when the woik was 
completed, he relaxed to thlrflc over t he epiatwaologlcal 
i s sues with some peace of ralnd. These r*?flectlons c o n s t i -
tu ted h i s ear ly fomula t ion about the paKjblera in question 
which he coapreased in a paper e n t i t l e d "Knowledge by 
Acquaintance and Knowled/je by Descr ipt ions" , f i r s t published 
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In the Proceedings of Axrlstoteliaa Society for lglO-11 and 
repr in ted In ^lystlcisa and | i a s i£ . '^Ms was followed by 
h la small book fyi^lfl.^^ sX ^hXl9^9fflVr ^ which the fomer 
was Included with sorae laodlflcations, Xn t h i s book, 
Hussell discussed h i s views In r e l a t i on to var ious o ther 
s tandpoints and developed I t s Irapllcat ions. In whr;t follows 
we s h a l l discuss a t some len^irth h i s pos i t ion regarding the 
p » b l « a of perceptual knowledge nn<i a lso vr^/ey the a r ^ « 
aents tha t he adduced to j u s t i f y h i s pos i t ion . But before 
we erabaiSc on describing h i s theory, I t I s worthwhile to 
see how he ac tua l l y takes the problem in question, t h a t i s 
to say, what according to hiia i s p rec i se ly the na ture of 
the problem of percept ion. 
I t i s obvious tha t i n our unref lec t lve nwments we 
hell<»?ve in very amy t liugs l i k e t a b l e , cha i r , t r e e s , stoi, 
o ther men, o ther minds e t c , e t c . But as soon as we s t a r t 
c r i t i c a l l y examining these bel i^^s , they seem to be ramsha-
ckled, "The t ab le vfelch appears to JL>e brown and dim, which 
I t a i d to regard as the r e a l appearance of the t a b l e , tnay 
appear to another person who i s observing i t tram s l i g h t l y 
d i f fe ren t p lace , white and shiny and to a t l l l ^ lo the r per-
son , of some s t i l l another colour, I3ven i f the same 
peraon se^s the same t ab l e in being di f ferent condi t ions , 
the appearances wi l l change accordln/ily, For example, i f 
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1 put lilue spectacle on ray eyes* the object vdll look blue* 
If I a« suffering froa jaundice, they will look yellowlah and 
if there ia daifc they will be of no oolour at all. It is 
evident tlmt the colour of a particular object (say* table) 
depends more upon the peroeiver's subjective and environmental 
conditions than the table itself* if at all« It follows* 
therefore* that there cannot be any colour to which we can 
10 
say »the colour* of the table, llie saae applies to the 
8}^pe* texture* sounds etc. of the table* because awareness 
of these qualities varies from person to person and to same 
person in differrait conditions (the siaoothness of table gives 
place to the rou^^ess when seen from a sdcrosoope and sindlaAy 
the hardness varies according to the i^ ressure that we exert 
upon it and like). 
But if a thing causes different appearances to differwit 
persons in different conditions, it is hardly justified to 
say one appearance as genuine (l#e, real table!^  — as is 
often done by conmon mortals — and the othei« as fake ones. 
Since there is no qualitative difference betwecei different 
appearances of an object* to consider one as real and others 
delusive* is simply a sheer prejudice, ^roa this it is alao 
plain that app^uranoes and reality of an object are two 
distinct things and in no case can they be identified. Our 
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awareness of a thing la that of how i t app^ra to mo, not 
of what I t 18 •really* l i ke , U'hat we are Immediately aware 
of when we say we obaenre a table* are what comes to ua 
through our dlffer«it aenee-or^&ns i . e . certain aensi)£Le 
quali t ies — I t s colour, shape* sound e tc . The table i t -
self i s u t te r ly beyond our aooessj i f I t la known, i t s 
knowledge i s inferred from what i s direct ly experi^ioed. 
But i f 80, tvR) questions nr l ' e ~~~- one i s t imt, i s there 
rea l ly a table which i s capable of bein^ asserted, and the 
other i s that what sort of object t h i s i s l ike? Those 
questions af ter being generalised, becoiae, i s there any such 
thing as tnatter and i f so what la i t s nature? 
As just said, the objects of our ia^iediate awareness 
are certain sensible quali t iesj iliussell ca l l s these quali t ies 
*sense-data* and the i r awareness as *sensation** The 
important thing i s that the sem^ation which i s essential ly 
an act cannot be identified with the sense-data which i s 
i t s object i . e , of which i t i s a sensation, "Let us give**, 
says Hu8aell,'^he name of • sense-data* to the things that 
are innediately known in sensation; such as colours, sounds, 
STiiells, hardness, rour^meas and so on. We shall give the 
name 'sensation* to the experience of being Iraiaediately aware 
of these things. Thus whenever we see a colour, we have a 
sensation of the colour, but the colour i t s e l f i s a sense-
datum, not a sensation, ?he colour IB that of which we are 
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13 innodlatcly aware and the awareness Itaelf is the aenaatlon, ** 
What is said above can be sumiaarlaed In these wordss 
Our direct knowledi^ Is about sense^data and knowledge of 
thln^. If they exist, is inferred from those data. The 
laportfiint question that arises here is that how far this 
inference from experienced *data' of unexperienced * things* 
is legitlnate? Or, in oth^r words, what is the nature of 
this transition froa known to unknown? It is natural to 
suppose thpit the physical thing Is underlying cause of its 
different appearances and being so it la in some way related 
to aenee-data, Thon the p^ orilem la in what manner is smise-
data relate*"^  to the world of physics? This problem, as we 
shall see, has been a persistent concern for Bussell till the 
last of his philosophical career. But this question can 
never be propez^y answered unless we already know what 
exactly is the nature of senso-data. 
The Nature of iiense-Sata 
The problea of nature of sense^data is, according to 
Hussell, of great importance, for, as he thinks, a wrong 
aimlysla of it has led c^my philosophers, in the past, astray 
and is still a source of many conftisions. In history of 
philosophy, it was locke who told that the qualities (called 
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by him secondary qualities) l ike colours, t as tes and smells 
as opposed to the prlisary qualit ies l ike shape» texture e tc . 
are not contained in the physical things, but rather , are 
dependent upon thei r being sensed* Beziceley, carryln/t the 
argument further aade the ideas of a l l sensible quali t ies 
subjective, since primary qualit ies were as dependent upon 
niad as were the secondary qualit ies for the i r existence. 
But the difficulty before hira tmd for others a f te r hlra \rfa3 
how to establish an objective world existincj independent 
of our Tainds. Since, otherwise, a l l things unex|»rienced 
would be called non-existent which la irapossible. I t i s 
absurd to say that when we shut our ^ e s , the table before 
oe ceases to exis t , or , as Ihissell says, when table i s 
covered by a cloth, there remains no table (because i t la 
no longer my sense-data) and the cloth i s tairaculously 
res t ing in the a i r . 
l e s s e n takes sense-data to be subjective, but not 
in the poyoholo^oal sense as Berkeley and others did; he 
takes i t ra ther in a physiological sense and thereby raak^ 
I t objectively accessible for physics* The fallacy, accor-
ding to hlra, in i d e a l i s t ' s reasoning i s that they f^ll to 
distinguish the awareness from the data I t i s awarwiess of 
and argue that since the awareness i s mental i t s data also 
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rauat be taental» l^ssell, on the other hand, maphaslses the 
relational nature of our knowledge. The moment we say we 
are conscious j^ J s®Mie»data, we are already out of the oiroua-
ferenoe of oulajectlvity, Inf&ot, sense-data is what is 
given or presaited to the senses and hence distinct from the 
sensation itself which is ofcourse mental, Lif=n3e-data, 
Hussell concludes, is certainly outside the periphery of 
psychology and can be dealt only by physics or physiology. 
A. crucial passage from his article "Eelation of Sense-data 
to Physics" (published in I9H) to this effect reads thus: 
I propose to assert that sense^data are physio il, 
while yet raaintaininc^ that they nevor persist unchanged 
after ceasing to be c^ta. the view that they do not 
persist is often thought, quite erroneously in my 
opinion, to Imply th^ it they are mental, and this has, 
I believe, been a potent source of conftiaion in regard 
to our pres«it problem. If there were, as some have 
held, a iasisal iiapoaaibilitv in sense-data persisting 
after ceasing to be data, that certainly would tend 
to show that they are mental, iwt if, as I contend, 
their non-pei^iatence is merely a probable inference 
from empirically ascertained caiioal laws, then it 
carries no such implication with it and we are quite 
free to treat them as part of the subject matter of 
physios."14 
As a matter of feet, there is no Incongruity involved 
when Ifiassell holds scmse-data to be physical. For, when I 
say I see a star, what happens is that some light waves 
emanating from star strike my eyes* retina which produce 
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certain dlsturbanceo in ny nervoua system and several 
currents carry the message of the oeourronoe to the brain. 
Throu^ this physical and physiologloal procesaea, ralnd 
becoraes conBcious of what has happened to body. But that 
is nil. It la only the consciousness of the happening wh ch 
Is on th© side of mind; the hapv^ ening Itself Is quite out-
side It (mind), A case of awareness» in fact, presupposes 
two elements — (1) the awarenese which is mental and (11) 
the data It is awareness of whicht by no means, can be said 
to be mental, ••What the mind adds to sensibllla, In fact 
is merely awarsnesss everylng else Is physical or physiolo-
gical. •'"'^  
since it Is only awareness which la related to the 
ralnd, it Is plain that in any case of a particular experience, 
If mind ceases to exist, it Is only avareneos that would 
vanish; the sense-data would remain there, i>o if, lUasaell 
contends "T!^ body could r^ialn in exactly the same state In 
1 o 
which/is, although ray ralnd had ceased to exist, precisely 
that object which I now see whai I see the flash would 
exist, althou^ of course I should not see it, since ray 
16 
seeing Is aental," 
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Knowledge tor Aoguaintanoe and Knowledge by Deaorlptlon 
The knowledge of sense-data Is called by iiussell as 
''knowledge by acquaintance". The epithet *acqwatntance*, 
in Busselian nomenolature« is n. contrast of the epithet 
•description* which stands for the knowledge of thin^ s^ which 
we are not icraediately aware of, whose knowled/;e ia derived 
from and dependent upon sense-data. We say we have knowledge 
by acquaintance when there is nothing mediating between the 
perceiving subject and the perceived object. 
And to say that I am *acquainted* with an object is 
same as to say that the object is 'presented* to me. Accord-
ing to HussQll, the cognitive relation of being acquainted 
is simply the converse of the relation of being presented. 
Both signify to the experiencial relation occurring between 
the subject and the object, nut whereas in the former, the 
emphasis is on subject, in the latter it is on the object. 
We say aublect is acquainted and we say that the object is 
presented, Infact, as l^ssell himself says, the term*presen-
tation* alf^t have been a viable and preferable substitute 
for acquaintance but two consideration prevent him to do so. 
In the first place, it is seen that the 'acquaintance* 
has wider range of its applications as compared to the 
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presentation* T can say that I am acquainted with an 
object which la presently not before ^y nin<i althoni^ it 
has been at some earlier nwraent present before my mind. 
But the same cannot be said about presentation. K resenta-
tion* I'aplies that the object ia given to ny raind *ju3t now'. 
In the second place, Bassell thinks, the kind of relation-
ship that exists between the peroeiver and perceived object 
in a particular case of direct awareness, is such that the 
two terms of relation fmet be juxtaposed, otherwise, there 
is an inherent danger of one's bein^ plunged into either 
idealistic or laatorialistio monism. To use the term 'acquain-
tance* is to give equal status to both the subject and the 
object. Whereas usin^ the tern •preaentation* would lead to 
inflate the object which is being presented. This may result 
either into identifying the object with the subject as the 
Idealistic philosophers did or in assirailating subject into 
object, as the ciaterialists generally do. "Now I wish to 
preserve", so Hussell says, "the dualisra of subject and object 
in ray teminology, because this dualism seeas to rae a funda-
m'aital fact <^noeming cognition, H^ice I prefer the word 
'acquaintance* bccawae it emphasises the need of a subject 
17 
which is acquainted. 
Knowledge of the objects by acquaintance is so innie-
diate and simple that it ia "logically independant of knowledge 
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of the truth". But there are very many cases where our 
knowledge dep<?nd8 upon some knovm truth about the object 
being known. That is to say, we do not come in direct con-
tact with the object; it is only certain knovoi chaj^ acter-
istios which we suppose applying to the object in question 
that lead us assert the knowled/^ of that object, ?o put 
It differently, we know only certain descriptive phrases of 
the forma Hhe so-sind-so* (definite description) or 'a so-
and-so* (indefinite description) which we think as applying 
to a particular object. In such oases the knowledge is 
described as 'knowledge by description*. "I ahall say", 
says Hussell, •'that iva. object is known by description whffli 
we know that it is 'so-and-so* i.e. when we know that there 
is one object, and no more, having a certain property; and 
it will be generally implied that we do not have knowled^ 
18 
of the saiae object by acquaintance". 
For example we know that the person 'who used to wear 
an iron aask* existed although we never saw hia. Or we know 
that 'the raost long lived man* belongs to ^ssia, but we do 
not know who he \^9. Si?ailarly, *'we know that the candidate 
who gets 130st votes will be elected'rmd in this case we are 
very likely also acquainted (in the only sense in which one 
can be acquainted with someone else) with the raan who is, 
infect, the candidate who will get most votes, but we do not 
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know which of the o a n d l ^ t e a he i s , i ,©, we do not know the 
propoait ion of the form, * i i s the candidate who w i l l get 
1Q 
most votes where A l a one of the candidates by name." In 
such cases our knowl0d,f;e la knowledj^e by desc r ip t ion . 
In t h i s cotineotion I t i s important to note t h a t 
Hussell takes ordinary proper names as desc r ip t ions . I t l^s 
a l r f^dy becBi seen t h a t senae-data, beinn purely derionatrative, 
a r e designated only by log i ca l l y proper naraea which r e f e r to 
what i u s s e l l c a l l s logrlcal aimoles or i nd iv idua l s . Meaning 
of a proposi t ion containin^lj an ordinary name, can be rtwide 
e x p l i c i t only by analysing I t in to simpler proposi t ions which 
would, in the l a s t ana ly s i s , be about senae^data. for 
example, supposinj^ a person makes a judgement about Bisiriajrtc, 
Flow v^at a t a l l he knows about Bisiaaric: a r e c e r t a i n charac ter -
i s t i c s (known through acquaintance o r hearsay o r h i s tory) 
which he thinks a re about the body (o r mind) of Bisimrk; 
l i s iaark 'a body (and mind) a re the t h ings , he I s not acquainted 
with. Therefore, bein/^ in fe r red , h i s knowledge of 3ismark 
l a knowledge by descr ip t ion . But I f Bismark himself has nade 
Bome judgement about himself and i f the re I s any p o s s i b i l i t y 
of being acquainted with oneself, then, certainly, ^^ssell 
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says, that kjwwledge will be knowledge by acquaintance. 
, ^^ z^a7^ ~^^ !^ h« second thing la that, it does not t-iatter wtiat 
.1 ^ n 3 9 . j§) 
- 70 -
what descriptions are betnj^  W3ed In order to express a 
particular thought. Different persons or the same person 
at different tinea nay use var^ l^iiiT descriptions in their 
statements about any object. In so far as the descriptions 
are correct, l,e, the object to which those stateraento are 
Intended to refer Is constant, the propositions will be 
equally meaningful, l''or example, a person whose knowledge 
about Biaraark lo only historical, will use the deacrlotion 
•the flrat Chancellor of Germany* while fiakin/^  any statement 
about hlya. tnothor person who has had an occasion to nieet 
Bismaik can aoaert the aaiae proposition by usin*'^  a different 
df'acrltJtion &,(*• *the person who used to wear iron mask', 
A third person can use still another descrl otion, fiusaell 
contends that it la merely by chance that what characteristics 
of an object are known to a person maJclng statement, The 
21 
essential point is that they all must apply to the same entity. 
Foundations of T^ Jaroirioal Knowled/^ e 
Hussell gives the knowledge obtained throu<^ h acquain-
tance, a foundational status upon \«^ ich the whole structure of 
huiaan knowled^ ie la built. Our knowledge of physical things 
as well as truths presupposes acquaintance. But the important 
question in this connection Is that what are the objects of 
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of acquaintance, .^re sens ib le qua l i t i e s the only objects 
which we know thit>u^h acquaintance? I f ao, then, to be mire, 
th?» sphere of our knowledge i s very narrow. We sha l l be 
c e r t a i n l y oitrapped into the prison of our own pr iva te subjec-
t i v e world, '!Tiere must be t h i n g s , contends i iuasell , besides 
sense-data which a re equally tangib le and c e r t a i n . The f i r s t 
extension tha t he pro;>ose3 t o make i s 'acquaintance by ra^nory*. 
In any case of reoerabering, the object being reca l l ed i s such 
t h a t i t i s d i r e c t l y presented to lay mind, although i t i s a 
past event, Such unmeditated knowledge through aeaory a r e , 
according to iitussell, the source of a l l our knowledge concerning 
22 the pas t , 
Besides memory, we have also acquaintance by •intros-
pection', Man, it is said, is privileged, in posseasin/; the 
capacity to access his own mental states, iiense-data produce 
scoisation in the body of animal in the a&ae laanner as in the 
hUT!«n organism. But the difference in two cases is that where-
as the -aan is conscious of bein/j avare of a particular saise-
datura, the animal is not. In other words, we can say that 
man, as opposed to anlttsala, is capable of asserting the propo-
sition i,e, he can say "I know X am seeia^ the sun". It is 
not only the sun, but also the 'av^reness of the sun*, which 
is his aata. An anlraal feels pain in the same way as a man 
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doeSf tout imllke man, anlaal csannot be said to be aware of 
his feeling pain. In old terminology such subjective expe-
riences were called as *8elf-con3Ciouanes»', "This self-
consciouanesa", aocordiaig to Bussell, "is the source of all 
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our knowledge of mental things," But from this, xiussell 
warns, it would be erroneous to conclude that we are also 
aware of other people's mental states. Our Jcnowlf?dge of the 
other persons is confined only to a^ise-data which we attach 
to their body and raindj their body or mind are never objects 
of rsy direct knowledge. Hence they must elude our knowled^ e^ 
by acquaintance. 
But the knowled/5^ by self-conaciousneaa, is not about 
the 'self' eviscreted of its contents, Whenev<ar we reelect 
Introspectively in oui«elvea, it is not the 'mre 'self* which 
we come across; it ia, rather, certain thoughts and feelings 
which are the data of our experience. The question whether 
we ever come across our bare selves is one that liussell is 
hesitant to give any categorical answer to. On the one hand, 
It appears that since our acquaintance is only with particular 
bits of ideas and sensations, the self which is supposed to 
irihere them is as beyond our direct access as are the physical 
substances. But on the other h^nd, there are certain consi-
derations which lead us to believe that we are also acquainted 
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with our selves. In the first place It is seen that in a 
particular case of intraapeetive avAreness, t%JO elesieata are 
osteaalyely involved viz» the perceiving subject and the 
object beljai5 perceived, 'They stand in saae kind of relation 
to one another in which we are related to them* For example t 
when I am aware of iiy perceiving the taiaet the sense-datua 
which represents the table and the self to which this sense-
datum is presented, are both contrite of my knowledge* "^ hua* 
we can say that the whole fact I am aware of is *self^aoq^in* 
ted - with - sense - datus** Hence it can safely he concluded 
that my 'self* is as well the object of ay acquaintance as the 
24 
aeoise-datum* 
In the second place» it is plane that X know that the 
proposition "I am acquainted with the sense-datua" is true* 
This implies that in some sense I amst he aware of the *!• 
along with datum* Otherwise I could not understand what is 
meant hy the proposition in question* i?rom this we can conclude 
that although there are certain r^sons which prevent us 
asserting!; our knowledge of •self*, soiae others cawry ua positive-
ly to affirm it, ausaell sayai 
••?hu8 in some aem&9 it would Bemi we must be acquain-
ted with ourselves as opposed to our particular experiences. 
But the question is difficult and complicated arguemeaits 
can be adduced on either side* Hence although acquain-
tance with our selves seems probably to occur, it is not 
wise to aasert that it uiidoubtedly does occur. "25 
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In the l a s t , ther« are some gensral ideas, or what 
RQ880II proposes to oal l the *univeraala» such as whlt^nesa, 
diversityt resemhlanoe e tc . which are to be included among 
the objects of direct knowledge. In the f i r s t place. I t i s 
obvious t M t we are acquainted with such imlvereale as white, 
red, black, aweet, sour, loud, hard e tc . A patch of white 
colour, in the f i r s t instance of our acquaintance with i t , 
i s a par t icular . But when, af ter seeing many white patches, 
we abstract the whiteness \riilch I s cof!iT!Kjn anom; a l l of th««i, 
we are acquainted with white aa a universal. Similarly about 
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other sensible qual i t ies , 
Moreover, we are acquainted with relat ions of being 
•left to*, *above*, *below* e tc . For example we see succe^^slve-
ly a nufaber of sense-data, soiae of whidh are l e f t to others. 
In a l l such cases of succeBsive perceptions, we find that the 
data hnve coraraon anon ?^ themselves the relat ion of "beinf^  to 
the le f t ot*** Thus we can say we are acquainted with universal 
27 
re la t ions . 
We can alao likewise be acquainted with reuembLanee or 
s i n l l a r i t y , «le see simultaneously two shades ot grefoi anA 
we say they resemble to each other* If we also see a shade of 
red a t the saae time, we would find that the two greens have 
more resetablance to each other than e i ther Y^a to red. In th i s 
way we become acquainted with the universal 'resemblance' or 
28 
• s imi la r i ty ' . 
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Concluding thia part of disotiaslont I t raay be xreaaHced 
that for ibase l l , our knowledge of oto^eota hy aoqwaintanoe 6om 
not involve the problem of e r r o r , ^ In ao far aa we are acquain-
ted with a datun, the knowledge can never be i l lualvo or fake, 
?he bent s t ick or dreams or other hallucinatory phenometm are 
smiuine inassuoh aa they are objects of our direct knowledge. 
They would be deemed erroiieoua only when they are regarded as 
tiaxks of soae physical object, The bent s t ick i s not rfjally a 
SJailiSf twt i t i s roally an Qb.leqf jjjg pereet»tiQn. Thu» the 
knolwledge by acquai itanc«3 raises no probl«a of error . This 
problem ar ises only in the ??iattera of beliefs and t ru ths , A 
belief tmy be true or fa lse . But a perception i s never true 
or fa lse . Our seeing a red patch of colour la neither true nor 
false; a t i s juat what i t i a . But our belief that **thi8 i s red" 
loay be true or fal8«. 
From what i s aaid above, i t i s c lear . tha t Buasell, In 
his an^d-ysis of experlanoet gives fundamental importance to the 
knowledge obtained throug^i acquaintance which consists in a 
simple and unanalysable relationship between the subject and i t s 
object. Objects of acquaintance are not necesaarily those 
pres^ited to outer stmaes} they include the objects which we 
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oogoise thxou^ menory and introspeotion* tls^versaXs aro as 
well our data of aoepiaintanoe as are the particulaze. We 
oan possilily add the selves also in this l i s t . All our know* 
ledge of physical things, other laindst facts and cognitive 
relations such as fedling* laaginingt believing eto« are based 
upon and presuppose these primitive data of experience* 
But i f the knovlid^ of physical things eto« i s based 
upon i . e . inferred from the senseodata, the v i ta l question, 
for Bussellt as we have already seent van that how can this 
inference be justified? What reasons, i f any, are there for 
the belief that there i s a pextaanwit, stable world (physical 
and mental) which sustains and subsists the fugitive and 
fleeting \iK>rld of aense-^data. Moreover^ i f there i s really 
such a world. In what kind of relationship does i t stand with 
the wozld of smise* 
Bttssell, at the outset, oakes i t (|uite clear, that the 
knowledge of any thing other than one's own sense-data can not 
be d«aonstratively proved. Knowledge of external things, other 
person's bodies are less certain and s t i l l l e s s certain i s the 
knowledge of other lainda. I t nay even be said that we do not 
posseaqiliny knowledge except of the datum whieh/oeeurring to ae 
at the given aioaent. *'Ko logical absurdity results from the 
hypothesis that the woild consists of myself and ay thou^ts 
and feelings and sensations and that everythiii^ ES else i s mere 
fancy" .'^ 
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Pbrt in dreams wo perceive an aXive world of things and 
events which vaaiahei aa aoon aa we awake, 4e conclude that 
the world of dream waa fictitious and not re«l as compared to 
the actual world. But if it is aof there is no leaser pooai* 
bllity that the world we auppoae to be actual may prove conjec-
tural and 'not real* as compared to some atill other world* 
'Fhere is no logical iaxwasiMlity in the supposition that the 
wl»le of the life is a dreaat in which we ourselvea create a U 
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the objects that corae before ua," 
'Phis ia a solipaistio mrnoluaion and Busaall's opinion 
about it is that althou,ih this doctrine "cannot be strictly 
proved to be false* there is not the alightest reasons to 
suppose that it is true**. At another place he aayfii" But 
althott^ this is not logically iapoaaible, there ia oo reason 
whatever to suppose that it is t«i«i and it ia infact a less 
sleiple hypotheaii^ viewed as a aeans of accounting for the facts 
of our own lifot than the <»)iru}n sense hypothesis that there 
really are objects indepwident of us, whose action on us causes 
our sensation," 
It is natural that in answering our first question we 
take reoourae to the fact of testiaony of other people. But 
that will beg the very question at issue, that is, it will 
not do to say that since the sense-data of many people siiaul-
taneously observing an object (say, a table) are aore or less 
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similar there must be a phyalcal, objective tal^o to eauoe 
these appcaranoee to different people. Fortour Imowledge 
of other people i t e e l f i s inferred from the senae-data I 
have of them and unless I t i s not established that sense* 
data refer to soae extenwil physical object, knowledge of 
other peoples reiaains precarious. 
All the aaiaot one thing, ^laaell thinks, >sust be assumed, 
if we want to proceed in our way. I t i s that a phyalcal object 
i i something niore than i t s senae-data i . e . i t pers is ts even 
when i t i s not the data of any mind* A oat cannot be said to 
be vanished when we abut our eyes and again eoBie into being 
when we reopeoi them* I t mist have be«ti persist ing even wh^a 
we were not seeing i t . I^oreover the oat gets hungry as soon 
as the time of I t s next meal arrives and i t i s preposterous 
to suppose that i t got hmigry although i t \i®s a non-entity, 
since i t was not ay 8ense»data in the intervening period of 
two meals, aassell further argues that i f eat consists only 
of sense^data, i t cannot be hungry. Obviously enou^, the 
patches of colour are "as incapable of hunger as a t r l a n ^ e 
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13 of playing football." 
But arguing this way, are not we moving in a vicious 
circle. Ihe feeling of being hungry to which we afty be certain. 
Is exclusively ay o\m experience. Therefore attribitting the 
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feeling of hunger to any other thing ia as tmoertain to sis 
as the i r physical existence, fheiPefore we are again a t the 
same place fxora \Alch we started; the exlat^iee of e r temal 
things i s s t i l l impioved, I^ssell adtalta i t and cryptically 
aayst " i t i s not l?y arguement that we originally <«)m9 liy our 
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belief In an Independent anfextemal world.* He l ike his 
many other contemporary r e a l i s t s , takes i^cours© to the so* 
called 'anlfflRl Inst inct*. •*We find th i s belief (In the l a -
dependent existence of physical world)", so he says, "ready 
In oiirsel*ve8 as soon as we reflecti i t i s What laay be called 
as inat lnct ive belief. 
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After establishing the independent existance of the 
exteitial world—-although admittedly n-,t on sound grounds*-—. 
i t reiaained for ausaell to discuss What kind of relationship 
18 there between the sense-data and the phyaioal world. One 
thing, in t h i s connection, whieth \ma alraost cer ta in , was 
that the sense-data, although connected in some vKiy with i t s 
physK^l counterpart, cannot be said to be exactly same to i t , 
nor even laore or less siiallar. Sbr, the intervanlng medluia 
causes a great difference to l i c^ t waves during the tlrae of 
i t s t iave l from the object to the peroelver 's nervous system. 
A ci rcular coin cannot be seen 9o unless we are di rect ly i n 
front of I t . Moreover, our judgement of I t s being real ly 
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circular i s , a» we have already sefai» auaoeptlttle of being 
0ho%ai groundless* 
What at best* we can say io that the order of our diff-
erent sense-data, corresponds to the order in the physical 
world, 'Phe observed distance between the two sense-data which 
wt? think are of two houses, may real ly represent the actual 
distance of two houses. We can ascertain th i s by other means 
as well e.g. by walking, by the testiB»ny of other people etc# 
But what i s beyond our capacity, i s that we come to know the 
real nature of the things, throu#i the sense-data they cause. 
Different people have the i r own * private spaces* fron which 
they observe the object which belongs to the publi 'physical 
space* which eabraees the observers as well, T'he iiifferawe 
in perspective makes a lo t of difference in the pere<?iver*8 
cognition of an object. He can only know what i s in his p r i -
vate space and never w>mt i s in public physical sj^ce, Bussell 
saysi 
'*Xf one object looks blue and another red* we nay 
reasonable presume that there i s some corresponding 
difference between the physical objects} i f two objects 
both look I0.ue, we rmy presume a corresponding siiallarw 
i t y . But we (umnot hope to be acquainted direct ly with 
the quality iix the physical object which makes i t blue 
and red, Soienoe t e l l s us that t h i s quality i s a 
certain aort of wave laotions, tm&. th i s souzids fiajsiliar 
because we think of wave motions in the space we see. 
But the wave-Qotiona must really be in physical aj»ce, 
with which we have no direct aetfuaintanoe; thus the 
real wave-motions have not that iSarailiarity t^iich we 
mii^t have supposed them to have, i^id what holds for 
colours i s closely similar to what hijpids for other sense-
data, •^B 
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This doctrine of structuial corroapoadanee between the 
world o* sense aad world of physloa %iaa one which liuasell 
aboufkined In hla suljsequent positions of pheaon^naliaa and 
neutral monism* As he denied the vexy reality of a phyaloal 
world beyond saisltollla, the <juestlon of correspondanoe did 
not arise* He, however, reverted to It In the last phase of 
his philosophy when he again oaae to hold the causal view of 
perception. He, however retained his emphasis on the relatio-
nal nature of experience In his phcnonenallsm* lilt sense-
data still constituted the objects of direct km>wledge and 
they along with hypothetical sensa eoaprised a physical thing 
which in its relation to alnd constituted a ease of perception. 
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Chapter i n 
(aelatlonal Theory of Perception) 
•Phenomenallso* is a term used to Bi^iXfy the 
eptstefsologioaX doctrine which is deriaed for putting an 
end to the rather perennial tug of war between the argu*> 
mentB some of which carry ua from dualls»3 to aubjectiviso 
and then to aolipaismt and some others which take us bade 
to duallaa* The dualistlc theory of knowledge, n ia 
already oboerved, nalces a leap froa what is experienced l»e. 
eenaeodata to what la not i.e. naterial substance and thereby 
leaves an unbrld^abls gulf between the world of aeanae and 
the world of physics. The only ground adduced to establlsjh 
the objective and peraanent physical world is the notorious 
•anl!*il instinct* which scarcely survives a rigjoTOua logic, 
'^la often loads to a total abondonsraent of the notion of 
physical substance and then of that mental. On the other 
hand» our faith in an objective and penaansnt physical world 
is too instinctive and intense to tolerate ai^ oh scsiJticisa. 
One way to avoid this odd situation iu that \m 
abondon our common habit to distlngulah the perceived object 
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from the perceiving nlnd and tnmt thm^ as be ng funda-
raeatally same stuff. ?hi» Is indeed the poaltlon adopted 
by williaa James and other Aaerleaa new»reali3ta* In 
t he i r systerae, aiiid ^id i^atter are asalmllated into each 
other and a new stuff, the neutral stuff* i s produced of 
which both alnd and laattsr are said to he constructions. 
As i t s loffleal oorollAiy, t h i s doctrine denounces the 
*a?elation' (•being aware o f , ' i s revealed to ' ) which i s 
supposed to be holding between the knower and the known. 
Knowledge does not consist in the confrontation of subject 
to i t s object but in cooing of the object in relat ion to 
other objects of siiallar so r t . 
I t i s obrlouB enou^ that t h i s view la implausible 
for those philosopher who are more sensit ive towards the 
relat ional nature of experience i . e . for those who think 
laind to be an indispensable t«ra in any solution of the 
problem of perception, for such people the rematniii^ 
a l ternat ive i s *phenoaenalis!a'» which althou^^ rducest as 
the subjectivists do» the *thin^* into 'knowledge of thlnfje*, 
but retains the i r 'objectivity* and in soae sense *peraan-
ence' too. 
One's loiowledge according to th i s or etriiif i s of 
course of one*a private *seiiae-data*, not the real thing» 
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but the fact that there may be a great imas sense-data (both 
aotual and possible)» some of which closely reeeablin*'^, 
a collection of these aoiBed 4^ta and these posaibly s^^aed 
may be supposed as public and belonjiln^i to an objective 
space, rtoreover, the fact that the aense data are quite 
d is t inc t from (in the i r being glv«ri to) aenaatlona, already 
proves that they are not me^ital and are proper subject 
aa t t e r of physioa. In th i s t»iay we see that th is doctrine, 
on the one h?md, atteiapta to overcome the di f f icul t ies 
of duali^i ( i . e . by abondnnini the inference of transcen-
dental things-ln-theaaelves) and on the other, saves oia» 
from bein^ ©itrapped into the prieon of aubjeotivity. 
h is tor ica l ly th is position was f i r s t adopted by 
John Stuart ?l i l l , who reduced niaterial things into whfit 
he t i l l e d *pernianait poaalbl l l t ies of sensation*. A 
physical thing, accordin^^ to ' t i l l , i s an asHeiablafje of 
the actual sensations which I have a t a j^i^on laoaoat of 
that thins and those which I had In past and will hnve in 
future together with those innuaerable aonaations which 
other people mi,'^t have a t different tiM9» a:id al^o those 
which cannot be experienced at a l l . Tfy own knowledge of 
a thin;!? a t any nonient la only a fragmentary part of the 
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t o t a l aspects In which i t m l ^ t be sensed* Mill saysi 
"The concept I form of the world existing 
a t any laomentf oomprisea alongwlth the seasa-
t ions I asi f0ellag» a countleso var la t i es of 
pos iMl i t i es of a^iaationai aetriely the i^iole 
of thoae which past observation t e l l s la© that 
X could* under any aupposable eiroui^tanoes* 
experience a t th i s tmwmiatt together trtth an 
indefinite and i l l imi table nmltitude of others 
which thou^ I do not know that I couldf yet 
i t i s possible "Orat I nsiii^t experience in 
certain circumstance net )?ni5wn to jaa«**1 
H i l l , in his book M ^IfM^m^m SS i iH .HUUSQ 
Hamilton* 8 Philo aophy* propounded what he called the 
•Psycholoirloal theory of belief in an extemial world* * 
His main claim was that our belief in an external v#orld 
I s not in tu i t ive tout an acquired product* By t h i s he 
meant that our worl('^!iiowii to be existim; only \s^ virtue 
of i t s belnf; known must be given only an experiential 
slgnifioanoe. %at i s to say any belief whiehAiot amenable 
to experience would be incrediUle« Ihat there are the 
oubstontial physical things i s one such Ineredlbl'* belief, 
What however cannot be denied i s that there i s world 
exteinal to us vrtiioh we fa i r ly know that we know. Thus, 
h is prohlea was to show the possibi l i ty of an exteiual 
and enduring world which doea not admit the precarious 
assumption of physical substance. On the basis of what 
he called "psychological t i « ths^ , "a l l of which proved by 
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experience" , he thou^t, he oould show the '^ .aM.lity of 
his •penaanent poasiMlity of senaatloaa*, as a functional 
substitute of physical substance* The psyeholoijioal truths 
were as foliovat 
In the first place» we may m«e, that huaan mind 
is capable of expectations* We can expect after having 
had seised some actual sensaticmst some posallide senaat* 
Ions i^ich ralght occur to us In suitable olroui&Btanoea ->— 
circumstances» the nature of which is known throu^ exp-
erience* iov example wh^i we perceive the surface of 
the table as of certain kind we can expect beforehand 
what sensations will we have by raping It or by preseliiig 
it with fingers* Thus the Inference of unsensed sensations 
from the sensed ones is natural and involves no preoarl-
ousness* 
In the second place» according to Mill* there are 
certain laws — — laws of asaoclations of ideas — which 
justify our belief in possible sensations* Hrstly there 
are appearances which being slsiilar to one another are 
thought to be associated. Secondly there are phenomena 
which occur contiguously to one another and are therefore 
associated in our thought* This relation of contigoity 
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may bs in the form of •almultanalty* or •isiaediate suoo«* 
salon* • Mct8 which have he&a experlc^ noed or thou^t of 
alraultanootisly, recall the thought of one another ( for 
example,the zaixdng and the sound of pattering)* Of 
faots which have been experioaoed In liiraedlate snocessiont 
the antecedent or the thought of It recalls the thought 
of consequent hut not conversely (for eocapplct Bmoke and 
fire). 
The third law of aasodatioa la obtained whan 
"contiguity becomes laore certain and rapid by repltitlon". 
That is to aay, wh«a two phaoomeaaa are always experienced 
together and in no instance otherwiaet then the certainty 
of their being associated inoreaaea gaf^ itly and we aay 
then reasonably call the aeaooiation inseperable* or as 
4 
Mill says, •lesB correctly* "indissoluble". But \xy 
Inaeperability it la not raeant that they are conjoined 
once for all and it is impossible to oonoelYo them apart. 
It simply means that as lon^ as no auo^ experience or 
process of thou|[^ t has taken lAacc* the aasociation la 
irresistible. The last and the aoat Important thing is 
that whan such inseparability of two ideas is achieved* 
it suggeots a slndlar unseprability between two things 
of actual world %*hleh amwer the two ideas^ " Things which 
• 96 -
we are unable of oonoeivla^ a i^r t appear Inoapable of 
existing apart "."^ Bvexytoody finds m his oonaolouaneaa a 
typical order of a^iaatlons and of »»arlnl8e<moes of aensatlona 
which he falely thinks as hsnrlng oownterparta in actual 
oater la l world. Thersfore» a l i t t l e cautiousness i s needed 
in order to get r id of one's auperatltlotto belief in subotan^ 
t l a l t h i n ^ . For fill l the order by i tself* suffices to 
account for the facts of eztexnallty and pex^mence with which 
the material world i s characterised. 
For further i l l u s t r a t ion Hil l takes into account the 
notion of cause and effect which i s the ba<flcbrne of a l l the 
represcsitati^ra theories eacplainin^ perceptual phenosMtia. 
What we ordinari ly think as cause and as effect , i s fbr Mill 
a "constancy of antecedence and seguence'** l?ow obviously 
according to his theory t h i s relat ion of anteoedence and 
sequence does not occur betwewa two substances but, instead, 
between two fixed groups of sensations arrangied in a fixed 
order* I t will be seen tha t the constant sequences only 
rarely exist between the actual sensations. Our actual sense* 
tions are only a portion and representative of a whole 
c lus ter of the poss ibi l l t ios of sensations* Thereforet the 
re la t ion of sequence i s between these clusters and not 
between those which COIM in our actual experience* This very 
fact prevents us to attach the relat ion in question to actual 
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sensations I we t<5nd to conceive It as occurring in two 
groups of poaslMlltles of sensation. We also corae to think 
that the (;i»upa of possibllitiea of aeneations are external 
and are underljrln?; cause of which the actual sensations are 
arbitrary effects. Mill sayaJ 
'*The wliole aet of eensations as possible fozm 
a poxmanent background to aziy one or more of thera, 
tha.t are at a given BK}ment actuals and the possilA-
lities are conceived as standing to the actual 
sensations in the relation of cause to its effects 
or of canvas to the figure painted upon it» or •••• 
in transcendeaital langua^^, of Matter and Fon]i''*6 
Mill, in this %«y, reduced the physical things into 
the groups of actual sensations and those "contingent" by 
v^ich are meant« "sensations that are not in our ^ oreaent 
consclousaessy and individually ntrrer was in our consciousness 
at all, but which in virtue of the laws to which we have 
leaxnt t^ experienoet that our sensations ars subject, we 
know that we should have felt tmder given supposat^e oircuni* 
7 
stances and under theiro drousietanees sd^t still feel** , and 
thereby rwiders the postulation of auhsisting igaterial 
entities gratuitious and logically unnecessary* Material 
woild i s aa ter ia l not in the sense in which coiaeaon men or 
sciet i t is ts together with a group of philosophers take i t to 
bei but in the sense of being objective, peiwan«it, enduring 
and s t r i c t l y r e a l . Different people cannot share in one 
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another 's actual sensations bat they do shflw In the per-
aanent posalMll t les of them. I t I s endurlni? since i t l e 
independent of our perceiving themi i . e , i t i s something 
more than and txansoondental to our actual s<»iaationa. 
Pemanent posaiMli t ies posaeas a l l the characterlatica that 
we oomttOTnly attach to material substances and therefore i t s 
function i s aaae aa that of l a t t e r . I t i s Mil l ' s conviction 
that "this i s the moaning of na t te r in the minds of many of 
i t s most esteened metaphysical champions t h o u ^ they thea-
selves would not admit as much". 
I t i s not quite easy to speculate about the extent 
to which Sbasell owes for h is doctrine of phenoiienalisra to 
that of filill. Jiiasell put th i s doctrine i n his .Qjye Knowledge 
SX "fehe Bxtemal World and two of hie a r t i c l e s "aelation of 
Sense-Bata to Physics" and * On the Nature of icqiuaintanee" 
(ori rinally given as Lowell lectures in ^ e r i o a ) , a l l pub-
lished in 1914» But despite great a f f in i t i e s nt very crucial 
points, a t no place Basaell !«ia given a reference to Mill . 
On tlw other hand, i t i s also diff icult to accuse hiia of 
boinf? ungrateful as he i s quite famous for beinji; ovezi;enexous 
in admitting h is debts to others . In any case, i t i s clear 
that the s imi lar i t ies betweim the two philosophers are iESsense^— 
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ao much so that the vlawa of aiss«ll oau toe said to be an 
enlarged and technlcallaed version of thttse of Mill, 
! ! i l l , in his attempt to reduce the inferred phyaloal 
substances was, as i s evidait fmra the preceding account* 
pr iaar i ly actuated by hia desire to avoid the diff icul t ies 
in Which the dual is t ic theories were t h o u ^ t to be involved 
while retaining the belief in an objective and real world* 
Itassell i s laore posit ive. His -groVlom was to provide the 
physics an experiential isasis so that i t aay gttiuinely be 
called as an (rapLzloal science *based on experiment and obser-
vation*. In other words, h is aim was to bridge the ^ I f th^t 
was caused betwe<»i the world of physiaa and world of percep-
tion due to physicis t ' s apr lor i assumption about the subsis-
t ing material substances an assurapti^i whic^ he himself 
ontertained in his Froblena j^l Philosotahy. 
The fpiidins principle that lurked behind the whole 
endeavour v«s that embodied in the imxim of Oc<«m's ra*or 
whichf as has been seen, stood for the reduction of Inferred 
en t i t i es and the i r replacement by loi;ioal constructions so 
that there do not remain any necessity to assert the logically 
precarious e n t i t i e s . 
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Preliminary Amlyala of Knowledao 
The problem then at hasid Is how to establish an 
Independent j ^ e i c a l vmrl^ purely on experiential grounds, 
Buisaell s t a r t s hlraaelf with a preliminary analysis of our 
common perceptual knowled^ j^e. We know a lo t of physical things 
given In the univeroe which we think are based on the evidence 
of aenscf v iz , chairs , t ab les , t r ees , r ivers e t c , e t c . 3ut 
the psychologists sake us Relieve that what wa actually see 
i s far less than what we say we seei the greater part of our 
knowledge la always inferred, For example, when we say we 
see a table* i t I s not that the whole table i s presented to 
ay senses; we see, instead, only soae of i t s parts (say. I t s 
upper surface, when seen from the above) I the Whole table i s 
inferred txy us from these sensible par t s . Moreover i t i s 
also to be obsenred that we oft«a tend to believe that we 
know the real shape or siae or colour of the table (or real 
t ab le ) . But as what has been previously discussed shows, i t 
la a-^ iply evident t}»t we never coae across the real table 
( i f there i s one), The Iraraediate data of our knowledge are 
certain sensible quali t ies from vi^loh we Infer a real 
substantial table . The knowled,ge of the t h l n ^ that are 
iKPaediately and dl i^ct ly /?Lvea to the senses, Bussell ca l l s 
now as »pri!iitive knowledge* and the knowledge deduced from 
i t are called by him as * derivative knowledge', 
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fhe derivative part of our knowledge nay be of two 
kinds v ia , psychological and logical . "FsyoholOi^oally, a 
belief may be called derivative whenever i t l 3 caused by 
one or more other bti.lefs or by aone facta of sense which la 
Q 
not simply what the belief asaerta,**^ A logically derived 
belief* on the other hand, la that which we arrive at l!^  the 
procedures of logical deductions and inferences. 
The derivative beliefs In i^ychologlcal sense are 
quite coinon place for aat we Judge about a man's inner 
feelings and emotions merely by o)»er»lng certain appropriate 
outside behaviour of that aan and in this no logical pit)oedure 
is involved. But since no logical procedure is involved, 
these psycSholofiically derivative beliefs are lo^oally primi-
tive. It la then obvious that there are countless beliefs 
which althou^ paycholoslcally derivative are logically 
primitive since they are arrived at without taking any help 
of logic.^° 
Bussell maintains that our paycholo^?ioally derived 
beliefs, in order to bo certain, must need be losi«»lly dedu-
dble from those from which they are psyctelogioally inferred, 
iJnleas this la done their truth will r^ snaln precarious and 
question begging. Our beliefs in external things like table, 
chair, mountain etc. which are derived from the i^ychologioaily 
primitive beliefs (i.e. from o^ise-data), for basing certain. 
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are In need of logical jus t i f ica t ion. Any aprlori assumption 
cannot pirovlde thew with the deaired c«rtainty« 3at the 
case i s not sane with the h«llefo which aa?e logically aa well 
aa psycho logical ly pr la i t lv* . They are self •evident, pfored 
on the i r own account, 
For the objects whose knowledge i s psycholOf^cally 
not derivative i.e» which are known throuijh aoqualntaneny 
Hussell now christens the team 'hard data*i and those which 
are inferred from these j^ychologlcally primitive data are 
called hy him as 'soft data*. By *hard data* are aeant 
"those which r e s i s t the solvent influence of c r i t i c a l refleo* 
t lon" and by soft data a r t aeant those "^ rfhich under the 
operation of t h i s process become to our raind niore or less 
doubtful. "^^ 
Apart trofn those xafescnted direct ly to our senses, 
the objects that cbssell* in his Prableaa Si^ ghiloaophv des-
erlbed as examples of hard tfeta were those known t h r o u ^ 
raaraory and Introspection. He now includes 'soiae spat ia l and 
temporal relations* such aa the case of a swift rat ion 
fal l ing within the species present» •soao facta of coraj^rison* 
such as likeness or unlikeness of two shades of colours, and 
12 
above all the 'truths of lo<?Ac' as hard data. At another 
placet the list is further enlarged by adding 'the faint and 
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perlpheitil sensationa* and 'th® present true beliefs* as 
the objects of direct acqoalntanoe* 
In r e ^ r d to aoiaory, %SB#11 In Pa^ oblaims jal gMloaoytpr 
a r ^ e d that Whon I recal l an object» I t i s i]j:»3edlately 
presented to me althouirjti i t appears as past nolaa presint* 
But the objection may be raised that in a case of reaerabering 
i t ia not the object to which the rera^aberln^^ actually 
refers , that ia presented to ae, hut instead, a replica of 
t h a t . My present itaage of Mr, Jones whom I saw yesterday 
i s not the same which I actually saw and therefore my present 
kiiowledi^e of Hr, Jones must be Inferred, 
lusaell meets th i s objection by proposing to make a 
dis t inct ion between what he cal ls the ' In te l lec tua l laemory* 
and •sensational memory* • Jhmi 1 say I know that "I saw 
Hr, Jones yesterday", i t la a feict which I kixow without the 
mediation of any idea and th i s affords a prsof that aaraory-
objeots are the objects of my acquaintance* The oases of 
such type are those of in te l lec tual mtntory* The case of 
sensational memory i s that in vdiioh Bomothtng has Just 
happened and an image i s s t i l l ostensibly present in my 
consciousness* In such cases, according to Husoelif the 
thing renmixm an object of aocpaintimce althou^^h i t i s no 
longer present* Thus, in both kinds of memory, the object 
recollected remains an object of acquaintance* 
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So far aa the knowledge of faint and peripheral 
seoiaations ia concexned» Btaaell thinks that in some cases 
a t leaat we should admit th®a as objects of acquaintance i*e« 
as hard data. I t ia clear that in a nowaal case ot visual 
sensation our at tention i s almost centered upon what i s in 
the middle of the fieldf the narfSins are geneially i^jaored 
by us thoui^ i f we will fteilly att«ad to them they will 
become our data* Xt i s obvious that what I experioioe effort-
less ly and what a f t e r a conscious effort , both are in soiae 
sense 'before ray raind* and are therefore ray itmediate data, 
The raere fact that the knowledge of perijfeeral sensations 
needs effort on our part cannot imply that they ars to be 
outclassed from the <^te^ry of hard-data, "It seams'*, 
Bus se l l concludes, "we must adrait things (aa hard data) 
to which we do not attend, fbr at tent ion i s a selection 
aoong objects that are * before the mind', and therefore, 
presupposed a larger f ie ld , constituted in some less exolu-
13 
sive manner, out of which at tention chooses what i t v^ants", 
llie same however cannot be said to apply in the 
cases where no sensation occurs althou|i!^ appropriate physical 
conditions exist to cause them, For exsunple, we often fa i l 
to hear a faint sound althoui^ we a i ^ t have experienced i t 
i f the a t t r i t i o n was duely paid« In th i s case there i s a 
aound-otimul-us to cause a s^m^tion but I am prev^mted of 
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having I t s counterpart inside lay mind« Faint sound (and 
for t h i s reaaon* a l l Haint aQnaations)^ thas , do not oons* 
t i t u t e hard-data. What i s titie for faint aensations la 
also title for faint wiahea» dla thoughta and «%^t«ver elaa 
l a not in the foewa of attention"^ 
About •facta* i t can b« aaid that moat of than cannot 
he ha3Pd data, A fact being als^ys couple* l a opposed to 
the sensible object %feich i s always simple or a t l eas t 
re la t ively simple, Fact i s an object of our belief which 
we express In a proposition, Ifow the belief in facts i s 
no doubt inraediately experienced 1^ ae, but the fact i t -
self , obviously enough, eludes our direct access, We do 
not experience that ' ear th goes rotmd the sun* or * London 
has six a i l l i on Inhabitants• or that •Wapolsan wea defeated 
a t Waterloo** But. however* Buasell thinks, the facta in 
which we ourselves are conati tuaits and in yfhieh rat t e s t i -
mony or deduction tvom other facts i s involved must be 
som^ow known to lae direct ly , ifor Instaaoe in the case 
above mentioned v i a . • ! saw Mr. ^ontm yesterday*, the fact 
I claim to know i s as indubitable and certain to me as are 
the objects of outer senses. 
I t i s seen that most of the things of the external 
world f a l l outside the scope of InKnediate experiaice. Our 
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knowled/^e of t aa l e s , ohaiz^, t r ees , other pcjople's bodies 
and nlnds i s a l l psychologically derivatiire and htmoe 
constitute the examples of soft data, 3ot what about th« 
knowled/;e of our hare selves devoid of a l l t h e i r contents? 
In ?.t?ff^ A?.iW 31 FhXUm:^* a i s se l l tentat ively augf^ested 
the possihl l i ty of the i r heiag direct ly experienced. His 
taaia argument was that I know that * I am ae(painted with 
th i s sense-datura*» This beiaig so i t i s d e a r that the whole 
object I am acquainted with i s the • aelf«^cqpuaintedUwith 
sense-dattim*, therefore, self i s also a hard dattxsu 
But a t t h i s stage he altogether rejects the possibi-
l i t y of direct knowledge of self. In the f i r s t pl^ce* h« 
says, •!• must be distinguished froa 'eao* which i s uni-
versal and of which •!• i s merely an instan<^, Whesi th« 
word'I* i s ut tered, there i s only one person w!w utterfsd 
i t for hi'nself although th i s pei«on varies according to 
the u t t e r e r . How, Bussell thinks, a l t h^u^ ' I* B»kes perfect 
sense to the person when hs uses i t , i t cannot be ^ I d to 
be known to hlra Intro spectivoly, Humes inabi l i ty to 
perceive himself was not peculiar and "I think* (says he) 
14 
•^ aost unpreju^Uced observers would agree with hia". 
Some mystics, have no doubt claimed to encounter 
their selves but such eases are very rare and the term *I* 
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as I t I s meaningfully used l^ y ooraaoa raaxip laust posaea Caome 
easily aecefjoible T9tazilng*# "It follows'*t iJaesall oonoludea, 
"that the word I as oowaonly csnployedf oust stand for a 
description; i t cannot be a true proper name in the loijiioal 
sense, since trae proper natoes can ojily be conferred on 
15 
objeolsas to which we are acquainted". 
Tie soft data a l t h o u ^ not as indubitable and certain 
as hard data, are nevertheless the objects of our knowledge* 
Htissell, indeed, denies the theoiy held by raany phHoso|*ierB 
that the knowledge of the objects beyond our experience i s 
not possible* lb substantiate t h i s su^es t ion , he makes 
a very subtle and detailed analysis of the terra •experience' 
where i t i s taken to mean as 'dii^sct v.:<f^rifciae*. At any 
giv<m aonent we are aware of certain things which consti tute 
•fsy present experience** This *msr px^sont experience* which 
we say ars the sole data of our knowledge, according to him» 
possesses, certain unity "importcmt to rea l i se but hard to 
analyse". I t raii^t be defined in te ras of vfeat •!• experie-
nce 'now*. But the terras •!» and 'now* arc such that they 
themselves are to be defined in terms of 'ny present exper-
ience* and in no case can be presumed. I t also cannot be 
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defined as *aXl expezlenees mmteapozaneoua with J^ dLS* uh«z« 
thi? stands tor aoae actual paxt of \Aimt X am pz«sently avMjm. 
For there la the possibil ity of i t s being experieaoed by so»ft 
other ainds. Sirailariy to defiiiA i t as •a l l e^erienoea 
vhioh 1 experienoe as oontemporaneoous with ^SXSt* ^ ^ ^^^ 
not do since now we will be ignoring t!»8e porti(»i8 of our 
knowledge Which fa l l short of our attrition i«e* which preawitly 
we are not intreapeotively aware of. I^aaell thiiiks that 
* being experienced together* i s a relation between experioieed 
things which i t s e l f can be experienced and i f so then we can 
define *4y presentoontents of experience* as 'everything 
experienced together with J2)li* ^^x^ this i s any experieneed 
16 
thing selected by attention* 
Bassell*a actual probl^a i s to show that *pres«it 
contents of lay experiaioe** or ttvm,, *my total experi^ooe' 
which I had in past* am hairing presently and will hove in 
ftiture i s not a l l eabnieing* ^hat i s to say, there do exist 
some knowledge-objects t^ich transcend i*e* l i e outside the 
periphery of my subjective experience* l^e ^est ion of 
transcend^ioet according to ^ s a e l l t i s vltatl in theory ot 
knowledge and has important bearings upon one's epistcmologioal 
views* 
fhe sol ipsist theory which denies the possibility of 
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knowledi^e beyond what we perceiTe just now, waa ©no which 
Hue sell himself alwajra thought as being logioally irrefutable, 
^erything is asserted only after its being known and to say 
that we oan know what is not our immediate data at present 
is virtually to say we ©an know \A)iSit we oannot know* "EJvery 
wjrd that we now understand must have a meaning which falls 
within our preseit experienoei w© can n^ver point to an 
17 
object and say} ShX& ^^'^ outsiAe my present ^Kperienoe*** 
Despite this persistent allegianse to the irref^tabliity 
of the solipstist doctrine, Ikissell, ad^mnoes here two argu-
ments, one enipirloal and the other logioal, i4iioh according 
to hia, render it implausible* tn the fii«t place, he says 
that we claia to know things which we have now forgotten. 
We oft^i, for example, try to rei^ Cll the naae of a person Whoa 
I met aoaetiao in past* I am certain t>]ftt the aaae oa&e into 
my experience though presently I as missing it, l^s palpably 
shows that there are data which transcend ay present experience* 
The aaae is seen in the province of mathematics 
"where we nay remember tlmt there are 144 laitities in the 
multiplication table, without remembering them individually 
and we may also know that there are an Infinite number of 
facts in arithmatio of Which only a finite number are present 
18 to our mind*** Moreover our memory tells us that we are 
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used to ooae to be av«are of the ob;}eets whioh did not u n t i l ! 
that tiiae ooour to iie« This &ho\m that tharou^out past our 
expexrlonee has not ham. al l-^abraclna. This also ahovm that 
i f there i s any futuarei wo must encounter the ^ t a whieh 
we have not hi therto eoiae aorosa, A o o ^ l e t e knowledge of 
the universe, ^ ^ s e l l says, auart ijiolude iiihat i s yet to ooiae 
besides what i s and iiAiat has be^i in ay experience* 
On the lof^ical aide, ^ a se l l saya that althou£^ the 
soft data i s not given to me direct ly yet I know osartain 
character is t ics vdiioh I think, applies to i t . In other 
words, we know certain descriptions, \^ich occur in th« 
propoeitions about a part icular soft datum* '^his pi»po3ition 
can be analysed into simpler propositions which will be 
about those objects which W3 rmj direct ly experience. I f 
there are objects in ray experience which answer the terms of 
simple proposition, then the <^mplex propositions about 
the thing must be t rue . That i s , we aay be sfire about the 
exi!5tence of a things whoii i t eludes sy iiaraidiate experi«»ioe« 
i f the proposition about i t can be analysed into the propo-
s i t ions which l^ve purely experiential objects as t h e i r 
constitu^aits, For instance, i f we know Jones and paternity 
and the fact that every person has fsather, we can know the 
t ruth of the proposition t i ^ t "Jones has a father** without 
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directly experiencing thia complex fact* In the region of 
taathematlca too we acquire knowledge througji descriptions. 
for example "we know that there i s no greatest Prime nuiber. 
But of a l l the prime nuiabero that we shall have «v«? thought 
of there certainly i s a greatest . Hence there are prima 
numhero greater thmi •ay t^nt \;G s^iall have ever t h o u ^ t of n 19 
From the reasons above adduoedt it can be concluded 
that we can know pretty much things apart from those that 
fall within the ^ope of m^ present axperienoe« Some other 
reaa<»i8 are also helpftil in answering the question how do 
we coTM to know that *our total* experlcBioe* is not all em-
bracing? 'JMa questiGn» presupposes another question which 
it is necessary to disentangle to. It la why do we regard 
our past and preseait c^erionees as all parts of one experien* 
be, namely,the experience whidh we call ours? 
It is obvious that it is m«aoxy through which %ra 
come to know our pavt experiences and which arables us to 
call them as •ours*. It is not that only those objects that 
we are presently remaabering are our experience, but that 
there is a \AIO1B nexus of experiences lii&ed IQT memory which 
all together oonstittrfee our experience* 
But, however, Bussell thinks, it is not memory per se 
that connects present to our past in this manner, but m&aory 
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of a certain sort. The objects of aeaory are not only those 
which we actually have experienced but also those Which vr« 
have not experleaeed at all. For ex^aple wh«i 1 hear a atrio* 
king clock I com© to know that it haa alrcdldy struck at several 
tinioa, thou^ I was not atteoitive enougji to hear the previous 
atrockes. Sv®i if I have acttially experienced thea^ I am 
now flailing to remember that I have done so. In this case* 
therefoxOf there are two kinds of aoaoxy distinguished fros 
each other. One is the rseooxy in whi<0) we r^^wiber only the 
stricking of oloek which is an outside event and the other in 
which we reaeaber the eacperienoing of -^Q event, auseell 
TBaintains that it is the latter kind of meaoxy that forms 
links between our present experiences and those of past, 'Eb 
remember the experiencing of something, according to hia. 
Implies that we can include that remembered experiencing in 
our present experiencing and so also those which we ai^t 
have remembered at that eaxliar time and "so back hypotheti-
21 
eally to the ea i l i e s t Inf&noy", In the same msamer we* 
can hypothetleally stretch our personality forward in time 
to a l l expexleneing which %dLll nnaember ovce present experiences 
direct ly or indi rec t ly . 
I t i s evident from what i s said above that apart from 
present contents, our to t a l experience ineltidea the objects 
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that we have experienced In paet and if time ia oontinu©d» 
as it IB Teedly pretty p3robable, then also thoae whioh \m 
will experiaaoe in future, Httssell soma up the whole diseu-
ssion in following pasoage* 
•*Jh« coneluaion to w h l ^ we have been led 
fcry the above diaoiaaaion io that aoae of the thtn^ 
in the woridf but not all, are collected together 
at any given moment of lay ooneeioua life into a 
group whioh aay be called *wy present experieneeS 
that this group embraces things existing now, 
things that existed in the past and atHstzaot 
f&etsi also that in my experience of a thing, 
something laore thaji the mere thing ia involved 
and roay be experienced in meaoxyi that thus a 
total ^p»up of ay experiences thzoui^out tiae 
nay be defined by means of ra^aory, but that this 
group, like the aoaeatary group, certainly does 
XK>t contain all abstract facta and appears not 
to contain all existing particulara and in esp©-. 
oial does not contain the experiencing whioh we 22 
believe to be associated with other peoples bodies". 
In ^ 8 analysis of expenenoe of this stage, Dussell 
retains the overbotmd aiphasls that im previously laid upon 
its relational nature* He criticises the neutxnl laonists 
who reduce aind into the stream of consciousness saying that 
in a ease of knowing the known ob;Jeet does not confront any 
transcendental subject, but only some other object of the 
•lailar sort. According to hia, an object mig^t be experien-
ced by two persons ainrultaneoualy but the experiencing of the 
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exp&rimkee of tliat object l a exoluaively one's own and does 
not In any eaee overlap. I can experience ray experiencing 
of an object and t h i s i s in no way lo??icaHy b^und up with 
my other expenenctng as tho neutal sumlets suppose* Hence 
experiencing I s a simple relation between the thln« experien^ 
oieng l.e« subject and the thin^ experiaiced I . e . object and 
th i s relat ion «an be rmm^id as •acquaintance*. 
Each case of acquaintance i s essentially a mental 
occurrenoe» althoui^ the objects need not be mental. The 
acquaintance Is possible only vdien the objects by relat ion 
theiaselves with subjects oake I t a complex fact . The bare 
object un->espou8ed with subject i s always physical, iiubject 
rmd object are two dis t inct and independent teanas of a case 
of knowledgCf subject i s m«ital and object la physical. 
"'ha-* the s€;ii:;'?-data (o 'jeot) are physical, has already been 
discussed in previous chapter and th i s question* fbr that 
raat-^er, need not engage us here. A quotation f«>?ti h is a r t i c l e 
"Tritinate Constituents of flatter" i s , however, worthr*5peatlng 
he? r e . 
"When I sec a flash of l ightning, ray ee^^lng 
of i t i s !iwa1»l, but what I see . . . . I s not mental. 
I maintain, Infact, that i f the physicist could 
describe truelyaand fully a l l t l » t occurs In the 
physical woild yhea there i s a flash of lightning, 
I t would contain as a constituent what X seo and 
also '>4iat i s seaa by any body else who would coian* 
only be said to see the sarae fl.ash. ftaiat I mean 
iway p^ihaps be raade plainer by saying timt i f ray 
body could resiain in exactly the same s ta te in 
which i t i s , a l t h o u ^ ray mind had ceased to exis t , 
precisely the object which I now see when I see 
the flash would exis t , although of course I should 
not see I t , since ay seeing i s mental.25 
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BbsselXt indeed refuses to subscribe to the Idealist's 
contention t)»t objects are mental since they are dependent 
upon the mental selves. A careful analysis of the words 
•independent* «nd*self*, according to ansaell, will amply, 
sbovf that in a particular case of experiencing, 'self* and 
•object* are two distinct teras and nor^ can be reduced to 
other. 
lb take *self* flrstt it may be seen that it can be 
defined in two ways vis. in tezms of bare subject t^ which 
objects are preseated or otherwise in tenas of the 'iiAolc 
assemblage of the things that would necessarlty case to exist 
if our lives come to an end*. Wor cur pres^it purposes, the 
first definition is inadaissible since our knowledge of bare 
subject is inferred. The second definition too involves a 
practical difflcult^^ w'lioh is that we can not specify which 
things are dependent upon our lives. Moreover this defini-
tion introduces the term 'depwident* which re<|alres a 
definiti<ai in the saae manner as our second tern 'independent*. 
It is therefore better to analyse first the term dependent 
(or Independent) and thrai proceed to do same with 'self*. 
Onething is said to be dependent upon another whoa, 
either it is that it Is not logically impossible to conceive 
one without the other or otherwise when the two are so causally 
related that one can exist only aa being an effect of the 
other. Tloreover one thing Is said to be dependent upon other 
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other i4i«a the former is a part of latter, lb say, thwa, 
that no reality eatists indepaident of our selves Is to say 
that our stlf is a necessary ingredient of all reality• How 
what€rsror be the definition of self, this contention is pal-
pably ab8tird« Idealism is thus shown ffelee by reduQti,p §^ 
The (peetion whether or not the objac'^s o^ experienee 
are oausally related to the subject is one which involves 
gr^t oomplioationa* It ia quite obvioua that m«ital events 
like feeling! desiring, judging are eauaally dependent upon 
the subjeet for their occurr«ao«» But it is diffioult to 
aay that same is the case with the sensations, CoiSRion sense 
assn?3as that sense-Ksbjeote persist even when we ©ease to 
exx>erlenoe thera, and, are therefore, independent of our 
selves. l^t if it io shown, as some philosophers really 
pretend to do, that they cannot exist unless sensed, the 
belief in their independence would beoose question beg,^ ing« 
•Piie (pestion at hand is tl^refore reducible to the 
question tliat whether or not the objects persist when they 
not 
are/given to our sense? IJhis latter question too involves 
two separate probl®as# First, can we kxnov tl^t the objects 
of sense or very sindlar objects exist at times ^hen we are 
not experiencing them and second, if this cannot be known. 
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can we know that other objects infenali le from the objects of 
aensQ Ijut not neoesaarlly resemblixig thamt exist e i ther when 
we are experiencing the objects of sense or a t any other ttraef 
These question reqtJijre a detailed disotiasion for t h e i r precise 
anawer and we shall t e tum to thea a l i t t l e l a t e r . For 
present we nay assume in the l i ^ t of preceding discussion 
that a case of experiencing always involves an irreducible 
relationship tjctween the experisnoing subject and the 
experienced object. 
But liere the objection aay be raised that if , as 
Hussell hiBself adaitOt we do not have the knowledge of our 
bare selves, how can we just i f iably sustain our aubjeot-i-objeet 
dist inction in experience, auasell confesses, that i f the 
knowledge of bare selves i s indiapenaalAe for si^intaining 
the dualism, we certainly can no longer asser t i t with 
warrant and that the doctrine of neutral sKinism will then bo 
t r ue . But he thinks tlmt he can show that there does not 
exist any necessary connexion betweesi the knowing of subject 
and asserting the subjeot-objeot diKilisia att<Sh that the for^aer 
i s indispensable for the l a t t e r . His arguaent i s siajay thlss 
I t aay be seen that when we are experi^iolng an 
experience of an object (mty 0) what i s before ay ffllnd i s the 
oofoplex "something acquainted with O*. The subject i s here an 
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apparcait varlal^e la thcr than asay precise individual. There-
fore i t i s perfectly possible to auppose the above oonplex aa 
25 
a datwm, inspi te of our ln<»paolty to he aoqtialnted vd+h subject. 
Moreover Jh&n two obj^'cto, say 0 and 0» are ©iratiltaneously 
presented to me, the feet I experience i s "something acquainted 
with 0 and 0*, That i s to say, the two objects have a comiaon 
subject althougji i t i s not direct ly known. 
I t follows that the mere fact that we do not have 
acquainlance of self does not prevent us from maintaining a 
subject-object dualism in experience* The self i s known 
a lbe i t indirect ly and i s therefore a necessary term of experi-
encial re lat ion, 
Sussell admits the mental substance as a neoes^try 
Ingredient of the fact of a given case of experience. He, 
however, doee not do the same in regard to material substances. 
His theoiy of experience i s a two-factor theory in which 
objects come in a simple relat ion to the subject. But the 
•objects* are not material snili^tances Which suboist different 
data but data themselves. Due to the passive character of 
sensations, i t i s natuazal to assume that they are produced 
by some outside eauaeCs). But that i s a l l . Ihat i s , what, 
a t best, we can say i s that our sensations have some outside 
cause, not that the o':>jeot3 of sensations themselves are caused 
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by some external thing. Our expert**neinJ5 I s no doubt cawsal 
»nA rplat ionsl In nature, Taut the relation in -luestlon la luy 
no means betwecsi rain A and raaterlal ;inbstanoe| I t I s simply 
betweai the mind and data, The attempt to Iwtng In the notion 
of material substance 1?3 both dubious and unnecessary. 
Conte|nt Theory ije.lecte^ 
I t I s fa i r ly evident fixi*ii abwe that BuaseH's theory 
of exportenelal knowled/je Is a two-fector theoi^ and being 
^To, iB 8?^rply contrasted with the representative thwirieo 
of Helnons and Aaerlean Crl t leal Heal ls^ Who lntro*ioe a 
th i rd fSaetor, the •content* between the subject and object. 
I t I s hold that in a ^ a e of knowledge, the object known to 
subject l8 always represented Toy the •content ' , or 'Ua^g©' or 
•idea* which lo a l u a ^ , Ilk© the act of experiencing, pityehleal 
as opposed to the object i t - s e l f which need not necessarily he 
ao. 
One of the arguments adduced to saibatantlate thia 
theory la the argument from • i l lus ion ' . We often come across 
the appearances of objects which we think are not real such 
as the bent s t ick, mirage, dream«objecta, There are also the 
ideas which do not have the i r refer^ita in actual world such 
as th*? ideas of •unlcom*, •winged horse ' , ' t^lden mountain' 
e t c . Likewise there i s the phenom^ion of memory In which 
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something i s knom althoug^h I t l a not present to the aenaes. 
I t follows from a l l these that something other than the 
object la piresented to subject in order to eonatltute a oase 
of knowledge* 
Another armment for the c»nt«5nt theory i s th ls i We 
have the expen^iod of blue and the experienoe of green. 
Mow, obviously, the two objects share in the q a l l t y of both 
t he i r being obleota sX «ypyi^ ertenea. a»t they are also diffe-
rent In some other reopeott for otherwlae no dist inction 
^letween them %rt.ll remain. This difference, i t i s alleged, 
la due to the cpntents which we have in our minde* 
3ut ^auaaell, in the f i r s t place,denies altogether the 
existerice of i l lus ive or delusive experiences. What Indeed 
13 the baala of our diaoririliiation nM dis t inct ion betweim 
the ssCaHed real appearances and the i l lus lory ones. 
Iliere i s qualitatively no differoace between the appearance 
r5f straight stick and the bent one and therefore both raust 
be equally genuine* I t i s matter of sheer liablt on* pre-
judice on the part of ooiinon sian, and in the case of philo-
oophers, of lo??ioal ineonsistanoy to take one as real and 
the other aa non-real. 
The supposed non»»reallty of bent s t ick or other l ike 
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pheiioaoaa i a due to t h e i r uriwaual nature l « e , due to the fact 
t h a t i t I s not posalble for ua to co r re l a t e mid Tsake then 
conaiutent srfith o thor objccta of axperieiMJS i n th« way whieh 
experionoe haa led us t o regard *noTml\ Tl-id the drea.>. 
objects ( for exai^pla) bean moro recurront , nore cousla toat 
-'lid last lzig for a f a i r long parlod of tirae we would have put 
same : ^ l t h in thaa ae we do tr\ the oveAts of ac tua l world* 
" D'ajects of S6aMi«"» I ^ s s e l l says , "are ©allod r ea l wh«n 
they have the kind of connection with o the r objects of sense 
which experience has led u® to regard as r e a l ; vhmx they 
f a l l In t h i s th^y a re ca l l ed • i l lus ions*« 3«t what i s i l l u -
s lo ry i s only the infertmceo which they give r i s e ; in thenK 
selves they are every h i t a s r e a l as the objects of vakixig 
26 
l i f e " . I t l a , a s a raatter of f ac t , our i n s t i n c t i v e fa i th 
In t he * th ing in - i t s e l f* being beyond and behind sanse-da-^ 
t ha t leado us to d l s c r i a lna t e one experieaioe with o ther •••IM*. (say) the appearance of the "oeait s t i ck with the s t r a i ^ t one, 
?hat the re should not be any dlseri jainat ion between 
the ' r ea l* and * i l l u s ive* appeiiranoesof a th ing was h i o t o -
r l o a l l y contended, tB,T before Busaell , hy Bmst Mach, a 
German i ^ y s l c l s t , in h i s wojfc Ana^ya^? a | Bgaisatitais. In 
t h i s , Ilach l i k e Buss«fll, proved a i^iyaiologioal basis to 
h i t h e r t o psychic phenomena and, a s a l og ica l coLiollary, put 
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an end to the age-long contrast between wttat he oalXed "appe* 
arance" and "rwtllty" raeoning oliviously IHQT thera the •illualoyy 
appeamnce* and the *r<[al one* respootlvely* 4e aay that 
the pencil dipped into water axmeaira eroocked while in reality 
it is straight, "aut What juattfles na", aaka Mach", in 
declaring one fact rather than other to he the reality and 
degrading the other to the level of appearance? In both 
cases, (he §oe8 on)t we have to do id.th facts which present 
us with different cotabinations of the elements, combinations 
-27 
which in the two cases are differently oonditionsd ••••••"^ 
Like Has£3ell, Maioh says that i t i s rather due to the i r 
abnormal nature that we take the dream-objects or bent s t ick 
as appearoncea as contrasted with r ea l i ty , "fo be sure**, says 
ftach, "our expectation i s deceived whin not paying su f f idaa t 
at tention to the conditions and substi tuting for one another 
different oases of coiabii^tiona, we f a i l into the natural 
error of expecting what we are accustomed t o , a l t hou^ the 
case iilay be an unusual one ••••••• In th i s <mse, " he 
continues," to sp^Oce of appeaxonce s^y have a pract ical 
meaning but oaniiot !^ve selentlw^o aeanlng • . ••*• In our 
\«klng Iwurs the relat ions of elements to one another are 
i'lnensly amplified in compr>.n.3on with what they were in 
dreams. We eeco^ ise the dream for what i t i s , When th© 
- t25 -
process ia rerversed, the f ield of psyohioal vision la 
narzowedf the contrast i s ent irely lacking* Where there Is 
no contrast", (includes Maoht" the dlBtinotlon betwe«o the 
dreaa and waking (or ibr that matter between the hcnt and 
s t ra ight appaaxonces of pendD * between apparanoes and 
26 
r ea l i t y , i s quite otolae and worthless** • 
How returning to Bus sell* we find that the oaas of 
rueraorywexperlOTice i s a l i t t l e taore c«aplloated« I t prima 
f a d e appears that unloss thare la a content representing 
the object of raeiaory the CKcperienoe in qosstlon oGUinot occur* 
for the actual object i s not presezxt. My • s t a t e of aind* 
when I aa r^ierabering an object auat be different from ay 
s t a te of mind when I do not* !4elnon£*s oontoita, lusacl l 
thinks, can be reduced into wihat i s ordinari ly called the 
s ta te of lalnd, "Phe question therefore l a that whether or 
nor there are ' s t a t e s of mind* as opposed to the objects 
cognised in 'mrioua ways. But, aa %»8ell has already shown, 
the raeiaory-cxpenence consists In the experlemje of a 
coi3pl« fact v i s . "experience of the reaeraborlng of the obj-
ect" , now since th i s ooaplex cannot be placed a t any definite 
position Int iae aeriea, the supposition that the "cont^ats 
must be present becomes gratultlous* The reaemberlng sub-
ject i s no doubt present but the contents of laaaory need 
not be "present" in any definite a^oise of the term* 
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What ia true for the mesaory-Hsbjecta i s also trua for 
the objects which do not belong to any time at a l l , So ffeir 
as thf? case of chlmertcal ent i t iea l ike ualoom, eteldea-aounc 
ta ln e tc , la conceznedf l^seel l had already shown th^a to 
be non-entltiee 1^ h is theory of descriptions. I t i s not that 
they are objects lujocexlstent, but rather they are not objects 
a t a n . 
The raost forceful argum^it In favour of content 
theory* was, according to Bos sen , that derived from the 
OS tensive difference between the tvw experiences, The 
experi^ice of blue and the experlenoe of green cannot be 
difierentiated In terms of the 'act* which I s coanou between 
thesli I t i s only the content of the act In which the d i s -
t inct ion can be sought, Superficially i t tmy sr-m. that in 
experiencing blue and then experieaaoing gre«i our ladnd 
undergoes some laodifloatlons. But in th i s idea of subjective 
T^odifioatlon, thinks Hnseellf luiScs the axiom of internal 
relat ion which he had already rejected. I t jaigjit have be«a 
thou^^t that the difference of objects raust correspond to 
Boae difference in the subject to ^^iloh the objects are 
presented. But, according to 3uss«ll*8 ovm theory of external 
re la t ions , the difference of relat ions affords no evidence 
for difference of in t r ins ic predicates. I t follows that the 
i s difference in two experiences/not due to sAae ' In t r ins ic 
obanije in nind* which occur when two different oejects taak« 
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t h e i r Impressions upon I t j the difference between objects 
by I t s e l f suff ices to explain the d i f ferent In experiences. 
On the pos i t ive s i d e , the chief d i f f i c u l t i e s tha t the 
content theory faces i s tha t the supposed contents a re not 
the objects which we can be a\iare of» We ar?? presented with 
external t ang ib le things and tha t there mediates sorae content 
between the«n and our nind i s c e r t a lb ly not known to u s . The 
Bara* d i f f i cu l ty i s of course, with A i s s e l l ' s own theory of 
acquaintance in which the sxxbject is admitted although i t i s 
not experience, Tut as Hussell himself says , h i s theory, 
" i t based on inference from the nature of experience, not on 
any supposed in t rospec t ive perception of the oubject ." 
The representa t ive theory of the o ther hand can s t ibs tant la te 
I t s e l f only on the p o s s i b i l i t y of In t rospec t ive awar^^ness 
of the contents , 2*0r the arguments t h a t i t adduces in 
support of i t , as in shown above, a re not v a l i d aiad cogent, 
Ifed they been va l id and cof^ent, then, says Hussell , he 'nlfjht 
have accepted I t . "If*, Russell goes on," the ari^uments 
by which 'liinong supports h i s bel ief in contents had appeared 
to us v a l i d , we should have adiaitted contents ; iiut in the 
absence of v a l i d ar^juraents in t rospec t ive evidence alone 
could lead us to admit contents , liince such evidence l a 
lackln,^, we aay therefore conclude tha t there i s 210 reason 
tn admit contents" . 
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%chiotion ot Qotmon Saaae World 
I t has beon noted eaxll«r that for Ibis sel l* th» object 
term In «xpexl«itlal relat ion i s aense«data and not any 
material aubstanee* Senee^data in thea^elTsa consti tute tlie 
object of knowledfifs and are not afspreaentative of anything 
beyond themselves, l!he view that sense^data represent sorae-
thing of which they are functions i s , according to aussellt 
a product of an uaifortunate blending of our tv» belie:^—--
one that there sMSt be soaething persist ing indep^idently of 
being known in sensation and the other that the changing; 
appearance of a thing i s <kie to changes in our own position 
not in the thing i t s e l f . Our inst inct ive fSaith in the per-
sistence of objects of knowledge i s the root cause of our 
belief in the existence of an indep^sident physical world, 
: ^ t , s t r i c t l y speaJcing smything we are ent i t led to 
asser t i s thing which we ^sperience a t a giv«i aomant* Matter 
of physics, even i f i t ex is t s , la quite elusive to our direct 
experience. I t follows that i f physics i s to be ver i f iable 
i t iiust base i t s e l f upon these raoaentary soa^eM^bjects or a t 
best on an aggregate of these objecteandthose which are very 
rauch sirailftr to these in the i r nature. In other words, we 
must reduce physical world into the actual 8eQpBe»data as well 
as those which are possible i , e , aensibi l ia , in order to aake 
physics an experiential sciea^tce. 
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auaoell proposes to reduce aubatantial aaterlal thing 
Into aenolbllia which Includes both actual and hypothetical 
senaa, Hypothatioal aeaisa mre not experienoedf their knovi-
ledge is inferred froa the actual sensa. But the question 
wao that Why we infer hypothetical senaa fir>m the s<mae-data? 
;^y do we not Infer from thea the aubatantial laaterial thing? 
For Russellt the reason is that the latter involves raore riek 
than the fonser, tlnexperiwioed sensa are similar in their 
nature and status with the experlraniwid datat vdtile the s^teriai 
thin/^ are radically dissimilar and different* aenslhilia are 
what are oapalale of being experlenoed whereas the things are 
utterly inexperioncihle* Therefore it is safer to infer the 
former as against the latter. 
In straightforv^urd oases the reduction is not far too 
difi'icult and can be aocoapliehed without lauoh ado» In coramon-
sense langtmge* for exani^et we state our different experiences 
of a table while morins about it \xy saying that we get diffe-
rent appearances of the aagw table %ihlle aoving around it or 
we say that a table causes different appeazfinces when viewed 
froa different places* Now If we svolA the talk of fixed and 
peiwment table we can simply say that there are soise imiscular 
and other <^an^ea which mp^e us say we are walking, whidh are 
connected In soiae way with the eontinucusly ohan^^iw; visual 
sensations in the way that gradual changes in (aay> colour are 
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alight enou^ to remain unnoticed. Talking thia way, we will 
be s ta t ing same feet a l t h o u ^ no aasuaption would be Involved, 
But th i s r e a c t i o n ia a b i t diff icult in eases where 
the a l tera t ions in appearances are due to what coraaon sense 
would ca l l a l tera t ions in intervening aediua such as when we 
put on blue epeotaclcffl or look througji a lalcroscope or press 
our eye ba l l s . The problem ia how to maintain subjeot-objeot 
dualisa while accounting; for the preaenoe of something which 
makes the appearances changed? for escample* we put on Mue 
spectacles and things ai^ear blue. How for f^ws^on sense i t 
i s easy to aay that appearances of th ini^ are changed because 
a blue glass intervenes between the eyes and the things seen. 
But aowrdlng to aas8ell*s theory subject i s acquainted 
only with the objects seen (here blue things) and i s not av^re 
of any intervening thing, Yet he thinks i*(at colours are 
changed. I t wil l not do to aay that as when we see throu{^ 
a dir ty pan of gHassn ^ a s s r^aains v is ib le so also con we 
see thrott4i;h Mue spectacles while being unaware of the pres^ace 
of i t , For in dir ty glaiss i t i s only eieaner parts that make 
us see beyond i t and they remain inviaiblet d i r t i e r specks 
thensielves become objects of sense. I t follows that by s»ans 
of sense of a i ^ t alone we oannot aooount for 1*« changes in 
appearances which according to ooamonsense ar« due to cMnges 
in Intervwalng msditia. 
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The existence of blue ^e^&at aXthoti^ unknowable to 
Ben&9 of sl^t» o£m be Icnoun l:^  sense of touch* Vie can aoTr^' 
late the space of touch with apace of aigjit and thus assert 
that there Is something intervening between ourself ancl the 
objects which makes their appearances blue* This correlation 
may be exposed to certain piaotloal difficulties but is theo-
retically possible and igsy therefore be supposed accomplished. 
But one difficulty still we face which ia this. We 
are assusdng that blue aj«etacles exist when we are not touch-
ing it* From our theory it oan exist only so long as it is 
object of our sensation. And Inssell ooraes to the concdLusion 
that this assumption is actually inescapable in accounting 
for the changed appearance of things and that Is why he 
proceeds to s e ^ grounds for this assumption* 
It will not be refuted that wh«a we see a coloured 
surface we can expect certain tactu^ sensations that we c»n 
^ T s if we touch that thing. This leads us to ^ y that it 
has those qualities of hairdness or softness whether or not we 
touch it. Thus whenever there is some alteration in visual 
appearances of things (in this caset change In colour), we 
must presuitts on the basis of fact of alteration that there is 
some Intervwilnft thing which would be tactually experienced 
if we pbt OUT fingers at a certain place in tou<*t space. 
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striotly speaking the preoence of spectacles Is still not 
satisfactorily acooimted for, laut, says ^tssellf if we wish 
to avoid the greater aasuaption of material suhstanee, this 
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Huch of assumption Is nec^sary* 
Hussell sums up the whole discussion in following wordss 
'*We oan now gX'V9 a statonsent of the ttcperleneed 
facts eonoezning the blue sp«otacles Which will 
supply an interpretation of Qomsaean sense beliefs 
without assuming anything beyond the existcsioe of 
sensible objects at the tliaes when they are aenai-
ble. By experience of the correlation of touch 
and sight sensations we become SkW.e to associate 
a certain place in touch splice with a certain 
correspondtni; place In sight space, Soaotimes, 
namely In ths case of transpareixt things we find 
there is a tangible object in a touch place vdth-
out there being any visible object In "tiie corres-
ponding si^t place. But in such a case as that 
of blue spectacles we find that whateiver object is 
visible beyond the empty sight place in the saae 
line of sight has a dlt^erent colour from what 
it has when there is no tangible object in touch 
space, the blue patch moves in ai{^t space, vhmi 
we have no sensible experience of an Inteivenlng 
tangible object, we nevertheless infer that if 
we i^ our hand at a certain place In toudi space 
we should experience a certain touch»sensatlon. 
If we are to avoid non-sensible objeots^ t M s 
must be taken as the whole of our aeaning when 
we say that the blue spectacles are in a certain 
X^ace thou^ we have not touched them and have 
only seen other things rendered blue by their 
interpoBltlon3,32 
aeoonstruetion of P h ^ i c ^ World 
From above what in nutshell Russell wants to say is 
that our whole knowledge consists of the objects which actually 
come in our experience plus those which although not data of 
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expQrienee a m , novertheXeas, eapa^e of bein^ data* The 
l a t t e r ltass«ll ca l l s •senslbllla* which Include the senaa 
which can ho experimioed T:^  aoae one provided he ooraea in 
contact with that and those which are not ^perlisieed a t 
a l l f hot are of saae nature and statue* 
I t Is necessary to make the diatlnotion toetwe^i sense-
data and senseMlla for whereas the former are our raost Inda-
Mtable ki»wledge» the l a t t e r , being Inferred, admit an 
eleaaat of doubt* I t i s obvious that a l l a«aae-data are 
senelbil ia but not conversely* Bixasc^ i l l u s t r a t e s the 
2>elatlQn between sense-data and senslbl l la by the analogy 
of husband and loan* All husbands are men but not a l l oesi are 
husbands* Iloreover, as a man beooiaes a husband a f te r ooialng 
In the re la t ion of laarrlage so does beooae the sens lb l l la , 
sense-da^ af ter being a term of experiential relation* ^ e 
cannot laeanlngfully ask the question vri^ether 8ense~>data 
exis t when they are not experlwioed? ¥ov sense-data i s by 
definition what la actually given to the senses* The r l f^ t 
question will be whether senslbl l la exist without being 
glv«a? or whether a part icular sensible can be a t one time a 
33 
aense-datum but at other tlae not* 
After reducing the eoraaon saiise world into senaibl l la , 
what remains for Bassell i s to provide I t with the persistence 
and perewienee as well as objectivity that the l a t t e r enjoyed* 
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In other words* he had /oonatruct upon the debris of ooaiaon 
oense voxldt a real speolo-tempoasal world eoaalatlng only 
of s^fwory ohjeots. 
We all use In our ordinary life vords like near, ?ar, 
here* there, tiiM opaoe and so forth* The problem waa hov 
to give an interpretation of these viords solely In terms of 
senaa? Bussell had to bridge the gulf that exists between 
the fugitive and fluctuating world of sense and the pexnanent 
and tangiblf world of physios. The taUcs was fomidabLe and 
Bussell claiow only to give a rou^ sketch of the way throu^^ 
which it can be aoooispliahed. The third article of his lowel 
Lectures under the title "The World of Physics and the ^JUA 
of Sense" is devoted to this possibility. Since the subject 
only briefly 
is, in the laain loataidiysioal we shall consider it/so as to laake 
our present discussion complete* 
The aain difficulty that beset the task of reconstruction 
\mB the notion of 'ccmtent* which supposedly intervened between 
the awital subject and its physical object. The theoxy was 
such that Bussell himself was one oonrinced of its force. 
But, as he hloself related, Dr. T.p, Nuna's article "Are aeoondar; 
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Qualities Independent of Perception" flhowed hia a way out. 
We have seon how Btis d l rejected •content theoiy* by 
rendering the arguments upon Which it is based, false besides 
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pointing to the difficulties to whioh it l» exposed* The isaia 
v/e 
argument for this theory, as/have aeen» was the alleged impossi-
bility of two contradictory appearances of amsm thing, aassell 
now says that the view that the t ^ oontzadiotozy appearances 
of a thing cannot atonce be real, is a pxoduot of an over-
aio^lified view of space* ki object of experittice do<^ not 
exist at one place* Instead, two places are involved ......p^^ 
one at which it is experiaioed and the other from which it is 
experienced* These two plAoes are located in two dififerent 
spaces. The place from which a sett8e«>datum ia experienced, 
liLissell calls • private space*. When I ara seeing (say) a patch 
of colour, I am seeing it in a space which is private to ae 
and if the existence of other observers ia assumed then there 
he 
may/an indefinite number of spaces in vrtiloh that patch of <K>lour 
can be experienced* Tlie difference in appearances is due to 
the dlvei^ity of spaces in \rtiich they are situated* But as 
they are nonthelesa situated in spaces* their physical and 
objective character ia by no means damaged* And hence no (fuestioi: 
arises as to their being merely aubiective fantasms "iith no 
objective content* 
Bussell compares his theory of space with Leilnis*s 
theory of monads. Like awnads, each persons have their own 
three dimensional world in which they perceive things* And 
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ainee all these mcmads hiave ao place oowaon amoag themselYoa, 
they oanaot see exactly the same thing aliaultaneoBiSly, ^ere 
raust he dlffereno* in appeazanoe, howe^ rer alight it s^y he* 
Mhen the appearances that two or more thsn tv»o persons 
have are no similar that they use one word to name theat then 
arises the notion of an external thing othei* than and tnde-
pendant of the appearances* All appearances are real in as 
much as they are objects of knowledgej the thing beyond appea-
rance is not known to exist* 
k given place froa which the things are experienced, is 
naned by xKussellt • perspective* and all the places from which 
sense-data are actially experienced i»e# private spaces ho 
calls 'perceived perspectives*, Besides perceived perspectives, 
there caay be an innumerable perspectives fronj which a particular 
thing may be experienced in the sarae way as in the fonaer# 
If two men are seQin/s; a table in the room then there are two 
T>ereeived perspectives in which the two visual tables are si-
tuated* But betw©«i these two perspectives there is a series 
of unpereeived perspectives and if a third sian comes and sits 
between the tw> persons than a third perceived perspective 
comes into existence* Lo^jioally, admits Bissellt we cannot 
know and for that matter assert the exi3t<a«s© of these unpeiv 
chived perspectives* Ikit as a possible phsnorasnon thetsp exis-
tence is not inadmissible* Perspectives n , perceived and 
unperceived, collected together fona what Bnssell i^lla *system 
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of perspectives*. "^  
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Besides the m&ny private spaces # there la one all-
enhraolng objective space of which all private spaces are 
memberis, Huasell calls it •perspective space* and it eontaina 
as its eleaaats the perceived perspectives as well as an 
innuraerable unperceived ones, fhls • perspective spaces 
according to Hussell» oaimot be kaowathrong experi^KM 
it can only be known by inference* We can c«matruct it by 
connecting and correlating perspectives which are slnilar 
eanough to be called by a single iiaa«« 
I'upposing for ea^ tmple* I am seeing at this moraeat a 
circular peBB!iy» This means that there is a perceived pe:^ » 
speetive which contains a circular appeai«mce to be called 
•penny*. Now I ajove a *tep towards penny and it begins 
looking a bit bi®;er and clearer, Then by reverting I get 
a step backward froa my original position* This time the 
appearance of penny becomes sli/^tly saaller and vaguer. In this 
way ^ .Q get three positions («e can multiply the number of 
positions by aovin^ forward and backward) In a aeries of 
line froni which the penny gives vaiying appearances. These 
perspectives (in which the penny looks droulazO will be 
said to lie on a stral/^ ht line in perspective space and 
their order on this line will be that of the sia© of the 
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circular aspects. 
We may draw a straight line ooimecting the perspectives 
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whose oarder la auoh tltfit every second perspective contains 
appearance of circular penny lal^ gcr than Its first, the 
termination of which is the perspective where the penny 
ceases to f^ve any appearance (ae it comes ao nea.T to our 
eyes to cover them, as we aay), 1*hen we draw a similar 
stralfjht line on which lie the perspectives containing ell-
iptical appearance of the same penny in the same order» 
llie place where the two lines will intereaect, will he the 
place where the penny la, This place will be an element in 
the perspective space and it would he the place from which 
the penny oroduoea varying apyearancea to the percepi?jnta 
situated at different places. It would also, according to 
Husaell, he the place with which physics is concerned as 
asainst psychology which ooncemes itself with the places 
in private spaces from which the given penny la experienced. 
fhe thing in perspective space with which phyaioa is 
concewied. Is however merely a logical oonatruction. Only 
the systea of its different aspects that occur in the perw 
C'-^iv^jd and (hypothetically) in imperceived perspectives, are 
real. It is when the 'perspective* (private space) In which 
a given thing looks l^ ii^ er la nearer to the place where the 
P'>ysloal thing is that we say that that perspective la nearer 
to thing ill comparison with other perspectives in which it 
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s r ^ l l e r , rioreover the place l a the perspect ive space which 
i s occupied by our pr ivate apace would he c a l l e d 'he re* , 
W'h<su th" placo where the th lqgla s i tua ted i s neaTor to our 
r l v ' t e space we would aay to i t be near to 'her©* • '-iijal-
l a r l y our saying t}» t our tijlnda a re ins ide our hefids crm 
iBo be explained by aayim; t h a t our p r iva te world la a 
place in perspect ive space and n^y be par t o t the place where 
the head i s , AxiB so on and so fo r th . 
In thlB way, auaael l constructed a p ic ture of the 
world which, however, waa in h i s own word^ l a rge ly hypot-
h e t i c a l . I t was hypo t ' letIcJil In tha t i t admitted and i n -
cluded Into I t s a a t e r l a l a those fac ts which were not psycl^-
l o ^ c a l l y prirai t ive but derived from thea . I t was ne re r -
the l eas the world which aay be a c t u a l . There were pos i t ive ly 
no i^rounds to support n e i t h e r were the re rniy t o denoliah 
i t . The only ground for I t a preferejaoe upon the world of 
eo!i»nonaense v*a3 tha t aft '^r asmimin^ i t t he re did not reaain 
any neceaaity to assume i^jratuitloualy the so ca l led t h i n g s . 
In other words i't f i l l e d the ieaaand of Occam^s imaor which, 
a s in the vei7 be ,0.nln^ of chapter ir«iflf v«3 the aole laoti-
va t ing and guidini? idea of t ^ s s e l l i n h i s endeavour to pro-
vide the physics ;in enp i r ioa l tesia. The world of aensiicxllle. 
i n 1^8sel l ' s own words, could be used with a e^rtaii i anioimt 
of t rouble to inter i^rete the crude fac t s ot sense, the fac t s 
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of physica and the tacta of Psyohology-imioh of th i s analysis 
io retfiined by Ikscell in his laentral monistic stage (upon 
which vm are now to embaHc) , only the scope in which the 
same appi^-'.-ua ie to '•*© applied Is Qilarged and extcjided. 
The *ego* or 'self* i s renjoved from the world in the aiae 
way in which the ' thing are removed. 
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Chapter IV 
(Hon-Belatlonal Theory of Perception) 
J^83ell*s ftindaiaental protileja In the theory of peroeptlon, 
as we have seen, was to bridge the gulf between the woxld of 
sense and world of physics. Bussell eould not accept the 'IiiT?M»n 
solipsism to which a logically consistent analysis of the phe-
nomena of knowledge ultiinately led. On the other hand, he also 
found it difficult to entertain the belief in the existence of 
permanent and objective physical things only on the ;^;round of 
ito being natuial and instinctive, k viable alternative seemed 
to him the doctrine of phenomamlisia in which he could dispense 
with the inferred and otoise physical things while yet retaining 
a physical world with all its characteristics of perraanence, 
persistence and objectivity. Physical things were replaced by 
the assemblages of the objects which were or wert? able to be 
presented to senses. Thes« assemblages of aansibles in relation 
to mind constituted the knowledge according to ausaeii's doctrine 
of phenomenfidism. 
But in having adopted the doctrine of phenomenalism, 
Hussell had alrf>ady travelled a half distance towards neuti-ol-
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monl^a* Doctrine o t neutxBl monl«Rii i s th? u l t imate dest iny 
towards %rtiich the phenonaaal ls t ic analyaia of knowledge log ica -
l l y l ^ d a . In phenomcBiallaia we abondton n ^ t e r i a l th ing due to 
i t s infer red and preoarlowa charac te r , But i s not mind, as an 
indepaident eubatttnoe, araenable to aatae treatment? I s not i t s 
cha rac te r a s jsuch infer red and therefore precarious sia t ha t of 
EBtatter? We a re nefv^sr i n t rospec t ive ly aware of our bare selvess 
we always i n f e r i t from the b i t s of expeaelences which i t i a 
aupposed to abide and iitihare* 'THwi be l ie f i n ^aind aa an iadepea-
dent aiibstance i s therefore psyeholo^e-i l ly not p r l a i t i v e but 
d e r i v a t i v e , fhls implies t h a t we ehould a lso replace i t by the 
sensa which i t i s supposed to be pres^aited t o , '"he de f in i t ion 
of knowledge tha t ataraa fa»m t h i s theory l a tha t knowledge con-
s i s t s simply In ooratnf? of one a-^nslble o'^ject i n r e l a t i o n with 
another one and not with some aind o r s e l f . 
I t i s c l e a r t l iat the doctr ine of nfmtr^l nonlsm has both 
i t s Rietaphywlcs and epiateraology. Metaphysically i t ai^jeots 
the i3jate:!'laXi3tlc and i d e a l i s t i c nonlanfc <is well a s psycho-
physical dualism, aaintainina ' t h a t the world i s composed of a 
s tuff which i s ne i t he r ioaterial nr^r n<m'*AX ^m"^ n e u t r a l , Bpis-
tenolo.^lcally i t denipg the causal or r e l a t iona l theory of 
Knowled^iie SJI which the -aaterial objftc-^*8 oonfron.tntion with th© 
mind tlirough mediating Hdea* o r * content* i s Sciid to be as 
cons t i t u t i ng knowledge. 
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ikisB«ll*3 r e l a t i o n t o the doctr ine of newta^al noniam %<ae 
very peculiar* His switching (yrev from t h e doctr ine of pheno* 
menalism to neu t ra l monism was not due to any sudden change i n 
h i s viewa hut was of the nature of a .uradual t i an s i t i on* I^LB 
f i r s t encounter w!th t h i s doctr ine w^s i n 19H when he was woikiag 
aa a l e c t u r e r of philosophy in Harward. His reac t ion however 
was, altofjether h o s t i l e . His a r t i c l e "On the Natur-^ of Aoqimintanoe" 
was indeed a polemic a ^ l n s t llach a:ad Jones who Mdve. the f i r s t 
propotmders of t h i s doc t r ine . The swbseqijent a r t i c l e "T^e 
Philosophy of L o ^ o a l Atoraism " rnaiks a ?^radual r e a l i s a t i o n 
alK>ut the ineff icacy of a'?rta5.ii object ions t ha t ^ i s a c l l niade 
afjninst the doc t r ine , F ina l ly Vh<m he worte The V a l v a l s of 
' 1 ^ . (publlahod in 1921> he ful ly acquisoed In i t . But again 
in the ensuing years he made lud ica l cl^uigco in h i s epiatemo-
lof^csil ide?'a while bein^; v i th ln the frat^wozfe of t h i s doc t r ine , 
( t h i s wi l l he disci23sed In the following chap te r ) , .411 through 
t h i s period of r e j ec t i on , gradnal aoceptence, fu l l endorsement 
•md then pai-tial r<:3V3r3.al, ha k^pt litaiaelf v e r / c lose with the 
wri t ings of "»"".ch and Williani .feiaea. I t wi l l he therefore i n 
order i f we dwell a t some len^^jth upon the theory aa i t exis ted 
p r i o r to i ^ a s e l l , Thia wil l - ^ 1 ^ help in trnderstandtng the dls» 
t-'.iictive feat''r--6 th&t -rh..ia;3Qll*a own for>xalation of I t i n 
co'iparison to those of h i s predecessore had, 
HeutmX ilonlm before ausaoi i 
r^mat Ltaeh i n hia woaSc Analysia Q^ aensat^oi^ ( f i r s t 
- 142 -
publiBhed In 1B97) as&s the (|ii«aticm what £;rotmcls» do we have 
for our be l i e f In substance-uonoepts m,, , phyaloal a s well aa 
mental? 
The t ab l e tipon which I wr i te l a one t h a t I have purcJmsed 
f ive years a/^s. I t lias l oa t ?3uch of I t a ahlao. I t has become 
a 
a b i t Toui^ and contataa/nuaber of pateheo of Infi:. I t var lea 
I t o colour acco2»dlag to the colour of l i ; :ht In the room. I t 
completely dlaappeai^ when I shut ray eyes or when the l i g h t goes 
off . But despite a l l the chiin^^es tha t i t h»-~i "antiergoiie, I 
be l ieve i t la the same tab le -^ihich T ptistjhaasd f ive years ago. 
sL'siiarly the coat tha t I have to«2ay iSf I rieiieve the same coat 
t ha t I wore f ive years ago alijhough i t haa become* a l i t t l e 3l»bby 
and i a no longer as f i t as i t waa e a r l i a r . Wo doiiot say t h a t 
the present t ab l e or coat i a exact ly aasae as i t wa3 e a r l l a r . 
We Vielieve however t h a t despi te a l l a l t e r a t i o n s and v a r i a t l o n a , 
i t 13 the aarae t ab l e o r coat« 
3«t y^ -KJre i s 'that wicVm/red and t>«ir?ianent thin^? ( t a M e i 
c o a t ) . I t i t not t ha t i t i s otsr eh-^er lip.blt of th inking a« \m3iX 
as apeaJcin^ and wri t ing in a c e r t a i n way tha t leads us to 
r e i f y an otherwise non-ex ls t tn t <«c.tlty. 
What i s t rue to body substance i s a l so t rue to ralndi-
eubatanoo, ^upoo-^ie I am thlnkiafi over soma phlloBOTshlcal proM.era, 
A now idea occurs to m9» then ooraes anotJwsr Idea Aid than s t i l l 
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another, and theaa it atops, I ea^rt ay mind bat nothing hai^ens* 
I feel a little erabrassed. But then it suddeal;/ oooesto tm like 
a flash of ll^t and I feel relieved and hftppy. How I say tlmt 
there is a pemmuint and porateteat •!• which Is baay in phllo-
sophislng which thiaka one idea after amthaziv which faela eia-
bxaaaaed and then happy, Hut wherefrom this pensanent I oaae 
in* What actually happmied la merely a o^maected and concatenated 
series of bits of seneatlona^ which we falsely claimed as belongs 
Ing to a subsistinc; entity I, 'I* la abeolutely inexperieaoed 
and therefore utterely noi>-exi9teBrit, 
A critical reflection, in this way, eliainatea both 'alnd' 
and flatter and leaves only •sensations* about whoa it was hitherto 
supposed they were presented to fozmer and produced by latter, 
?hl8 sort of analysis aay rougly be called as neutral monistic 
analysis of 3mowledge. Aa is clear. It reduces the •relation 
that is said to be holdblng between the knovdng, , mind and matter. 
•Fhere is no aatter to produce setisatloos and there la no lalnd 
to reelcfve them. Sensations thenaelves are the sole material 
out of which the unJI^erse is built up. These sensations when 
arranged in one way conatittite the subject aatter of physios 
"nd when in a different way, that of psychology. 
According to Mach a physical body consists iBitirely of 
•sensations* or what he himself prefers to call •el€®ent8» 
such as colours, sounds, taste etc, and nothing beyond. But 
- 144 -
frora the very fBiot t ha t ^Hxr a r - seasatlona modifiable by our 
sfjncing them, !i6 aayg, i t can be concluded tha t they a re a lso 
meiital. iaoh a l i o ai^ fT<iea fo r the n e u t r a l i t y of Bensations \iy 
invoking the fact t ha t the socal led cen ta l and physical pheno* 
mena can Intezact aa ju'ilng oh7lor.r.ly the car tes ian idea t J ^ t 
two subBtmicea of e n t i r e l y diff«r?mt kind and chasaotfir oanaot 
i n t e r a c t , 
*%et ua deaolBthe abave-a©ntimied elcjiaenta (coiour# 3ouiida» 
aae l l a e t c . ) by the l e t t e r s J13C • • • • • • KI i . I . , , , . , o< ^ T • •• 
Let those complexes of colouira, aounds and ao for th , eomaonly 
ca l led bodies, be d<moted, for the snke of c lea rness , lay iI>C., , | 
t he consplex, Icnown as our body which i s a par t oi the fonjicr 
complexes dist i l led.shed by ce r t a in pf tcu l ia r l t leo , taay be call«»d 
KXI!.«,,| the coiaplez cor^pocsd of To l l t i ona , njeoorj-in^gss, aad 
the re3t we sVuill reprrjaent byo^[^)-, , .• Usually, now, the eoapl« 
o^pr • • • • ICU*I • • • • : as r.ial:ln^? up the e ^ , i s opposed to th^? 
co'aplox 13C»,, . , a s laaking up the world of physical objects} 
soiactiaes also.w: p ^ r . . . . i s viewed as ego, and lCUyE«,» ABC.,, 
a s world of physical ob jec ts . Row a t f i r a t blush, A3C,»,» 
appears independent of the ego, and oimosed t o i t as a separate 
exiatenOQ. But t h i s independence i s only r e l a t i v e , and gives 
way upon c loser inspec t ion , Mtioh, i t i s t r u e , Byty change i n 
the complex p( Ri , . , without mich percept ib le change beinf? Induced 
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In ABC • « , ; and v i ce vexea. But nsany ohangea i a x / ^ ' r ; . . , do 
paaSf by way o i ohaagis iu KM**« » to 43C«»«., and vica v^ q^wa 
(Aa, for example when powerful Id^as bars t for th In to ac t s* o r 
wh«a our eavljwrvaeat Induces notloeablo o>)an«;e8 in our body). 
At the saiae time the /];roup K1M»,» appeal's to be laore lntlraftt«ly 
oomieoted vdthcxf^r and with JBC##., , than the l a t t e r with 
oao another; and t h e i r re ia t ioi ia ^Ind t h e i r cjxper'^ssion i n 
cori'icn tlioufiht and STje^ch* 
Prec i se ly viewed, however. I t appears t ha t the gSfoup 
ABC • • • I s always oodeteTr:»lned by KIT!, A cube when se-.m close 
a t ^land, looks lar?^e? w'yen seer* a t a aiatroicc, s a a l l ; I t a 
a.^^,,QSixmiQQ to the ri(?ht eye dlfx'erea from i t s appearance to 
the l e f t ; aotietineB i t appears douiile} with d o s e d eyee I t 
i s i n v i s i b l e , The propert lea of on9 and the same body,therefoi^s 
appear Modified by our own body; they appear conditioned by i t 
But t h e r e , now, i s tha t aarae body, whioh appears to diffarafit? 
All t h a t can oe said i s , t h a t with diffej 'ent iCfil d i f fe ren t A3C.«,. 
differf?nt 43C a re aoaoclated. 
But the re nay be ra ised the object ion tha t i f sensat ions 
SkTo only r e a l i t y known to be exlBtlns how c in wc account for 
the two, f«inctlonally a rad ioa l ly di f ferent phenojicna naraely 
physical and mental psychica l . Ue >mve a \rivid caid conapiouous 
knowled/T;e of the bodies of our fellow ?aen but we have not ev<in 
the f a in t e s t idea of t h e i r ^inda which, we th ink , raust be 
•>» 1 4 6 -• 
at tached to t h e i r bodies aa oiir»a i a a t tached to our own. I s 
I t poBSihle to deny the dxftereiice hetweon the one domtln to 
which we have tm ef to r less accese and th^ o ther to which w© 
have a l toge the r no acceas, i?or Itach to be surs t t he re i s xsto 
Btioh neces s i t y , ue can diffuse the pl-^i^aioal nrid pBychiCfiLi>he-
nomena in to each otiter \.ftiii© yex retaiiiini^ th^ d i a t l a c t i o n bet* 
we«n the two# "Xliia can \v? aoootaplltJhed h-j fn2*riinA» two rjroups 
in which the sa^ae eleiaaata occur with r^^lation of a differ<s2at 
natai'e# '^le element A (j:*ay» colour) i?u ph. a ica l as lon,T as i t 
i s gtudied a i^d observed in l i s r u l s t i o n to varloiia other colours 
(K) o r sounds (C)« But the aamo A :)ecoKios psychical whon i t 
i s abs t rac ted from i t a r e l a t i o n to J and C and ooaerved in i t a 
r e ln t i on to some pr<9Vlou8 knowledji© (zaeaoxy) of colour ( °<: > 
o r oorreapondlnfj memory of aoimd ( [^  ) , 'iach says: 
"A colour i a a phyaiJ^l object a s soon a s we 
ooaaider i t a deperidonce upon o ther colourst upon 
tempratures, upon apaoiSt and so fo r th . When w« 
consider , howflvir, i t a dependence upon the r e t i nae 
( the el^xents KHU. . ) , i t i s a j^ycholcglca l obj ;c t , 
a scnaat lon. Not th^ aub ieo t -oa t t e r but the d i s t i n c t i o n 
of our iny-^sti. '^tiori, i s d i f ferent in the t -^ 
doisnniB."^ 
Baaiet Itocli approacl^d the doctrijae of n e u t r a l aonism from 
the standpoint of phys io la t , Wllilan Jaaea, hia youn^sr 
An»riC3l contemporary approaches i t froa the atandpoint of a 
psyohologiat , A jfull-blooded statement of t h i s doctr ine was 
given by Ames In h i s woxk §smm M ^^^.ftil, 3SSXSXSlm» t h o u ^ 
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In gezmlnal torn I t can also Is© ae«i preaent in hla Psyohol^ogy 
written aliout tw^ity years before the fbmer. In Payeholoay 
although Jaaea ioea not reject *<K)naeiou»ie88* aa an Independent 
4 
aubatanooy and even reg^irda i t aa a fundamental datum of P3y(^iology» 
an unoonaeloua urge to deapenstt vdth I t l a fa i r ly diaoerdable 
In hinu For oaEaraple when he sayat "if we oould aay in Bngllsh 
• i t th lnkaS aa we aay, ' i t raina* or ' I t blema*, we ahould 
be s la t ing the facts laoat aiaply and with the BriLnlrauBi of aasitia* 
tiona' • 
...5 
In the aaae booki Jaraea deacril^d four Iraportestt charao-
terlatiea of oonacloueneaa. iHratly ervery atate of it la 
aubjectlve. Secondly* it la in a atate of oonatant flux. The 
flux or contlniity of conaeiouansaa ia experionoible and laatly 
it neyer (»)mprehen^ ita objects in their entirety but always 
c!ico80s the appropriate parta of th«a. It will be aeen that 
while the firat and last characterlstioa later conatituted the 
baaea of Jamea fkuaous pragaiatio theory of truth, the second end 
third in which the chang^ble and fluotin® aharacter of oon8ei«> 
ousnewB has been aaphasieed, paved the way for his future 
abondonaent of eonaeiouanesa aa an independent substance, 
The central idea of hla new philoaophy, Jaees put in 
following? wordat 
% theaia is that If we start with the supposition 
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that them Is only one pzlnal &t»M or Eaaterlai in 
the worXd» a stuff of %(hi6h everything is eomposed» 
and if U8 oall that stuff*^ure experlenoe, than 
knowing ean aaaily be explained as a particular 
sort of relati<m tov>iard one another into %^ioh a 
portion of one experience aay enter. The relation 
itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 
•teras' becomes th« subject or the bearer of the 
knovledge» the other becomes object known".7 
James claias to explain interas of hia theory a paradox 
which, he aaya, "the W?TO1O philosophy of perception from Demo-
critus* t±im downwards has been one long wrongs over? The 
paradox is this". On oomftwn parlance the experience is const* 
dered to be a simple confrontation of raind with its object* At 
present I am seeing the roomt table, pea, book etc. which I 
think belong to outside world* But in so far as I am percievlng 
them they are also inside my mind« The problem is how \Am.t 
appears to be only one reality can aiaultaneoualy exist at two 
places* Dualistlo or itepreaentativ© theoriests coooct an idea 
which they say represents the mitside thing and belongs to 
mind* But according to James this *Idea* is mnmf experienced; 
aind muaadiatcdly encounters its obj^rts in every case of 
experience* 
The pussle, James aays, can be ^sily unznyelled if we 
abondon our babit to think mind and material thin/^ s as being 
two opposite realAS of being* There is only one indentioal room 
i*e* its pure experience upon which two different sorts of pro-
cesses converse, 8u8t as th« point of Intersection of tvw lines 
- 149 -
i s vertually one Iwt yet oan be said to be belonging to tvw 
different Xinest In the astrae way one Idsntloml roora can be 
said to be existing a t two places a t once* 
There are two piocessea going on aiaultaneoualy in our 
uniyerse. One of thse conalsts of soasatlons, «aotiont "volitions, 
ill short, of what we ca l l ordinarily aa m®atal oocuzHmeea. IMa 
process belongs to the personal biography of peroeiver. The 
room experience, wh«n i t enters into th i s proeeaa i s loosely 
called mental. The other pojooess in which the same rooro-aa^eiw 
ienoo eaitera oorapr.lses a number of physical operation's aucfti ais 
carpentering, fuzniahing, papering e tc . 1?his pz^oeas i s uttexly 
independent of any ona'a experiencing th«a and i s the phyaioal 
history of the room, 
Occuring in these t ' ^ prc/ceaa B the experience alao 
changes i t e characters. As a ph;y»ioalroom, i t oan be experienced 
by any nunbcr of peoples as a mental Totm i t i s s t r i c t l y pejv 
Gonal and private . -4s physical room i t will take a <»urtain 
??j sviit of time and labour to deriolish i t mxt as a ocaital room 
i t can be destroyed in a second —.«--,« siiaiAy by closing the 
eyes. As a physical root^ you have to pay a certain amount of 
money to l ive in i t but as a maital vooa» "you aay occupy i t 
for any latigth of t i a e raat-fx^e", ind so on and so forth. 
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I{0ft>lutloa8lng tHus the whole notion of mind and matter, 
Jaraea prooeeds to expteln various sorts of 'knowing* e.g. pei>' 
oeptual, conceptual, memo r i a l o t o , . In the lifjht of his theory. 
Perceptual kziowlag, according to hira, as explained above, conalsts 
in the oocuirence of self saiae piece of experience twice over 
l2i two different context. Conceptual knowing, although soraewljat 
different from perceptual knowing, can lie nererthelesa defined 
in purely expcilential tersao. I t i s , as Janea says, "leadin^i 
tovjards* mid "Tennlnattng in" percepts "through a series of 
trEwisitional experiences whieh the world suppM-ea",^ Our lamv* 
led^e of a Sxyg, when we have only an ' idea of i t in our mind, 
consists entirely in the ideas a b i l i t y to lead to and teztilnats 
in through certain intermediary experiences, percepts, e .g , 
haiklng, blade and hairy body which we ooaaonly ascribe to the 
dog . 
Or l e t xm take another* exaiiple gX^on in deta i l by Jaaes 
hin^elf, "Suppose ae**, he aaya, "to be s i t t i ng in l i b i a iy a t 
caMhridje a t ten raiiiutes waUc from •Memorial Ilall* and to be 
thlniclng trualy of the l a t t e r object", "Ity mind", he goes on 
"may have before i t onlj the name, or i t raay have a clear laags, 
or i t R©y have very dlra iiaa.^e of t>w ha l l , but such Intelnale 
dlffereances in the image laake on Inslnsic differeaoe in I t s 
c o ^ i t i v e fsinotlon". How, says Jaaes, "if I can lead you to 
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Itell and t e l l you of I t a Matoxy and i t s preseaact useof i f in 
i t s presence I feel lay idea, however iiaperfeot i t laay have be€n« 
to Mve led hi ther and to ho new tgraiytatedi i f the associates 
of the iaage and of the f«l t hal l run pa ra l l e l , so that -^ aoh tena 
of the one context corresponds se r ia l ly , aa I vialk, with an miaw-
erlns teiss of the others . . » , ray id^i muat be «••» called oo®-
not 
nizaat of r ea l i t y , " In case a l l these are/aoeoiBpllahed, in case 
I f a l l to t e l l you what ha l l T mmn by r^ y iiaagei or ' i f I f a i l to 
to point or lead you tov^rds the Harword Delta? or if, being led 
by you, I aa uncertain whether the Hall I see he what I had in 
ay laind or not", ny claim of knowing the ha l l will be sheer pretens 
In sum, according to James, 3aK}wled^ i s e i ther a direct 
confrontation of one eatperienoe wljb h another one, or a pitycess in 
which one eacperienoe passes thxou^ certain intermediary experience 
into another experience* In any case, i t i s the expsrl«ice i t s e l f 
tha t la kncwer and th^t i s known; the transcendental raind < to 
experience) and the transcendental thin@-in»lts«lf (to be experient 
are both non-exlBtent. But here i t imy be objected that i f i t i s 
the experietioe i t s e l f Which Sanctions a t one tlrae as thin^ and a t 
another, as tlroUf-^t, thsn how the two Phenomena are qualitatively 
so different, A 'thing* i s extended, colored, hard or soft , siaoot! 
or rough* ^ t the thou^^ts con nwer possess these qual i t ies . Jam 
however, dispposea of th is objection 1:^  saying that thoughts do 
possess the quali t ies that the things are said to possess. The 
thoui5ht of f i re i s as hot, as hot i s the actual f i r e and the thou^ 
of r iver i s as wet as wet i s the actual r ive r . The two phenomexia 
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differ only in that while the experience qua thing Is active and 
effective I cma thought it lacScs these charaot eristics. The physi-
cal triangle and the mental one ere saj^ In their interlnelc nature; 
their difference lied only in the f&ct that vMle the point of 
11 
former can wound, t h a t of lat t f?r cannot. 
4 very iraportant MijaX t o 1)e r ea l i s ed lii t h i s connection i s 
t h a t Jaiaes* neutssal-sionism was a t the bottom an epistomolor^lt^l 
and not a metaphysioaoal doc t r ine , Hlo »pur^»experi^iee* was not 
a netaphysicai suba t i tu t e of mind o r matter (o r lioth i n conjtinction 
Uetaphysioal iy, he was a p l u r a l i s t bel ieving i n t l u m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of experiences a l l as the ul t i iaate ontologlcsal oonat i tuents of the 
un iverse . He, indeed denied i n very c l e a r words ajiy "netaphysicai 
12 
atatuo to h i s pure-experience. 
I t were, l a f a c t , socie of James• detjciplea l a t e r known as 
irew-Healista who transformed i t frotn a theor^r of knowledge in to a 
theory of r e a l i t y . I t were they who f i r s t used the phrase "neutral 
stuff" and cal led i t s philosophy aa ' 'neutral nonisa" cont ras t ing 
i t with i d e a l i s t i c and r .aterial i s t i c kinds of aoniawa to whom ?nind 
and laatter are reap c t ive ly the ul t iniate imderlying substances of 
the universe , 
ifech approached the theory of n e u t i a l laonisa from the s ide 
of phyaies and w i l l i a a James, fron the s ide of psychology, ausse l l 
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appioaches It from hoUh phyaiOA and payohology, liat» Interestingly 
enou^t a phyalos xBokmi\>ax to Mach and a psychology unioioun to Jaaea, 
•fho first two decades of tho presoat oeatury \d,tne8sed a groat 
revolution in physios vhoso reperousaiona and raraifioatlons were 
also f«lt in the other doaains of knowledge^ partleularly philoso* 
phy« Qoanta physios and thaory of Belativity aetaaorphosed the 
traditi<nial notions of apaoe* time and aatter« The notion of 
alMolute time and ahsolute space was 3*eplaoe4 hy a relative spaoe-
tiae and the natter oeased to an «rtendedt indestruotlUle sulMtan* 
tial entity! it eaae to be considered as matheaatical oonstructions 
out of Inconeeivattly alwtraot entities (or noa-entitles), 
Cn the other hand a ooimspondiiig revolution was created 
in the realra of psiOholofiy TB^ Behavieusists« BehEiviousisa was a 
oulainati<m of reductive tsidency in psychology \Aiioh nAde its 
first appearance in the late ninetecmth century in deraany* Psyc-
hology ^ t rid of "omiseioumiess'* which it has hitherto regar-
ded as its fundamental datum* There were thus at that time two 
opposite tendw30ies in the doi^ln of soienoe • one evlsereting 
aatter of its •materiality' and other evisoretins ^tnd of its 
•mentality', Ibxssell ttiottght himself to find in ^ e doctrine of 
neutral monloa a meeting gpround, a conflux of l&ese two oonflttent 
tides of modeza k2t«9wledge. In the preface of his Analyses jj^ Mlnd> 
he sid^ di 
"The view tJmt seems to me to reconcile the 
materialistic tendeaoy of psychology with theanti-
matf?rialistie tendcsney of physios is the view of 
William James and the other imerioan new a:>ealists, 
according to which the "stuff* of the world is neither 
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mental nor notarial, Knt a "heutial stuff" out of vfhloh 
130th are ooaatiMoted. •••••*»* 
It Is also to be noted that for Haoht neutzal aonlem was 
raore a methodelogioal prineiple than anything elee, Wllliaa Jaaea 
emphaslaed ite eplste^^logleal aapeot while dasying any aetaphysi-
eal status to it. Prof, iony and othera aade it into a full» 
blooded iaetaphyeioal arctilna. aasBellt on the other hwid, tajcea 
it in all its three aspeeta* It is for him a peifeet raethoiolo-
r^ ical Tioflel to be apT)lied in all tho branches of science. .I^ pisteno] 
Sioally $ he oontrasts it with the causal theory of knowlidie to 
which he himself \*aa otwpaitted before accepting it. On metaphy-
BicMl plane* he ooasidera it to be a viable substitute of ideal* 
istic and mateTialtstic noniams on tJe one hand and i^ycho*phyai 
oal dualism on the other. Presently, we ehall confine our diacu-
aeion only to the epistvaolo^eal asp ct oi iaiBsell'a theory* ^hs 
seope of our diseuasion will be further namowed ae V9 shall estp* 
hasise only his theory of peremption igpoxlng his sieira about 
*B^K>zyS *8enaation8% 'iiBaga* ete (except where neoesaaxy) whio)] 
he developed in the lig^t of his new dootrine* 
its i0 already mentioned* lbasell*e riKustion to dootrine of 
neutzQl noniam was that of rejection and he only gradually came 
to believe in at fully. Here w« shall first discuss the grounds 
upon which he rejected the doctrine and then see how could he 
suroounted those grounds, Xn the last we shall discuss his defi«-
nition of perception which he derived frwa hie fresh approach. 
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Thdre az« e]|pi8t«aologloally two sources of the doctrine 
of neutral taonltm. One i s the assumption that v^iat i s presented 
to Bind unaediatedly laust be part of i t and the other i s th« 
belief that physical things oan be untaediatedly present to the 
mind* I t was t h i s asaimtlation of physical things with raind 
which led Ii^ ioh and Jsuaes to t he i r btdief in the neutra l i ty of 
the world stuff. Keutral aonis ts , by eraphasising f i r s t , 
rejected the *oont«nt theory* and by eraphasiain^ the second, 
refuted the idealism. Bussellt for h is par t , confutes the 
•aasuraption* but confirms the ' b e l i e f . As a matter of fac t , 
both Bussell 's phenoBSwrnalism and the doctrine of neutral 
monism were half way housas between the content theory and 
subjective idealism* Bussell 's preforwooe of former upon the 
l a t t e r owed to his belief that the fbrmer was free from t}:« 
Beackeleyan f a i l a ^ in which the l a t t e r was br is t led v iz , the 
fal lacy of identifying the act of sensation with i t s object. 
I t w0ij be ae&n. that the real issue was the existence of 
mind. If mind existed, neutral monism van wron:^  and i f i t did 
not «Klst, Bussell 's ph^iomenalism was incorrect , ^ s s e l l ' s 
main objection a ^ i n s t neutral monism was based upon i t s inabi l i ty 
to explain the mental occurrences. And as soon as ha was able 
to explain these purely in physiological terras, he aboadoned 
phenomenalism and accepted neutral monism. 
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aussell first criticises the Jaaes* view that In a 
case of experiencot what ia experionoed comes into contact of 
another oxporlenoo and not of any aubslBting raind. That whether 
a given patch of colour ia expe3el«io«d or aott depends according 
to his view, upon whether or not It la related to some other 
experienced object. One could experience the colour only when 
he had already in hia life atleast one other experienced object. 
Accordin/*lyt it ^m9 loi^oally impossible for one to have only 
one experigaod. 
But Husaell thinka it to he a1»urd» '*tt ae^is to me 
(he says) posQllile to inagine a mind existing for oiay a 
fraction of a second, seeing the red and ceasin/; to exist 
t8 before havln^ ^ any other experience.'* There is involved in 
my seeinf!: the red at this raoraent a coi^ iitive element which was 
absent in preceding moment when I %ia3 not experiencing it and 
will vanish after a raoraont, never to recur* thou(^ I shall be 
able to recollect it, "^ he difference between the presence and 
absence of this cognitive elemeat does not consist in the colour's 
bein,;^  and not being a part of a system of experiences, but 
"in ooae way aore liainedlate, E»re intliaate, laore in tu i t ive ly 
evident". 
This dif t ioul ty heixifr, generalised can be put thus, 'm 
nay ask what i t i s that makes the objects of v3^ experience at 
t h i s nioraent dis t inct and isolated from the objects t>uit I 
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expeHencad aar l la r or will experience In aoraents to oomtt 
i^ y present exp^rirnktm, according to lusaoll» logical ly, i s 
out off from my past and future experlenoes and also from the 
expenenoea that other people might be having a t the aaiae 
raopent. Clearly I t 5 i i t s being aX ^wperience i . e . the aental 
content that I s added into I t a f te r oomlng into re la t ion with 
lae t>t^t provide I t with i t a unique and isolated character. 
I t i s t rue that the saac object can «ater into two "alnda 
si!inltaneou3ly« But the fact that minds cannot experience 
each other ' s experiences shows i t beyond doubt t>«it an expe-
rience to i t a Tilnd i s i t a exclusive possession. 
The saae applleo to logical and aathaaatioal forrsulae. 
f^y thinking of 3*3 » 6 at a given nomtnit and your thinking of 
the same a t the same raosent are two dis t inct events although 
the oonteaata overlap. There la something necesearily exist ing 
in a l l the different experi^ices whi^ separates them. This 
something I s obviously nental content or consciousness which 
the neutral monista dcaiy* 
I t i s possible for neutral 'iKsnlsts to take recourse to 
physiological considerations iaorder to explain the privacy of 
the thoughts while not admitting t he i r mental character. The 
thoughts are subjective in the only sense that they are bound 
up with one's biological orjf^anisia. B^saell however doubts the 
va l id i ty of th i s argument. His reason i s sinply that to know 
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that I know something I t i s not a t a l l neccsaai^ to he awaiw 
of the physiolo{?i©al piocesses that are involved In the knovijas* 
Husoell says," those who have never learned physiology 
and are unaware that they poaeees zisrve* are quite oorapetent 
14 
to know that th i s or that comes within the i r experience'*. 
But, c lear ly , th i s i s not an argument. -Twioualy,every person 
who i3 a l ive , fc '>wa that he knowa aoniething, hut there are 
only a few (Huseell, of course, being one of thoa) who have 
theories which they say explain the poroblem of kriowledge. 
Another diff iculty which prevented Iktaeell to accept 
the neutral aoniatio theoiy of knowledge ^^s i t s inabi l i ty to 
explain •heliefs*. *Belief' i s different from the 'sensation* 
in that wher^s the l a t t e r has aiwa3rs a reference to eoae out-
side object, the forawr la<^s any such refer«fii»t« For instance, 
when I believe in the proposition* Today i s '^leeday", thers i s 
no such ent i ty called 'today i s tuesday* to which my belief i s 
directed. Iiifaet, belief i s always about *propc£Jitions* or 
•judgements* not about 'things* or * facts* as i s generally 
believed. 41though we speak of our belief or disbelief in 
God or Adaa or ^ e , as i f they are sone objects . But actually 
they are not objects in the logical senae of the word. They 
are desert t ions and our belief in then sinply aeaas that we 
believe that there i s an enti ty answering these descriptions. 
Beliefs , thus, in a l l cases are *objeotles3*. But yet they 
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porforra a cogaltiTe function. I t follows thorofore that thexe 
I s neoessarily a aind which knowa something althoui;h no phyoioal 
ppesemtatlon of any kind la involved, 
Analoi^us oas9s In which tho suppoaitlon of a mind aearas 
to ^ necessazy are those of mQ^mry and thoughts of non-terjporal 
objects , When I recal l an event which occurred an hour ea r l i e r . 
I t la clear t ir . t the same event i s not presented to rae now, 
Xt Is a replloa of the previous event and heln«^ so I t T u^st be 
a t leas t s l ight ly changed. How the a l tera t ion in the character 
of the «fv®it recollected can e i ther be explained l^ assw^lng 
a taind Whose contact to event i s resixjnalble for the change or 
believing that our present knowledge Is mediated by norm Idea 
which reprearaats the orl/HUial event, 'The l a t t e r possibi l i ty 
I s upheld by the p ro ta^n la t s of oontent*theory and neither 
Huaaell nor neutral monista can believe In i t . Neutral monlats 
reject the former possibi l i ty too and thus f a l l to explain 
t h i s important phwiomena, 
James* saying that things and t h o u ^ t s differ only in 
thcdr being mid not beins active and effective respectively 
cannot be acceptable, l^or, there reoains the question that i f 
they ai'e laade of the awae substanoct why are they so radically 
different in the i r qualities? :?or misaell, the pheiiomena of 
aeeoiy can be explained only )a^ adaittlnf; the mental elem<fmt 
in our knowing. If we are to avoid the orecarlous content-
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IilkewlM, If we say that in our believing 2*2 « 4 no 
mental eleiient is involved» then we are compelled to assiijn 
some natural status to the eonstituent nuabe2«( which existed 
at the time of our believing In them but which did not exist 
when we ceased to believe. But the reifioation of mathematical 
numbers anounted to believing an ontology which atleast for 
l^aaellf v»s preposterous. ?rom the very fact that we know at 
a coaptain ooaent the proposition 2*2 « 4» althou^ none of the 
cofaponents are temporal, it follows that there coiaea to be 
attached some mental element which enablest the proposition to 
16 
be known at that i!K>ment. 
aisaell ia also dissatiafied with Jaiaes* definition of 
knowledge as a prooeaa of *leading to** My idea of a dog* 
according to this yiew» would be a genuine idea if it ia capable 
of leading met throu^^ certain intermediary ideas, to the 
perception of "^  jumping, bazking, hairy body". But, Buaaell 
says that the bare idea, not accompanied l^ some int'antion or 
purpoae cannot be treated as tantamount to the knowing of the 
actual dog. It is possible "Wiat I ooi!» across the dog in the 
street by accident while I am in search of him. In this case 
the effect is no doubt %^ hat was ultimately intended, but as the 
encounter ia wholly 1^ chance and unintended it ia not possible 
to say that ray original idea led me to the dog and was therefore 
cognitive. 
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3e8id«8 thi8» there la alao involved aocordlng to aoeseXl 
in Jaaea tToatmont of an idea of a tbizig as oause and the aotial 
experience of that thing aa effect, %niat he calle '*i\ certain qa^if^t^ 
towards seienoe**, "a certain tmorltioal aeceptenoe of What may he 
called aoifsitifio (KimonaenBe* Which aoema to ne lai^ely -to des-
17 troy the val«» of their apeeulationa on ftmdsaental pro Ideas'** 
He, however aaya that if ie not a vital oh^eetion to Jaaea vlevj 
18 
"it is not unlikely that it could be avoided by restatement". 
There ia alao, lioaettll points out, a oonfusion on Jaaea* 
part as to the loiovledge of things and knowledge of propositions* 
James speaks as if we can know directly the things as such* But 
according to iHuiaell's theory what ia strict sense I can kKU>w are 
*siaple8*; knowledge of all other thlng:s is knowledi;e throtz^ des* 
criptions, ?httB iriieai I claim to know Memorial Hall, when it ia 
not presented to lae, ay knowledfje is actually about a proposition. 
I can know, for example, that •Memorial Hall is a building which 
ia roaohed at by taking the f^rst turning on the right and second 
turning on the left hand and then traversing a distaiuse of 200 yards 
But In this proposition, the •Meoorial !fall» is not an object that 
I can actually experenee after taking the two turns and then going 
200 yards. It is instead, a disorlption which applies to an <mtity 
called MenKjrial Hall* I can know this proposition (for instance, 
by the help of a laap) without ever }«ving se«n the Mesaorial ^aH, 
In the last there ax^ considerations about v^t Bus sell call 
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*eiB|^batie partlculais* (v i s , ' th lB*, • ! • , ^OOM*) «]iioh r«ad«r the 
theory of nentxaX iKjnlsra unacceptable, • llhls' I s a proper xiaise 
v ^ e h applies to an object to Which I attend a t a givan moment, 
The subject that attends to • t h i s ' la called •!• and the time at 
which •!• and •thla* come in relat ion to each othor le called •«©¥• 
How "there la observed a peculiar intlsiacy and liaaedlacy between 
•I* and •this* and • ! • and •now* which la <|aite absent in *!•« 
re la t ion to other objects and at other timea« Heatral lotmism does 
not offer any stalsfaotoiy explanation of t h i s peculiar re la t ion-
ship. Were James and hla followers true in t he i r eontentimi that 
there i s no sp^ i f i<» l ly mmi1»l oont^snt in the knowledge, thez« 
would have be«ai found in the world a coiiplete i a j « r t i a l i t y , "an 
evenly diffused llg^it, not ^ e co i t ra l illuralaation fading away 
into outer daxkness which i s characteris t ic of objects in relation 
to mind", 'The phenomena of emiteatic i^ r t icu lars su/^gest the 
selectivmieas of tsind and neutral aonism which denies i t i s surely 
fa lse . 
l e s s e n om»sludes t h i s w}«»le discussion in following wor^i 
*iQr these reasons • • •«• • 1 conclude that n ^ t r a l 
aoniaa though largely right in i t s polemic a ^ l n s t previous 
theories* cannot be reisarded as able to deal with a l l the 
facta and aust be replaced by a theory In which the di» 
f ferenoe betwevi what i s experienced and \i^iat i s not exper-
ienced ty a givea subject a t a given aoment i s laade simple; 
and Eiore promin«it than i t can be in a theory which wholly 
denies the specifically mental entit ies,*20 
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The99 object ions apart^ there were c e r t a i n things i n new-
t r a l moniaa to l u r e Bussel l , ^ reraos t among them waa tha t i t 
conformed t o h i s Oc<»a's nasior, Which he took aa the aup2*«^e ae-> 
t h o d o l o ^ c a l jaaadra in philosophizing. I t 1»B h^^m. rep^Jtedly poi» 
nted out t h a t Basse l l ' s raain aim in philosophy was to dispraise with 
the infer red © i t i t i e s so t h a t soieoioes may hsve loi^lcally s a f t 
and secure hasea* He had alr-^^ady ooniahed •suhatanoe* frota physics 
in h i s phenoae»aiisa, Aoceptenoe of neu t ra l noniera anountod to 
nothing ijut to fur ther car ry ing out of t h i s plan* iha t is» hy i t s 
means ff he could fntQ hanished the 'iidnd* a s vMllt Which was ad£>ti* 
t t e d l y a soft da ta . The theory tl«it could deapense with both miiA 
and mater ia l sulwtanoe was indeed such a s to s a t i s f y best to Boaao-
11* 8 8eia!ifio teaperament, "*!1iat the th ings given i n experience 
should be of two fUndam^itally dlffereait kindst laental and physical 
sa id 3uasell» "^s f a r l e s s s a t i s f ac to ry than t h a t the dualism shoul 
be ae re ly apparent and superficial,•» 
5he o ther reason to make t h i s theory acceptable fo r Buascll 
v®3 t h a t i t oonforaed to the r e s u l t s of var ious emerg«it t r en to 
in sciences* "Ehe new physics asaer ted t h a t the fijatter l a not a 
s u b s t a n t i a l , eactended e n t i t y , but '*n reraote supersnaisuous cons-
'^ruction connected no dDubt with sense, but only t>a?oufl^ a long 
chain of interra^diata inferences*. Physiological psychology, on 
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the other hand, said that the immediate data of soaae alwuld he a 
fjuh^eetniatter of psyohology rather than P ^ s l o s , S^iacwohjects 
were thue the sole things whloh w© could approach tha?ough »©w 
phyaloa and paychology. 
BesldeOf a Isgloal analysis of phenomena of perceiottiaL 
knowledge also leads to assert ing only aense-ob^eots. I t ofoourse 
led to so^ipalam batt as we have seen in the preceding; chapter, 
Baasell found reason and rhyme for admitting the hypothetical senstt 
(aenalMlla) besides those actual . An ag^^regate of closely resea-
hling sensa constituted the •physical thing' and i t s relat ion to 
mind constituted knowledge. He admitted mltid, heoauss he t h o u ^ t 
i t una'voidabls In explaining the essentially relat ional character 
of knowledge. How i f the theory of neutral rwniaa were tsue» the 
supposition of nlnd was also unnecessary, ' ^e sensa themselves 
would do the f^mctlon of a thing as well as raind, Xnowled^ of a 
chair, for eaample, does not consist in the presentation of a 
physical thing or i t s representation hy something else to mind. 
There are merely certain sensations which in relat ion to each other 
consti tute the olmlr and the knowledge of I t . ^ e s e Sfmaations 
are neutral in regard to the i r •pysicall ty ' or •mentality* but 
being subject -to two different kind of laws they are studied sepa-
jmtely by the two sciences. C^e law pertains to physics which 
makes them a thing to be experienced and the other i s psyc^loglc^l 
which laakes thea an experiencing subject. Qaly sensations are real 
and actual en t i t i es i mind and matter are both hypothetical cons-
t ruc t ions . 
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Clearlyt »laoe ther were in nsutareil monlsia raliiiimim of asa-
waptions to be aad© In explaining icaowle<ige» Bisadll fe l t strong-
l y inclined to believe in i t . But there were a t t h i s stage, aa 
we have just seoi , certain dif f icul t ies which he thouf^^t Insuxw 
ptountaljle in the l i ^ t of t h i s doctrine. Iraportant aiaong thea 
were those derived from the tonslderationa about "emphatic pa r t l -
Qulare* and •beliefs*. Bttssell'a relat ion to t h i s theoiy a t t h i s 
staf^, l a indeed very in t r i ca t e , 'mere appears to be in him a 
clash between What he wish he beleived and vihat he o u ^ t to bele» 
v«* In t i a e , i t was the former which got upper hand. He atrived 
hard to find arguiaents which nay enable him to dispense with the 
various d i f f i cu l t i es . He la even willing to abondon «>ae object-
ions on grounds which ha hi^i^elf on other occasions» v«id.d have 
regarded as being not ao sound. In the lecture IV of his •Fhiloso-
phy of logical Atomism (delivered in l91B>i he saidt 
m 
• • . * • • 
Therefore the whole theory of neutral 
monism i s pleasing to ae» \nxt I do find so f^ very 
great difficulty in believing i t . You will find a 
discussion of t l ^ iiAiole cpaestion in some a r t i c l e I 
wxt>te •••••• I should real ly >imnt to rewrite thira 
rather because I think some of the ar^^ments I used 
agsinst neutral monlmn are not va l id . I placed niost 
z^lionee on the argument about emphatic particulars» 
• t h l s S • ! • , , I think i t la extremely d i f f i -
cult» i f you get r id of consciousness altoiijether, to 
explain what you mean by such a word • th ls» , what i t 
i s that asakes the alK3<»ice of 1 ipar t ia l la ty , , , , But 
what r ^ a i y happens I s that we plcjk out cortain facts , 
past and jRiture and a l l that sort of things they a l l 
ladiats from ' t h i s * , and *!• have not myself se -^n how 
c«n one deal with the notion of •thlri^'on the basis of 
neutral aonloa , , « , " 2 1 
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But when he comas to his concluding lecture? v/hich nunber 
elTjht In scpiesi he abondons this ob;Jeotlon. He saysf 
I1ier« 18, on the other hand, the argument from 
emphatic particulars ••••. 3ut the arguiaant from 
©nphatlc particulars is so delicate and so subtle t!«t 
I cannot feel quite sure wliather it is valid or not and 
I think the longer one pursues philosophy, the raore 
conscious one becomes low extr^ iaely often one has 
taken in by fallaoles, and the less is one to be quits 
sui^ that an argument is valid of there is anythiiig 
about it that is at all subtle or elusive, at all 
difficult to gJ«sp» That mskea me a little cautious 
and doubtfulabout all these arguments and therefore 
although I am quite sure that the question of the 
truth or Halsehood of neutral nonisia is not to be 
oolved except by tl^se means, X do not profess to know 
i^ether neutral moniBm is true or is not .««• "22 
Bussell abondmied the objection frota emphatic particulars, 
but the problem of belief remained perplexing hin. In the iBine-
diately preceding lines of the above passage, he sayei 
*•••• Il^ vlng said that, I oui^t to pa!t»oe?d 
to tell you that I have discovered whether neutral 
monii^ is true or not, ,•«, But I do not profess 
to know whether it is true or not* I feel more and 
laore inclined to thlMk that it may be true* I feel 
jnore and acre that the difficulties that occur in 
regard to it are all of the sort that may be solved 
by ingenuity. Bit nevertheless there are a number 
of difficulties* •*..• Ctoe is thequestion of belief 
and ^ « sorts of fEicts involving two verbs^ If there 
are such fiacts as this, that, I think, njay sake neu-
tral fjonlsra rather difficult, out as I v^s pointing out, 
there is the theory that miQ calls behaviourisia, which 
belongs lo^ tlcally with neutwal laoniwa and that theory 
altogether dispais »s with those facts containing two 
verba, and would therefore dispose o* that arguaent 
against neutral monism *•«« "23 
It is clear frora this pas^ge that the problem of •beliefs' 
was for aussell a genuine difficulty in the way of hia accepteaoe 
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of neutral taoniam. But i t I s also clear that he, a t thio atage, 
was oonteraplatiivj about a possible solution of the problem in the 
l i i t i t of behavlouristie psyo^wlogy. He, However, eachewed making 
any <»tegorleal s ta t^ient beoauae ha had not found ao far enoui^ 
time to study and think upon the various isuues and intr ioacies 
involved. The opporttmity waa however, afforded to him when, in 
aueeeeiing year he vas S€ait to j a i l foy hia opposition to \rfar, 
Ther« he read eact«iaively about behaviouriran and reflected upon 
i t s bea r ing upon the problesa of knowledge* lltese reflection he 
co?5pres3ed in hiepaper ent i t led 'On Propositions' putdLiahed in I9l9« 
Hhe question was what do we aesun when we say ye >el i^e 
something. According to the theory which Buasell formerly n th ro^ 
ted, i t conalBted in a certain kind of relat ion between the aubjeot 
and the • content* of belief. The rela t ion i s such tbat i t aakea 
us say that we are ^ l i ev i ng* the object as a^^inst * des i r ing ' , 
l^b t ing* eto« of the same. In a l l oases of w!^t we ca l l aental 
occurrences, the content r^aains same} only the 'act* i ,e# the 
nature of subject 's relat ion to oontaat i s di^i'srent. We ^ y , 
for example, believe that the servent I have recruited i s honest, 
o r we aay wish that he be honest, or merely consider whether or 
not he i s honest« In a l l these oases, the content i s aamef what 
dlfferenoiate one occurrence froa another i s the peculiar nature 
of relat ion in which alnd stands with l t« 
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How aocording to the BeihaTlounatlo psyohology whleh avolda 
the notion; of *subJeot»t belief oonelsta merely in the oanaal 
flffioaoy of the content whloh I s iielieRrod and not in i t s relation 
to the alnd. A content will he said to he helieved when i t lo 
oapaWle of prodoeing certain appropriate actions in the body of 
bell even Suppose e .g . that someone hears i t being said that 
an escaped t ige r i s In the s t r ee t . Wow i f he displays certain 
changes in his behaivionr ««g» i f he trembles or runs away he will 
be said to be believing the proposition. But i f the proposition 
comes before hla in the form of a question v i s . supposing i f thens 
i s an escaped t iger in the s t rpt t* he wil l certainly not run avAy 
or show mny aim of t0SiT» 1A t h i s case he will be merely 'oonsi-
derizig* the content. S l a i l a z ^ about other socalled mental 
phaioiiMma. 
%sss l l agrees with behaviotinats in t he i r re&jotlon of 
subject. Het however disagrees with thwi in t he i r oontsntlon Iftiat 
i t i s -ttie (»ui»a efficacy of a content which makes i t to b« a 
belief-object . I t i s aaid that in beliei^ing a content and consl* 
dering i t» the content i s samo* Bat i f content i s a%se lu>w can 
a t raxe moment i t prodlees drast ic changes in the person's body 
and a t other !ioraent no o!mnge at a l l . The theory goes a ^ i n s t the 
principle of same osuss-sams effect. I t follows that there must 
be some additional element either only in belief or only in consi* 
deration or otherwise on% sort of additional element in belief and 
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other sort In eonsideration to snake thaa two dis t inct kind of 
25 
phenomisia* 
Star 2ttso#ll, this adclitioxial element is what he calls •belief 
feeling* which la not neeesaarily mental. 4e will \m seen shortly. 
Has sell helleves •iaaises* and feelings* as intrinsically of the 
same nature as sensations* Sensations are neutral and so are fee-
lings. 'There are aecordlnf; to him three kinds of beliefs pertalxw 
ing to aeiw)ry» expectation arid Mre aaaait. Bach of these consist 
in a certain feeling or ooraple* of ssmsations. A belief occurs 
only when any one of thea Is attached to the ccntvit believed, 
ye nay remeraber that it was ralnin^t o^ expect that It will rain 
or merely as eat that it is raining. In all these cases the coii-
tent believed is same} what differondates one sort of belief with 
other sort is the particular bellef-feellng which is attached to 
26 (intent. 
Mter e3(9?lalnlng belief, in th i s way, in purely p>iysiolo* 
f^lcal tei^is, BoBsell proceeds to B^ke an a l l over attacdi upon the 
nf^tion of aental sA f aa indep^idcait siibstanoe. I t say be x^salled 
that in 2TQ\iLmm of Philoseti^y. HusseU adialtted, thou^Ji hesta-
tingly* the possibi l i ty of being acquaintent with bare self . His 
argim^it was l;>«at when we perceive any object. What we perceive 
i s the oomi^ex *self«»acqiiaintented with object*. Hence both the 
- 170 * 
ohject and self are In some s^mse ay objects of awareneos, ^ t 
i» .QSU: ^ w l e d i e igj* Byteiaaal ^aiSliii ho denied thispossibl l ty say-
ing that I t i s 33ot Introspectly revealed to u s . He however, ad-
raitted i t s knovfledi^ o aa imowl«dge by description. He was then 
qtilte convinced about I t s Indispenslbil l ty in exiabaining various 
mental ocourrencas. Butt as »oon as he vras al^e to explain these 
mental ooourrcno*?© In no»»psyoMeal terras, he rejected the pheno-
mcna altogether. In itnalval^a a£ iifli* he surveys •recent c r i t i c i -
sm of oonsolouanesa* and oolKSlud^ that I t cannot just ly be elaiaed 
as exist ing. 
What characterises iii the a^ln, the mental phenomena i s 
ccaasclousaiesa. There are dlflerent \«aya of being conscious v l« , 
by peroeivlngt by remeraberlag e tc , What i s oomsion in a l l these 
different ways of being conscious i s the i r object-dir^etedness, 
W© arf' always conscious of something* '!?he consciousness and I t s 
object seem to be two dist inct terras the relat ion therebetween be-
ing irreducible, The eonseiousaess i s always ^mitaX while the 
objects H'^ ed not neoessnrlly be so . In t radi t ional psychology, 
the knowledge (M>xu3lsted of three elemental the act ( l , e , consciou-
sness), the content and ttm object, Bissell had already assimila-
ted the object Into contait by fi^ylng the former a function of 
l a t t e r . He rww endeavours to give a similar treatment to the 
re!!»izilng element o»e, act or subject, The act or subject i s also 
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rendered a conotruction out of dlfferei t b i t s of aensations which 
i t WIS hitherto considered to be prf?sented t o . 
Cionsolousaesa should be disbelieved because I t i s not an 
object of acquaintancGi nor i s i t indispenalble in explaialn^ ^ e t s 
Following ?!ach and James, Bussell too seeks our fai th l a oonaciou-
aneas aa a peraiattag entity abldln*^ the fle^-tlng and fragraentiY 
expericaices in a :ifel8e laogua^se l aMt . We aayt ^ think so and 
so", and I t seeas that there i s something •!• which i s transcend-
s i t a l l y related to some object. :^ 3ut thla Is a f&lae conclusion, 
^^htre a re , Infe t , only thoughts collected Into bundles, such 
that one bundle i s ay thou#its, other that belonging to another 
person i s h is and oo on. Thoughts of one collection are related 
to each other and I t i s t he i r re la t ion that constitute tho consc-
iousness. A t h o u ^ t aa subject cornea in the contact of another 
thought which functions as an object to the former thou/;^t and la 
thla way the event called knowing occurs. «!• aa a permantmt 
substance i s not an eleraent In th i s re la t ional system and there-
fore i t s supposition i s superfluous. As a raatter of fact the ver; 
^ranimatleal foiaa "In think", "You think"t "he thinks" are rals-
leading. The loore correct way of s ta t ing i t would be "It thlnka 
22 in me" or "therels a thought in lae" e t c . 
I t l3 iiaportant to note here that 1^3sell, in denying tainc 
^nd ooxiaclousness, does not d^iy the maital phenomena altogether, 
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leJiAviourista deny whf>lesale the pmecnee of Imeges, feelings e tc . 
rediieing them Into sorae physiologioal change In body. BaasoU 
does not go to thla extent* Aocordln^S to hlji we can deny traages 
of other rainde. Bat we oemnot deny our own trm&Vim "Phe preseaoe 
of •laages* ia untpiestlonabl«> on purely expexleneial groimda. We 
can think of a fnend s i t t i ng l a the ohBlr a l t h o u ^ the chair Is 
enpty. He however says that talking of Iwagea aa a^tital does not 
l!^ply that they belong to some tranao'mdeatal subatanee* 
Inagea, in t he i r ea^^entlal naturet are not dis t inct fzoa 
aenantlons. Traditionally i t was believed that senaatlon* are 
vivid and active whereaa th© iaogea are faint# f le«tin^ and ooswi*-
tary# ^ t auasell thinks that althoui^ theae are chazactlos which 
uaually distlngHish Imagea from aenaatlonat they do not do so 
;Lnv^yialft,y^ What in the laa t analyaia dlffereiaoiatoB them i s the 
dlfteraace of context* Sensations are caused 1^ sttsiull external 
to nervous aysteni or hrnin. Iiaa^ieSt on the other hand, are caused 
by t he i r association with sfsaaiitlonB* Imtges too, l ike sensations, 
have causal relat ion t» outside physical object, }3ut the object 
in th i s case beloags to past not to pr<ds«nt« They art? copied o€ 
2B 
sensations which ws experlaaic^ of an object in past , 
Moreover lunges are private in a smise in which the sensa^ 
t lons are not* 4 simsatlon seems to srive us knowledge of sons 
external thing while liaaiges appear to be Internally excited* Thsy 
- 175 -
therefore give knowledge of What Is within ourselves, Imageae are 
thuB quite alike with sensations In their intrinsic nature; they 
aiffer only In their being inside the hraln. In other words It 
can be said that they observe <^uaal laws different froia those 
29 
observed by sensations, 
Hassell indeed says tbat there are operating two kinds of 
laws in our universe. There are things subject to physical laws 
(such as physical things) and there are things subject to psycho-
logical law (such as in^ages). Sensations are subject to both 
laws and are therefore neutral physically and psychologically. 
There ar" no material or mental subatancea. The world is made of 
the same stuff via, experiential particulars. It is only differen 
sorts of laws that niake one particular c»lled mental and the other 
physical, Hussell ^ aysi 
**r^  o\m belief ,,«• Is that James is ri^t in 
rejectin/; eonaciousneas as an entity, and that Amerl-
can realists ar partly right, though not wholly, in 
considering that both mind and laatter are composed of 
a neutral stuff which, in isolation, la neither mental 
nor material, I should admit this as regards aensatlonsi 
what Is heard or seen belongs equally to psychology 
and to physios, "Jut I should say that ii^ges belong 
only to mental woi^d, altlwugh those occurrences 
(if ai^> which do not fora part of any "eaqperienco" 
bel<mg oxily to physical world. There are, it seems 
to me, priaa facie different kinds of causal laws, 
one belonging to physics and the other to psychology. 
The law of gravitation is, for example, a physical law 
while the law of association is a ps/chologlcal law, 
Sensations are subject to both kinda of laws, and are 
therefore truely "neutral" in the Holt's sense. But 
entities subject only to physical laws or only to 
psychologloal laws are not neutral, and may be called 
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respectively pu2'f;ly laatorlal and purely mental, Biren 
those, howerver, which are purely siontal will :aot ha"ve 
that In t r taa lc reference to object a which BrCTttans 
aualgna to them aad which coiistitutca the es^^ice of 
'^consciousness" as or i lnar i ly understand ... , ,• '*30« 
A'tor rojectia(5 mixid aa traascoadsaital siabatanoe What rt^nialr 
ed I'or BuQ^^cll v^s to construct a losioal s«b©titut® vSiioh could 
do r.ll the fimctlona that were previously done by the auh^eot. 
He was EODraover to evolve a new definition of perception v^ch 
would not admit the Ajality of subject and objcKst in the abo^e 
soaise. In other words, he has to replace his former epiatenjology 
of oense-data by a non-relational eplsteaolog^ which admitted only 
aeneations and i t s mental a:i3"''\;:uea» 
I t o se l l , in ^ y ; %?¥t^f^g Si. iSSi£S3^ ^i£i^> '<bl3.e const* 
ructing a lo{;ioal axx'mtttntf» oi ?«iterlal thing, devised two ways 
of collecting together the partiouxsura ( l*e . aenaibilia)* Ons 
way was to group them according to what he called the *law8 of 
perspective*. Given any part icular , we find that there are aroirn* 
i t a number of other ^artioulaa^ which differ frora i t In /rraduall 
incr t^sins dogroeaj and thia change la due to the change In pejv 
speetive. A cliair, at a given '^m*^it /^ives a number of appearan* 
ces when ae j^n hy a number of p-^raoia, ^ e appaaranc ?s differ 
from each other following the laws of pc»rsp«ictive, ^^ssell woulc 
c a l l the set of these appearaacea, a'nioniaatary oliair*. In respec 
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to anything there can also be conceived a vdiole series of such 
Bets of appeaianeea in temporally suocessiva noaents which are 
related to each other IQT the laws of d;^naaics, I M s serl«s of 
sets of particulars constituting laomentary chair %rould be the 
•chair* as a physical thing. 
Itow reversing this two-fold way of ananglng particulars 
we Kiay huild up a construct v^ iich will be a substitute of mind-
substance. That is, instead of first collecting together all the 
appearances coi^titutint'; a nonentary thing and then fortaing a serw 
lea of thenif we iai{^ t first arrange in a series the successive 
appearcnces of a thing and then make a set of w w h series by 
including appearaaces occuring in other perspectives. In the case 
of chair» for example, the first plan would be to collect together 
all the aspects which it presents to different observers at a 
given oonifflat and then to forra a series of such collections or sets 
belonging to other niorasnts* The other plan is to collect together 
all the aspects which it present in successive aoraents to a given 
observer and then to do the same with other observers. A set of 
suc'^  series would be the •mental chair*, or 'biography* in Hussell' 
words, 'The second plan in which, we forra a set of series instead 
of a series of sets will be a concern of psychology instead of 
physics, ?or it telle us not what the chair is but what impress-
31 
ions it is producing to ae. 
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I t IB Clear t ha t according to BbtiSi^ iell every par t icmlar has 
a two-fold looat loni I t la simultaneously a member of two group*, 
on the one hand I t i s a member of the gZYJup itfhi<^ cons t i t u t e s the 
objec t ive physical th ing and on the o ther I t belongs to 'biography* 
For example w i^on I see a s t a r , ay seeing of I t has a dual r e f e re -
nce . On the one hand i t belon»'?3 to a group of p a r t i c u l a r s which 
I s ob jec t ive ly ex is t ing in the perspect ive space and i s s tudies 
by phys ics . And on the other hand I t I s a par t of observeWi* 
personal biography and i s a mabjectnatter of psychology. 
I t i s to be noted tha t wheai i iussell speaks of biography, 
he does not necesaar l ly mean by i t laind, Tho observer may be 
a human person o r a camera or a dictaphone, 4 eamcra vd l l record 
the occurraicea on i t s p l a t e l a the same manner a s they a re recoiw 
ded by us In our b r a in . The 'expertsnces* of pl^tographic p la tes 
w i l l be as much subject ive is our own. 
The only difference betweaai t^e nature of expartence by a 
photographic p la t e and tha t of a human organism i s t h a t while i n 
the former the occurrence i s mere occurrencet i n the l a t t e r i t leada 
the observer to r e c a l l sorae previous occasion on which he had ex-
pertenced the same ooouri'euoe» o r some occurrence v^hich i s r e l a t ed 
to i t , For exaarple ..hen we have smell a flower we IraEiediately 
r e c a l l a s imi la r odor which v;e have expertencod on some e a r l i e r 
occasion. Or whai we toek a t a penny, the sensat ions a re of colour 
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and rouiidnesa, 3ut a t the same time we alao come to know t h a t i f 
touched i t would be hard. We have not touched the penny. The 
Impression of i t s hetcvi hard spontaneously a r i s e s when we jus t 
see i t . Clear ly , what makes us so bel ieve hao i t s source in 
past experience. In the past whene^rer we touched the iJonny i t 
was hard and the experience of t h i s hardness always accompanied 
the experiences of i t s usual colour and roundnesa. 
This fact of an experience of present moment being 
cor re la ted with a s imi la r experience occurred in paat i s what 
-Husaell c a l l s •nineniic phenomena*. 4nd i t c l iaractcr ises the 
experiences of living; or^^sinisms as agains t those of photographic 
p l a t e s or a n i i ^ l s , ^hxsmi bein^;s laeroeive while the photo/graphic 
p l a t e s only sense. And t h i s perceiving of huiaan bein^is cons is t s 
only i n the capacity of g iv^ i occurrence giving r i s e to ranenic 
phenom«ia# But perceptions not only give r i s e to smeriic pheno-
mena, they a re a l so affecteti by them, v^ /hen a word i s u t t e red 
before a person the meaning of which ho does not know, he would 
not exhib i t appropr ia te bodily r eac t ions . In o ther words h i s 
perception of the word would be di f ferent firom what i t would 
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have been if he had already knovnthe meaning of word. 
Perception, accordiiv^  to ^^saell consists in "^he appea-
rance of the object from a place x^ /here there is a brain with 
sense-or/^ans and nerves formin^; ?£irt of the intervening medium." 
It is not that the appearance is before some riind. The particular 
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i t a e l f accKsapaaled with certain other l ike phanoaana whloH i t 
opon'toneoualy amuaea tjoiivt in contact vrtth a lonnan orfi:anlam 
that constitutsa perception, ivery eao© of perception ima itij 
senaatloiml QOXB and mi extra-a^aaational aeoretion« '>j0O2Wtl-
cKsilly the tvw ar«t dlotin{^lahlble though pi<actio»illy i t '^ 1/^ ht 
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not be poJ50ihl0 to do so. 
I t 'iiay further "km clarli ' led that althouis^ ;:iu3Bell ai^eoks, 
especial ly in the caae of axpcrienoca of ohoto/jpaphio platest 
aa t h o u ^ the object (e»g# atajA ia a t one Dlaoe <md th© 
oxi^rienolna bioippaphy a t a different place which smnld imply 
tha t s t a r ia an iadepondait ob;Joct yhich ^mkQB i t s inprinta 
upon pla tes , lut th ia iiiipresalon i s i l luaiory and la (hie to 
the l i i i ta t ionei of our lajiguago, lusooll*^ point la thnt wh'it 
we ca l l a s t a r , is» infaot, a congloiaorate of an innuraeratile 
aapects ths^t i t can present at an inf in i te nuraber of points 
f bioiT!rai*iieo> ixx apace, Tvery rcipilrir appearsmce i s an actual 
aemh^P of the Bysti?m uhich in the at?ir and i t a causation ia 
ent i rely Internal to that ayotea* "^njfs appefirancea of st.ir a t 
a certain placet i f they are reifular, do not require any causQ 
or explftmition beyond the existence of the a ta r . Uo rsay ex.>reea 
th i s 1^ eayln^l, eays ^iuBseil^ '*ttet a r^siulai* appearrmce of otar 
ia (Me to stiir alonet f^ fid i s actually a part oi s t a r , in the 
senoe in which i^m i s a part of huiaan race". I t rioos without 
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aaylii,; that •hwraaii race* la not by Itaelf an entity. It is 
Eierely a name» a construction which stands for a collection 
of individual nmi. Therefore the atar itself is not an 
entity except in the aenae of being a system of ita appoarfinces 
and aspecta, T>^t the physical objects do not have any 
independent exiatence is stated clearly by iussell whe i he saysx 
**Tn our ovai caae the one tTi^ up la our )ody (or our brain), 
while the other is our nlnd, In so far ao it conaisto of perc^ p^-
tions. In the case of photogranhic plate, the firot -^ jroup is 
the plate as dealt with by ph;y3ics, the aecond the aapect of 
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the heavens which it photOf^raphs," ' 
It is clear thit the theory of knowledge alxjve develOTjed 
is non-relational and non-cauaal in its character, Physical 
things are reduced to their apnearances which are not presented 
to any subsisting mind but theiaaelvea constitute aind. In 
subsequent phase of philosophy, J^assell retains his po:^ ltion 
of the neutrality of ultinato occurrences conotitutinfj the 
universe. He however inakes the knowing a three tora process, 
.kn occurrence in the physical world causes an occurrmice on 
the neivoua system of the pepcelver's liody and this, in turn, 
causes an occurrence in the brain. And it is this oocurronoe 
in the brain that oonytitutes the knowing. 
Chapter V 
POCTHIHB OF NEPTRAL H0KI9^ ( I I ) 
(Causal Theory of Fttreeptian) 
PrallBdnary Resiaykg 
Bussall* s Tha A|aaXystg of ^ind appaarad In W2t» 
This ifTas followad by his another vork nrlth a corraspondlng 
t l t l a . Bja Analysis o | Kattar ^ l e h appeared In 1027,* 
This wcsrk i s vary iisportant In that i t eontainad Hussell 's 
most matura idaas regarding various iHtillosophleal issues 
and almost f inal yrords about the prohl^Q of pereaptlon. 
As far as tiia l a t t e r probl^^i i s conoamedf his subsequent 
^ ^ ^ « M ft^^^^QO 2L ^ i lpgopty (1929) t ^ ^gu i ry i^ to 
Meaning; |gjd Tru^ ( 3 ^ 0 ) and Hiaaan ^owiedg^^ i t s Sgopa 
«|nd l imits (1948) are merely revri tea in diffaresit oonterts 
and in s l ight ly abbreviated forms. Even ^ a n the wrote his 
philosophical work, Kjr ffijlosophieal Pavelopaent in 19S9, 
he did not have anything new to add in what he had already 
said in Analysis of Matter* 
There has bean a lack of c la r i ty on the part of 
Russell' 8 erltlquGB and ec^ninwtators ««».«^ ana no less oo 
the part of Russell himself «..«« as to his position in 
Analysis of Matter vls .a v i s . his position in Analysis 
of Kind* In t^e l a t t e r , as has bean seen in tha 
preceding chapter, Russell committed himself to a theory 
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whlch was admittedly non-relatlaTial i»e» which repudiated 
the causal ecwmectlon supposed to be ex i s t ing betwe^i the 
object and the subjec t . fJeutral asonlsm held hoth mind and 
matter to be ncmexist^Bt and hence imy r o l a t l a n the re -
between to ocmstl tute knowledge was a myth, Kow In 
Analysis of Ha t t e r i Kussell advocates very e x p l l c l t e l y a 
causal theory of perception which presupposes the dua l i ty 
of mind and matter and i s t^ierefore againf?t the ccwelusions 
of neu t ra l m£»iism« Ob the other hand, he continues to c a l l 
himself a neu t ra l raonist denying the mental and lEatsrial 
substances* 
A f a i lu re in reconci l ing these two api^arantly divergent 
t r a i t s in Russell* s philosophy a t t h i s stage has made the 
discussions of h i s various cooinientators on t h i s subject 
b r i s t l ed with a l o t of confusions, UT, Stacef for example, 1 
a parenthes is of his a r t i c l e « Russell ' 3 Ueutral Monism" 
contributed to philosophy of Bertrand Russell (ed.by Shll lp) 
t a l k s as though Russell in the Analysis of F a t t e r , in the 
s a i n , dr i f ted froo his posi t ion in Analysis of Hind."The 
Analysis of Matter (1027>5 he says , "though i t contained 
s ^ e elements of Neutral Konisra, belongs on the whole to a 
l a t e r phase of Hussell* s thought in t^ilch Sc ien t i f i c real isn 
and causal theory of perception f ina l ly gained the up^^er 
hand. I understand (he continues) tha t Hussell himself 
does not recognise tha t there i s any Important difference 
between what I would thus d i s t ingu i sh as two **hases of his 
thought «^ 
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Cto the othop hand is Ronald Jage r , the author of 
The DevQloi^Bent of Bertrand i^ssel l* 9 yhlloaophy who 
seemingly does not see any liaportant difference in the 
i>hilosophies envisaged in tfio books. He ccmtrasts Hussell* s 
n e u t r a l E<»ilstic theory of perception ^ t h t ha t vhlch he 
(Russel l ) advocated as being a phmiomenallst, implying as 
though the neu t r a l mcmlsfs were a s ingle theory* At one 
place he saysi^The theory of perceptlcai wtiich ft he (Russell) 
bui lds i n t o neu t r a l monism i s d i f f e ren t in fundeu^ental 
respec ts frcnn the theory Iml l t e a r l i e r i n to his log ica l 
p 
atomism.«• I t i s c lear tha t for the author , there i s s<Hne 
uni ta ry doctr ine which Russell adheres to in his two 
consecutive phases , wl ich for him d i f f e r s " in fundaBental 
r e spec t s " with his e a r l i e r philosophy. The fac t I s however 
not so simple. The episteisology of j ^ of H a t t e r , as wi l l 
be seen in ensuing pages, i s r ad i ca l l y dissinsllar to t h a t 
^^ A 2L ^lS^« A^^ ^^® *''® ^ ® r ad i ca l l y d i s s imi la r to 
t h a t of p hen !^ en a l l sin, 
^hat makes the matter worse ccmfounded I s the f ac t 
tfsat Russell himself betrays on his p a r t a lack of c l a r i t y 
as regards the i s i ue s athand. Although In My Philosophical 
Development, he speaks of the "new problems" which al legedly 
arose "as a consequence of the abondoniEent of sense-data"? 
he does not fu l ly r e a l i s e tiie extent jf the change which 
iiie ideas underwent when he came to wri te fils l a t e r book(s)# 
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In the i^hlloso^tiy of Bertrand Hossell ( ed . by Shlll*/) , 
Russe l l , wiJ.lo rsi^lylrig to tho c r i t i c i sms raisf^d by Stac© 
says ; " I am ra ther sorry t ha t he (Stace) excluded the 
Ax^alysls oi: Matter from the scoi>e of his d i scuss ion , because, 
although there i s some change of view in tha t book, in the 
main, there i s a fu l l e r and more careful stateuient of 
theor ies not very d i f f e r ^ t from those of The Analysis of 
Kind. I cannot understand (he continues) why Mr. Stace 
holds t h a t neu t ra l mcanlsm rou?^t not regard physical objects 
as CQUSAS of sense-da ta ." (Baiphasls added) 
But, to be su re , the change from an admittedly 
non-relatlCflEial ei>istOTiOlogy to a causal or r e l a t i o n a l 
0*>iSteffiology was not a minor change. Vhat i s th^i the 
solut ics i? . The pu-szle, i t saams, can be resolved ty 
. i is t inguis; i lna the ejc^lstemology of neu t ra l sionism from i t s 
metaiihysics. I t Day be contended that Russell becane 
ei>ir,temologlcally a causa l l f t while meta4>hyslcally 
p e r s i s t i n g as a neu t ra l mcaii: t . I t i s generally presiffiiod 
t h a t a non- re la t iona l theory ofknowledge i s a l og ica l 
concordtant of the doctr ine of neu t ra l monism as i t denies 
the existence of dual r e a l i t i e s of ndnd and matter which 
supposedly ccsne In r e l ticm to each other to c ^ s t i t u t e 
loiowledge. But, a t l e a s t In the case of Hussel l , t h i s 
presumption i s not api^Ucable. Various consideraticms 
from the quanta physics and thfsory of r e l a t i v i t y enabled 
him to develop an ontology frcwi which he was ablo to derive 
a causal, theory of knowledge ' ^ thou t indulging In any 
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incons ls teney . This poin t wi l l be elaborated and es tab -
l i shed in the pages t - a t follow. 
Another quostic^ th t may be b r i e f ly ctaisldered hero 
i s t h i s J what were th© actual reasons which led Russell to 
abandon his n o w e l a t i b i a l theory of i-erceptisMi and to adopt 
in i t s place a causal theory?. 
iiere again no de f i n i t e answer can be obtained from 
Russe l l ' s owD wr i t ings . Altf^iough a t one place in The 
Analysis of Matter he has dwelt upcm to consider scane 
ob^ecticwis against the doctr ine of p hen CMS en a l l sis (defined 
5 \fy him" as a view tha t there are cmly percepts" which 
means t h a t his actual r«^ference I s to the neu t ra l monism 
^^ 4 2C. H I B ^ I ^Qcause phenc»!!enalls!s in the sense in wiiich 
i t ' ^ s presented in External fCMrld. adrdtted mind too be^ifles 
Pe rcep t s ) , i t should not be sup^josed tha t i t wero these 
objections which led him to abondcm his forrer posl t icai . 
In fac t i as may be gathered from the r«l<?vant t e x t , he did 
not develop these objections pr ior to i ls ra-adopting the 
causal theory but only l a t e r to i t . 
Allowing the use of a l i t t l e iinaginatlc»i| i t may ba 
said tha t i t was Russell* s inner temperarsontal urge to 
conform his ^hilosoje»hy v i th th© s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses triat 
led him to adopt causal theory. He seaas to have thought 
t i l s theory more In ccmforraity with the r e s u l t s of p tys ics 
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than th« n<»i-relational theory of Jamsean ta*and, f'hysics 
t e l l s tha t knovledge occurs '4h(m. some l i g h t currents t*roceed 
from an outside ^^hyslcal ob^oct and s t r i k e the nervous 
system f^ the ^JercGi^lent and a message i s thereby sent to 
the brain on ihich the Image of tha t object I s Iniiirlnted• 
This inter^jretat lon of knowledge, of course | involves In f e r -
ences . But inferences are indls^jensable so long as v/e do 
n o t , as Russell r e a l l y did n o t , wish to i>lunge In to solli^sisai. 
Any theory of knowledge which i s not so l i i>s i s t i c , must admit 
inferences i . e . the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of objects wliich are not 
known by d i r e c t e3Ci<erlence but are derived froja i t . 
Phenomenalism as well as neu t ra l manlsK admitted irfepences 
when they included wiong th© sensations those ones which 
were not one* s da ta a t a given moment. Hussell thinks the 
causal theory as "a good s c i e n t i f i c theoi'y" i . e . according 
to him" itr- ve r i f i ab le consquonces are novor found to be 
f a l s e " . Moreover he thinks tha t i*iQrsics might collapse 
in case we do not acce^^t the i>ercei;tic»is to have external 
7 
causes . 
Fresh Formulatlcai of the l^obleia 
According to Russell there are two ways to ap^^roach 
the problem of perce^^tlon. J(ne way i s tha t of Physics in 
iirhlch the subject of concern i s the object of percOi-tion 
not i t s ac t « A Physic is t assumes the t ru th of Physics and 
then proceeds to ascer ta in the Physical s t a tus of pe rcep t s . 
-If i^-
A percept I s sjEiet ing ifhlch i s known and i t i s not 
necessary for htm to discuss wh .t I t I s t h a t makes I t 
Icnown I . e . the process of knovrlngL. The question tha t vh t t 
I s the nature of r e l a t ionsh ip between the knower and object 
knavn I s a concern of psychologis ts . 
The other way to approach the problem vrhlch may be 
cal led phi losophical , on the other hand, takes In to account 
the question of 'knowing' • The question of the I n t r i n s i c 
nature of the process of 'knowing' , for philosopher, however, 
i s important not for i t s o^<in sake. Ife discuss s i t for the 
sake of l i g h t tha t i t throws upc«i the character and extent of 
8 human knowledge. 
Russell reformul i tes the problem of percei^tlon by 
f i r s t taking up the que t i ^ i of knowing. In his irtrobleos 
2L ^'hilosophy and Our knowledge of Extornal '/orId« he 
described the r e l a t i o n occuring between the l<nower and the 
knovm as 'acquaintance* meaning by i t a simple and s t r a i g h t -
forward encounter between subject ard i t s ob jec t . But when 
^^ Analysis of Kind, he cajre to adhere to the theory of 
neu t r a l monlsin, he dropped a l together the notion of acq a in -
t ance . There was no independent mind to be acquainted with 
the ob jec t . Therefore the whole notion of acqualntarice was 
redundant. The data or the sensations were in thoirselvos 
knowledge in being accomi^anled with junemic phenomena. 
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But again \^«n he comes to his 1^  • of Matter« he becomes 
scep t i ca l about the f e a s i b i l i t y of t h i s view. Fie betrays a 
g rea t sensi t iveness towards the basic d i s t i n c t i o n and dua l i ty 
betveen the ac t of knowing and the object of l t » In the 
experiences of headache or other such feel ings and In smells 
and t a s t e s th i s dua l i ty I s not ccxis^^lcuously manifest . The 
occurrence of toothache rcay be Ident i f ied -/ith the fee l ing of 
p a i n . But in v isual and tac tua l experiences, the dua l i ty 
I s I r r e d u c i b l e . Mcanory also ^^rovldes the instance in which 
the d ls t lnc t lcm between the act of r eco l l ec t i ng and the object 
9 
reco l l ec ted i s conspicuous, Jamsean theory of neu t ra l monism 
was thus implausible now for Russell Inasmuch as i t denied 
t h i s d u a l i t y . 
Should then Russell r e v e r t to his o r ig ina l notlcnn of 
'acquaintance* to explain the relat lcm between the knower and 
the known, t ' l r t l y ye s , i . e . Insofar as th re I s a dua l i ty in 
knowledge sotae s o r t of co^initlve re la t icm I s I n e v i t a b l e . le 
however says tha t mere acquaintance i . e . a simple encounter 
of subject with object cannot wholly explain the exact nature 
of r e l a t i o n between the two. Take f ^r exan-ple the case of a 
i>ersan who, walking In a wet day, su<i^«nly s teps aside af ter 
seeing a puddle. Obviously, his behaviour I s not wholly 
de l ibe ra t e or conscious l , e , he does not say to hlnself tha t 
there i s a puddle and i t would be bad to step in to I t , 
However, i f asked why did he step a s ide , he would ce r t a in ly 
say tha t because I did not wish to s tep i n t o puddle, )ye knows 
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re t rospQct lve ly , when the a t ten t ion I s drawn, tha t he had a 
v i sua l perception to ^^Ich he acted appropria te ly• The fac t 
t h a t he remembers the inc ident shows tha t he mu t , In soce 
sense , have known i t . But what would have he known and in 
what sens© i f his a t ten t ion was not drawn ta the matter?- In 
other words what i s the nature of h is kno^^ng the puddle as 
agains t merely seeing of i t ? , 
Hussell refuses to accept the Behaviourist ' s reduction 
of knowing in to ' act ing ap^^ropriately'. Accordliig to behaviou-
r i sm, i t was the bodily action of stepping aside which i s 
what the knowing of the puddle amounted t o . But, Russell 
says , there may be other things to make me s tep a s ide . For 
example, there may be some thorns ly ing ar >und the puddle 
and my stepping aside may be due to my des i re to avoid them. 
In tha t ease the same action '«rauld account for kno<rlng the 
thorns and not knowing the puddle. I 'oreover, the word 'appro-
priate* may carry d i f f e ren t meanin s Inre.jard to d i f fe ren t 
subject ive d e s i r e s . I t might be tha t the person '.miking may 
for same reason think i t c<»iivenient to stejt^ in the puddle. 
In that case his stepping aside would mean tha t he did not 
know the puddle. I t Esay also bo added, in the l a s t , t ha t 
» ac t ing api'roprlately* i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s c i e n t i f i c 
instruments l i k e galvan<xrieter and therEaneter as well out no 
one would say tha t they know anything. 
iha t then i s the exact nature of knoving? i ^ s s e l l says 
t h a t •Noticing" ;ray be an api^ropriate word to describe i t . I t 
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stands for the sensible prossaice of the object plus some-
thing more I . e . the a t tent ion. Certain occurrences, due to 
their intensi ty or emotloiial significance In our Xlfd| oateh 
our a t t r i t i on and we say Uiat we know them* A loud noise or 
a faint music \irtilch I l ike coi&mands my attention and X 
Inasedlately come to know tha t . This i s not to say that the 
events ^^Ich are not attended t o , which are not noticed or 
whldi are t hou^ t to be ea;porl<»iced unconsciously are quite 
unknown. Russell, Infact , Says that * noticing' i s a mattor 
0'" degree. In one sensa i t may be said that an event i s 
'known* If i t rouses in us any emotitMi, however faint „ 
t f i t plaases or displeases us , If I t In teres ts or bores, 
or i t I t laakes us surprised or If t l I s Just what we were 
'^Ith the reappearance of tiie relat ion of »kno^*lng' , 
the'data* which was dropped along with i t In Analysis o£ 
Mind i s also resurrected. I t i s , however, now glv^i the 
name **percept9'*, and i t s concept I s also somewhat modified. 
I t i s no longer that mysterious simple logical entity 
necessarily known by virtue of being giv^i in experi^ice, 
Hussell now defines i t as "those matters of fact of which, 
indepaidently of Infaraoce, we have a r igh t to feel most 
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nearly cer tain". They may even be true or fa lse . I t may 
bi recalled that Russell in his Probleins of philosophy 
and External •iorlA and in his lectures on logical atomism 
has given pretty much emphasis upon the point that sense-dats 
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are neither true nor false . I t i s the beliefs or pro-
positions about th«a which are either true or fa lse . 
But he now talks as If to make i t as being proved 
true or fa l se . "The essential characterist ics of sense-
datum", he says, ••is that I t i s not inferred. I t may not 
1^ 
be t rue , and we nsgr not feel certain that I t i s t rue ," 
An obvious example Is that of memory, ^e kno'^ that scmie-
t ines our Eoaory betrays us . But s t i l l ^^e believe in many 
things cai the basis of cieiaory alone. Another exami^le i s 
derived from faint yercepticms. Suppose, we are l is tening 
to a sound wtilch Is growing more d i s tan t , for examiJle of 
a receding aeroi^iane. At one time w© are sure that we hear 
the sound but at another time we are sure that we do not 
hear i t . During intermediary times we s t i l l haar i t , but 
cannot be sure about i t . Thus there i s a^whole variety 
of sounds ranging from mora certain and certain to less 
certain and altogether uncertain. For liussell, a l l of 
1 *5 
these would be our data or percepts* 
In regard to the nature of percepts, there i s an 
important related problesn that whether only the bare 
sensation should be treated as a part icular percept or the 
element of interpretat ion or inference whic'i usually 
spontaneously accompanies i t should also be included in I t . 
In almojt ever ' ease of percept!cai, some elsment of i n t e r -
pretation or Inference i s inevitably pressnt . This i s 
evident from the fact that the effects of a r^ jlven sensory 
stimulus upon t^>K> mai with indistinguishable sense-organs 
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but d i f f a ren t h is tory of experiences are very d i f f e r e n t , A 
ch i ld who i s s t i l l In the stage of l ea rn ing the words i d e n t i -
f i e s each Individual l e t t e r s and only af te r t h a t i s he able 
to read the word* But a man who i s habi tual of reading ^^asses 
qui te unconsciously from the l e t t e r s . Or to take another 
exatn>>le9 i t i s seen tha t on ordinary man| when he seas a 
faroiliajr o b j e c t | he also atonce becomes aware of the t ac tua l 
sensat ions which the object i s capable of producing. This 
cannot be the case witti a man who i s bom blind but i s enabled 
to see as a r e s u l t of operaticwi, Ife cannot infer t ac tua l 
sensat ions of the object when he I s seeing i t for the f i r s t 
t ime. 
The problem i s tha t the innenic associa t ions u^ o^n which 
the ' i n t e rp re t a t ion* depends, although frequent and usua l , a r e , 
however, by no means i n v a r i a b l e . This would mean tha t i f we 
allow the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to b© included in datum, there would 
be cer ta in perceptions which would bo errwieous. For exami^le 
in the case of seeing water a t a far off ^^lace in des_Jirt in 
sunshine, the seeing i s In te rpre ted wh®i we associa te with i t 
a l so the t ac tua l sensations which i s chcoracteristic :>£ water. 
Clearly the occurr^ice inasmuch as i t I s seen i s qui te genuine. 
But i t becomes err<»ieous when we add to i t i t s usual anemic 
elements . Thus including the in te rpre ted eleme^nt in data 
indiscr iminate ly w>uld amoiint to providing roam for some 
perceptions being erroneous. 
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But on the other hand the bare sensation la not usually 
d i r e c t l y experienced. In our most of experlenoes I t I s 
accompanied wltti I t s nmeffilc associa tes 'vtilch can be separated 
from I t cwily by an e laborate theory. And In the process , I t 
may be feared tha t the bare sense-dattan r«EalJieno longer a 
datum and bacooe a hypothet ical e n t i t y In being Inferred 
from what I s ac tua l ly experlcoiced l«e* In terpre ted datum. 
This l a s t argument seems to Russell to be conclusive. 
Percept ion, he says,'*rriust Include those elemetits '4hl.0h ar? 
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I r reduclb ly phys io logica l" . But, she goes on, " I t need 
not on tha t account Include those el«nents ^ I c h come, or 
can be made to e<%ie, within the sphere of conscious 
17 Inference" . For example, the Inference of a subs tan t i a l 
e n t i t y dog from his barking I s conscious, or a t any r a t e , 
i s capable of being eas i ly made conscious* Thus, In t h i s 
case , the bare noise of barking should be t reated as datum 
Instead of accompanying anything e l se along witti l t « 
But pjarceptlsan being so defined, there remains the 
problem tha t in some cases a t l e a s t , i t vould contain seme 
elemmit of e r r o r , ausse l l here d i s t inguishes between two 
kinds of erroneous percept ions . There may be the case in 
which the porcei^tlon i s r e a l l y unreal and there may be the 
case in ' ^ I c h i t I s cmly made to be so by ut« For example, 
the above case of mirage i s r e a l l y an I l l u s i v e >*erception. 
But even in th i s what i s unreal I s not the visual datum which 
we are seeing, but the expectation tha t i f we go to the 
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iJla.C9 and put our hands th«re m would eXi>erimiC9 ce r ta in 
sensaticffis vhlch water generally i>roduces. i/hai t h i s 
3Xi>0Cti(» I s not f u l f i l l ed we dub the whole ^^erceiition a3 
errcmeous. I t I s qui te feas ib le to sei<arate the element 
of expectation from our actual data and regard the l a t t e r 
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alone as r e a l . 
In those cases in which t^e t o t a l perce^ticm does 
not Involve ex;t^ectatlcmf Russell says , there i s no need 
to regard than as decei>tlve« The saiue coin loolcs to one 
perceiilent as round and to other as e l l l i > t l c a l . I t I s 
said tha t one of the t"»ro must be f a l s e . But Hussell does 
not think i t s o . Two d i f fe ren t events occur in the braljis 
of two tiercepients when they are In contact with coin . 
,^d as both r e a l l y occur, they are equally genuine and 
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r e a l . 
i tusse l l , in the l a s s , refutes ins t rumenta l l s t s ^ho 
claim tha t the very noti^Si of i^ure datum i s lini>ossible as 
a l l our lanowledge involves inevi tably and invar iably stxie 
element of inference . 7hen we say "look, there i s an 
ecl i i ise of the Koon", a l o t of our knowledge about a s t ro -
nomy i s i>resUi)jt>osed in understandlr g t h i s s tatemant. iiut, 
Hussell says , t h i s view understlmates the i^ower of lot j ic . 
There I s no denying tha t our everjrday intor i^retat ions of 
iierceptlve experiences arid even a l l our everyday words 
embody t h e o r i e s . But, he contends, " I t I s not impossible 
to wh i t t l e away the element of In te rpre ta t l ea i , or to invent 
*X04« 
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any a r t i f i c i a l language Involving a minimum of theory" . 
'• '^ y these raothods", he goes on, *• i^ re can ip,pproach 
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asymptotically to the pure datum". 
That there must be a pure datum, I s for Russel l , a 
l o g i c a l l y I r r e fu tab le ccaisequence of the fac t tha t percep-
t ions gives r i s e to nev knowledge, Supposing, for example, 
t ha t we have h i the r to a cer ta in group of theor ies Iwt we 
now find tha t s^aewhere among these theor ies there i s a 
mis take . This mearis that there i s sane tiling which i s 
inexpl icable In terms i . e . not deduclble from the previous 
theory . And th i s scMsethlng would be a new d turn for our 
knowledge of matters of f a c t , since 'datum' means simply 
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"a piece of knowledge that i s not deduced". 
Causal Theory of i:*erceptlop 
Russe l l ' s renewed f a i t h in the ' d a t a ' and ' relat lcwi ' 
(between subject and object) amotmted a r e t r e a t no t only 
to his phenomenalistic posi t ion of "External iforld" bu t , 
in very important r e s p e c t s , to his o r ig ina l d u a l i s t i c 
positicaa of Problems of Philosoj^hty. I t may be reca l led tha t 
in th i s l a t t e r work, iUassell advocated a thre« term theory 
of j>erception in which the da ta mediated the subject and 
(mater ia l body) In the i r being caused by the l a t t e r and 
presented to the former. In the J , of F a t t e r too he 
bel ieves In these three terms. The theory he terms as 
" causal theory of p^srceptlon" In which the subject confronts 
percepts which reveal the s t ruc tu re of physical things which 
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eause th«n from ou t s ide . The basic difference be Ween the 
tvo pos i t ions i s tha t while In the former subject was a mind 
as a subs is t ing e n t i t y and object a mater ia l substancei i n 
the l a t t e r , both are made of the same stuff* Hussell r e t a i n s 
the metai>hyslcal pos i t ion of n e u t r a l i t y of s tuff upheld In 
A*2£ Hind In t h i s s t age . Both subject and object are q u a l i -
t a t i v e l y the same r e a l i t i e s . They are what Russell c a l l s 
" events " ^rtilch may roughly be understood by tbm terrr. 
»energy-units ' to which Russell arrived through theory of 
r e l a t i v i t y . 
To put i t in gCTjeral terms, Russell*s new causal theory 
of perception I s t h l s j At every moment in our cosmos, there are 
occurring an i n f i n i t e number of events some of whCMts, a t a par-
t i c u l a r morrent, f a l l within the experent la l f i e ld of a brain 
which i s I t s e l f a composition of events . The occurrence of 
an event in the experent la l f ie ld of a brain causes to s t a r t 
a process of events which ends in the nervous system of the 
body ( i t s e l f a collocatlc«i of even t s ) . From the point upon 
pereelvers 'body where t h i s process te rminates , another process 
of events s t a r t s which passing through the nerves reaches a t 
brain and produces an event i n t o i t . I t I s t h i s l a s t event 
in the brain which i s to be addressed as the ' experiencing 
of the object ' belonging to the world external to the 
pe rcep ien t ' s body. I t ' s 'percept* and I t i s r e la ted to the 
o r ig ina l event through causal laws which are studied in physics. 
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^h^ti, for example I we say tfe see the sun, what hai^^ens i s 
t ha t a tJroQess of events s t a r t s trcm the sun wtiich t ravers ing 
the space betwemi the sun and the eyeS| reaches u l t imate ly 
the brain and produces the event cal led " seeing the sun". 
I t i s obvious t lat t h i s whole iirocess which cons t i -
t u t e s 'kno'^ing*! ctMapriseB three terns i the external event 
which i s causing the process , the brain and the percept a l l 
being events . I t i s a l so c lear tha t «hat the subject i , e , 
the brain Icnows i s «pereepet* t/hich r e f e r s ( i n being causa l i ty 
r e l a t ed ) to external event . This means tha t the knowledge 
of external events i s inferred and therefore amounts to 
begging the very quest ion. The gulf between the world of 
sens© and world of physics of vrhich Russell spoke in his 
e a r l i e r works thus reappears . He makes a fresh attempt to 
bridge th i s gulf by evolving firguments wtilch can make ttio 
exis tence of external physical things Mghly probable, i f 
not c e r t a i n . 
But he had f i r s t to show tha t the universe i s not 
s o l i p s t i s t i c i , e , i t contains the elements wl-iich are no t 
our own percepts and r e c o l l e c t i o n s . There are no demons-
t r a t i v e proofs for t h i s , Russell frankely admits tha t "at 
bottom our main ground i s the des i re to believe In simple 
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caus il laws" . But "proximately there are other arguments". 
Scrnie of these are a? fol lows. 
That there are percepts other than those possessed by 
our own body can be shown by the s imi l a r i t y of behaviour 
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whlch the bodies of other persons exhib i t In the shared 
circumstances, /hen we speak to the people they behave a l -
most in the same way as ve ourse Ives would i f \r® bave heard 
those words. This I s to say that In a ce r t a in circumstance 
our perceptions of the i r bodies change in the same so r t of 
way as the perceptions of our own body would in the same 
circumstance• Bow since my act ing in a cer ta in way i s 
always a r e s u l t of my hearing soae ^jarticular word, i t i s 
na tu ra l to Infer t h a t others have heard ( i « e . they had 
percepts) those words -^ hen they act In t ha t cer ta in way. I 
know tha t a word of abuse mal^ e^s me frown said on t h i s fac t 
I can l eg i t imate ly Infer tha t a person heard the word of 
abuse I made against him whai he d isplays s imilar looks , 
s im i l a r l y , on off icer may think himself j u s t i f i ed In 
in fe r r ing tha t his subordinates have heard the word of 
coBBnand since they exhib i t the same behaviour as did he 
himself when confronted by the same words frosB h i s of f icer . 
Again Russell says , 
" . reading a book i s a very d i f f e r en t 
experience from composing cme; y e t , i f X 
were a s o l l p s l s t , I should have to suppose 
tha t I had composed the works of Shakespeare 
«uid Newtcm and Eins te in , s ince they have entered 
i n to my exi*erlence. Seeing how much be t te r 
they are than my own books, and how much l e s s 
labour they have cost me, I have been foolish 
to spend so much time composing i,irith the pen 
ra ther than with the e y e . . . . . . , ' ; ^ 
The task of bridging the gulf between the world of 
sense and the world of physics I s accoo^illshed by Russell 
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In three stages* F i r s t by r egu la r i s ing and arranging our oii«n 
d i f f e r en t i)ercepts of an ob jec t , then by in fe r r ing the e x i s -
tence of analogous percepts In the brains of other parsons on 
analogical grounds and l a s t l y by showing tha t a grouij of 
analogous porcepts re fer to an external physical ob jec t . 
F i r s t there i s the labour of arranging and orgjinlsing 
our own percepts whlc' we think are of on© ob jec t . This i s 
not a very d i f f i c u l t task and Ruasell had a l roady, in his 
e a r l i e r works, devised the ways to build up a l og ica l ccaistruct 
by ©pouiJlng together sensations of d i f f e ren t kind which In 
t h e i r cor re la t ion seem to r e f s r to one objec t , /e see a ba l l 
and expect what sensations would i t produce i f we touch i t . 
Thus by cor re la t ing v isua l sensations with th& usual ly acccwn-
panylng sensations of touch we can form an idea of ari oxtornai 
physical thing ( i n t h i s c a s e | of ba l l ) ^#dthout regarding i t 
as scwsething s u b s t a n t i a l . 
The next task i s to ascer ta in whether there are percepts 
connected with the brains of other persons. I t s p o s s i b i l i t y 
has 3wst been observe In preceding l i n e s . But the argtmients 
given are such as to r e s t upon analogy (analogy between our 
own acts and the acts of others) 'jrtiich p r i aa facie ?eems to 
be obvious and s t ra ightforward. This , however, i s not Infac t 
the case , /e are not In the poslticxn of having perceptions of 
our own bodies as we de f in i t e ly are in having porcei>tions of 
bodies of o the r s . For exaititjle, we cannot see our own face 
(except a i^art of nose , by squinting) or our head or our back. 
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Russe l l , however, says , the i r t ac tua l porceijtlcms are con t i -
nuous i . th the perceptions of v i s i b l e pa r t s of our body, ^e 
can therefore eas i ly imagine 'j-hat t he i r movement '/ould be l i k e 
vhen we are not seeing them, .'e cannot see what our face would 
look l i k e wh^n r^fe frown but we can imagine i t m the analogy 
of others fro'^ning. And th i s analogy i s j u s t i f i e d on the 
basisof the fac t tha t our bodily act ions ^ e r e s u l t s of 
i n i t a t i o n s that we unconsciously do in our Infaiicy, That we 
fro r^fn i s due to our havinf^ roi/eatodly seem in cliiidhood the 
frowning of oth r s . So our in for r lng what our o%m fro^^ng 
looks l i k e from o the r ' s fro>min , i s qui te ^us t i f i ad . 
-/ith t h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n in mind, i t i s easy to s e t for th 
the above given argument in more formal language. Let us take 
what Russell says , i s the simpler kind of analogy. In t h i s , 
our perceptions of the ac ts of others are almost s imilar to 
the pGrceptlcais of our own a c t s , Te clap -^lon the sii.ger 
f in i shes her son?; and the curtain goes dO'.im, or we s?iy "C»i", 
when the rocket b u r s t s . In such cases there Is a sharp stimulus 
among us which i s followed by sosro very deflr / l te bodily ac tn , 
•Te a l so find tha t our p-jrceptions of the movements of bodies 
which we think are of other* s , c losely roseciblo to our 
perceptions of the movements of our om boily. I t i s then 
n a t u r a l to infer tha t the perce^jtions /rdch caused the 
movetnonts of other ' s bodies wai'e similar to the jt/ercei/tlons 
wi.ich caused our o\m. The jt-assibili ty of the percepts other 
than those which ai'e our O'^ n can, thus , p laus ib ly be asser ted . 
Th«r« may9 however, be an objectlcm to t h i s analogy. 
I t may bo said i*y to suPi»os0 separate perceiitloBS stimu-
l a t i n g the movements of d i f f e ren t people ' s bodies? fliy not 
to suppose the very samo event producing s imilar reactisais 
in d i f f e ren t bodies? I t i s lOt^ically quit© poss ible tha t 
a s ingle event of tlie curtrain* s going dovm made a l l the 
appearances of bodies to apj^ear to applaud. The ob^action, 
Russell says , may seem to be "far - fe tched" , but i t i s by no 
means " unreasonable". ^ 
Ve may, however, take another kind of analogy which 
would not admit t h i s ob^ectioii. In t h i s , we find the 
movements of other people ' s bodies as appearing sir.llrtr to 
what our own body i s l i k e l y to make in resptsise to cer ta in 
stimulus which present ly we are not experiencing. Supposing 
for example, A alcaig '-rith his seme f r i ends , I s hearin:, comcentry 
of a c r i cke t match on r a d i o . Suddenly, he hears a burst of 
cheerin^s from his f r i ends , Ue sui^posos tha t tiiere i s some 
big addit ion in the score of the favoured team which i s 
heard by Ids friends but which he himself could not hear duo 
to scsne reas(»i. A moment la t ter , the cotamontator re^^eats 
what ho said e a r l i e r and th i s makes the su^i^osition of A 
t e s t i f i e d , Now th i s Imulies tha t the fr iends of A had 
perceptions and (as the i r percei^ts occured e a r l i o r ) they 
were ce r t a in ly other than those which were had by A 
himself. 
The ai'gUTient in favour of the perce^jts connected -^ th 
o t h e r ' s bodies (as exemplified above) i s , obviously, not 
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demonstratlve and for tha t reason cannot be a t par* in 
poin ts of cogency and i ) l a u s l b l l l t y , -41 th the arguments for 
the exis tence of our o^m percei^ts. There i s a f t e r a l l 
" Decartes ' malicious deiron" wtilch can v i t i a t e our f a i th in 
the argument. Being Induced by drugs we mistake the non-
e x i s t e n t things as r e a l . I t I s l og ica l ly jiossible t ha t in 
any case ^ l a t we think as m^ movement of an ac tua l body 
and ascr ibe to i t as i t s cause same **erc0i<t, may turn out 
to be deceptlcm or deluslcai. itussell i s ccaistralned not 
to deny t h i s objec t ion . He, honrever, says tha t the dece^^t-
t ions or delusions can v i t i a t e only SCMB© i 'ercept lons. I t 
I s h l^ i ly inii/robable tha t a l l of our i^erceiitions are de lus ive . 
He sayst 
"———Frcwi the observed cor re la t ions of A and B 
we may argue, as regards cases in which B i s 
observed but we do not iaiow whether A ex i s t s 
are n o t , e l t h e n (1) A i s always j^resent, op 
(2) A i s generally i^rasent, or (3) A I s sometimes 
p re sen t . Drear^s Suffice to show tha t w« cnnnot 
a s s e r t (1) -But (2) I s ciore probable 
and (3) seems extremely probable. Now (3) i s 
onou^ to allow us to Infer a proposi t ion of 
grea t philosophic importance, narr.elyj there 
are ex l s t en t s 'fhlch I do not p e r c e i v e — - — 
The argument, though not demonstrat ive, I s 
as good as anjL^of toe fundairentalilnductlcms 
of sclGnce". ^ 
Having thus es tabl ished (though not 'Without an i o t a 
of doubt) the p o s s i b i l i t y of percepts had by o t h e r s , 
Russell 4>roceeds to work on much laore dubious and rauch 
more hazardous task of e s tab l i sh ing an object ive physical 
world. I t i s more dubious and hazordous because while In 
th« former case , th© inference vas of soaethlng very 
s imilar to our own percep t s , in t h i s , w© have to infer 
what can never !>© experienced. Anyway, the procedure 
envlf'aged by llussell to e s t ab l i sh i t i s t h l s j 
I t has been seon tha t an observer can forta a group of 
p Tcepts vhich he thinks are of one objec t , l*iOV the 
number of group can be enlarged lay placing a number of 
perceivc-rs around the ob jec t . If ©very percoiver i s said 
to draw ifhat he sees before him then 'J© wi l l find tha t the 
p ic tu res drawn liy thens are s i n i l a r in some respects and 
di«sl!?l lar in o the r . This moans tha t in each case of 
perception both subjective and object ive factors j^lay 
t he i r r o l e . The s imi l a r i t y .imong d i f f e ren t p ic tu res suggests 
tha t the things seen are object ively ex i s t i ng whereas the 
r ' ls5lEi l l i r i t l©s would suggest tha t thol r seeing the object 
must have be^ n^ in ••(ome sense pr iva te and subject ive to 
each perce iver , Hussell saysj •• I t i s the absence of 
i d e n t i t y which makes us r e j e c t the naive realism of cornnon 
sense J i t i s the s imi l a r i t y which makes us accept the theory 
pe 
Of a cc»iro(a:t or lgin for s l r r i la r simultaneous peroe^tlcms,*• ' 
(Emphasis added.) 
The arguinont for the unpercaivable physical ob jec t s , 
as s ta ted abave, i s corroborated by some other argurieuts. 
suppose for example, a gun I F being f i red on a h i l l t o p , liow 
a person standing some distance from the gun i s observing the 
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gunfiref f^  v l l l find tha t thero I s a ce r t a in In t e rva l 
of tlffio In seolng th« f lash and heiTing the sound. If 
the dis tance between gunfire and observer i s increased , 
then the i n t e r v a l bet\«®n seeing and hearing wi l l a l so 
Increase and i f the dis tance i s shortened, t i e i n t e r v a l 
wi l l also be shortened accordingly. Row i f the na ive rea l -
i s t l c theory vere t rue there could not have he&a the 
fluctuatl^ms In the duratl<m of i n t e r v a l s between the 
seeing of flash and hearing the sound. I t roust have boom 
f ixed . For both the v isual and auditory sensations are 
emanating fron the saiDe source and therefore the f luc tua-
t ions must be due to the var ia t ions In the A'O-ltlan of 
observer . The fact tha t the duration of In te rva l doijonds 
upon the dis tance of observer frois gunfire a lso loads to 
have a causal vie-^ of sound. If the two sensat ions r^.^ ro 
I n t e r n a l l y s t i e u l a t e d , then trie i n t e r v a l must have boon 
f ixed. I t a lso follov/s ti a t there i s an atstual Intervenlns 
space between the ousarver and the gunfire w^ilch reti irds 
the movement of sound. The argunient, i ^ s s o l l confesses, 
I s perhaps not very strcMig, " but we cannot deny tha t I t 
has some force"."^ He, however, says tha t there are "much 
strcMiger argunsents" t ha t can be derived from other sources . 
Suppose a room In /hlch a number of j^eOi^ lQ are engaged 
In merry-making. They cha t , smoke, dance and d ine , Kiw 
suppose again tha t a l l the i r a c t i v i t i e s are being photo-
graphed by a movie camera and simultaneously being seen 
by a person hidden soisewhere In the To<m, Now If t\ ere 
I s an agreement between the 4/hotograi>hs and ^i&aX the hidden 
man observed, i t would be na tu ra l to Infer tha t something 
happened where the career a was which bore int imate r e l a t ion 
to what the roan perceived. The agre^nent a lso Implies that 
what xsfas recorded by camera and se®n by the man was caused 
by soBie external coojKon source. Any explanation of the 
agreement in terms of mere chance would be extreniely and 
implaus ib le . 
Hop-Relational Theory Iteijected 
I t may be seen tha t in the tl-iree stages through 54rfiich 
Russell* s attempt of e s t ab l i sh ing an independent physical 
world and making thereby a c a u s a l i s t i c view of ^iercei^tion 
proceeded I the ffiove©«nt was from more ce r ta in to l e s s c e r t a i n . 
The argumoat for our percepts supposed to be re la ted to one 
physical object was obsolutely cer ta in as the percGi^ts were 
obtained within the s o l i p s i s t l e world. The argument(s) for 
the percepts ccmnected with other bodies (In being inferred 
from the fac t of t he i r s imi l a r i t y with our own percepts) 
were, a t the most, in Russe l l ' s own words, " probable in 
highest degree". 
But the arguiiients for u t t e r l y unperceived and 
unperceivable objects were l og i ca l l y l e a s t cer ta in due to 
t he i r wholly ififerred n a t u r e . They could be accejvted only 
by re lax ing to a considerable e x t ^ i t the log ica l vigars. 
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Bvon Hussell* s own s c i e n t i f i c formula Jf Ocean' s razor 
rendered t h i s Inference im^'lauslblG. In liis e a r l i e r 
works, he had shown s e n s i M l i a to suffice to construct an 
object ive and i>ermanfflit world. All t l ^ pro^iositions of 
science could be es tabl ished without ccHnmitting to mind 
or mat te r . Kow believing in a causal theory of pc-rcei^tij^i 
aiBountGd to a r e t r e a t to his pos i t ion in i»?bleE|,;3 2£ 
Philosophy. Obviously, t h i s r e t r e a t could be j u s t i f i e d canly 
by reconsidering the non- re la t iona l theory of percoi-ticm 
and invoking fresh grounds agains t I t . This Russell does 
by f i r s t giving a s l i g h t l y modified versicm of what he said 
in Analysis of Mind> 
A niBsber of d i f f e ren t tierceyts which are su>>posed to 
belcaig to one i^hyslcal object can be arranged about a cen t r e . 
In t h i s arraxjgement, the t^lac© which f a l l s between two actual 
perceiits i s never void. I t i s occupied by the events which 
can be perceived when a parcelver i s placed t h e r e . The 
in tervening space between the person and the object he i s 
see ing , i s " idea l" but successively i t s points can become 
ac tua l when the person moves towards the ob jec t . There can 
thus be formed a group of idea l and actual percepts arranged 
about a centre _«,»,«._« the centre i t s e l f being the place 
i^e re the object i s . 
The laws ' ^ i c h cor re la te d i f f e r en t analogous percepts 
forming a group are cal led the laws of p rsp6<5tlve in a 
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generallsed s ^ s e . On the bas is of thase la'^/s w« can 
Infer Idea l percepts wh«n a ce r ta in number of ac tua l 
percepts of a group I s given. Similarly when a ce r t a in 
nuBsber of analogous groups I s glvarif we can a l so Infer 
fr':^ t h ^ other groups a t d i f f e ren t t imes. Two a&alogous 
groups obtained In two successive ccxn^its wi l l be two 
successive s t a t e s of a t h ing . The whole aer ies of such 
groups obtained in succeeding motnents wi l l b© fa i led the 
* biography^ of the th ing . If there i s some gap between 
the times of obtaining analogous group?, the se r i e s can 
be completed by interposing idea l groups, A thing ^/l l l 
be called ' r e a l ' when there I s a t l e a s t one r ea l group 
in I t s biography (a r e a l group I t s e l f I s defined as 
having a t l e a s t one r e a l p e r c e p t ) . 
The above construetlc»5, says Russe l l , preserves the 
whole of phys ics , a t l e a s t in form, I f not in f a c t . He 
admits tha t l o g i c a l l y , i t s soundness I s unassa i lab le . But a t 
the same time, he says , i t s conclusions are incompatible mth 
cer ta in very strcaig be l ie fs of casiaORsense and sc ience . 
For eaaaniple, i t I s believed in physics t ha t the 
efficacy of causal laws depends upcm i t s two terr.p i . e . 
when cause and effect are ac tua l ly e x i s t e n t , /anything 
merely imaginary cannot be an ef fec t of any cause or a 
cau?e of jany e f e e t . But, according to above theory, 
there may be occasions when we would have to explain m 
action '/? t^out thc»re being any ac tua l ly ex i s t ing cause. 
In the rrasr- of t^e camera pHoto?^raphing the a c t i v i t i e s 
of people in the room, the camera cannot be said to be 
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ac tua l ly ex is t ing when I t was taking photographs, fop, 
than i t was not seen. I t was seen only before and a f te r 
the photographing. In the rnoantlne, I t ex i s t ed , a t bes t 
cmly ' i d e a l l y * . But the problem I s t l a t , i f the emnera 
exis ted merely I d e a l l y , merely hypothe t ica l ly , how I t s 
clean p la te? underwent the modification to give the 
appearances of laen In the rocaa. I t I s much more na tu ra l 
and s c i e n t i f i c to suppose tha t an ac tua l camera did e x i s t 
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there even though I t w?is not our percep t . 
Moreover, the causal laws are derived from our 
observing In a nmeber of cas«s cer ta in things producing 
saise e f f e c t s . These laws wo think to be p r a c t i c a l l y 
Invariably t rue in a l l the future cases i . e . we think tha t 
In future a l so j i f a familiar event happens, I t s cause w i l l 
be sanje which had been in previous observed eases . t<iow 
t h i s so r t of determlnlsK i s poss ible only because ^nt Invent 
a f i c t i t i o u s physical thing which I s permanently there to 
cause the event . If we do not I n v a i t t h i s f i c t i t i o u s 
perinaiient thing and confine our world merely to pe rcep t s , 
no .uch predict ion ^ U be po^ . tb l e . ' ' ^ 
A simpler but for Russe l l , the s t rongest objection 
comas from the consideration of cont inui ty in our exper i -
ence, -/hen we ob'?(&rve a physical body, e i the r f ixedly or 
moving towards I t , there I s an unbreaked cont inui ty in the 
ai^pe-^rance of the ob jec t . But I f we repeatecSly open .ind 
shut our eyes , the object would appear and disappear 
accordingly. Kow I t I s very d i f f i c u l t to iRairtaln tha t t h i s 
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appeai&noe and disappeiranc© Is du« to the corresponding 
existence and non-existence of the object, a l l the more 
so wh€tti another person Is seeing I t continuously. I t I s 
Kuehmore reasonable to say that the visual discontinuity 
l9 due to occurrence and ncm-occurrence of the percepts 
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in u s . 
I t may be concluded on the basis of above that 
supposition of external physical thing i s natural and to 
a great extent valid and the non-relational theory which 
regards this supposlticxi as unnecessary i s not plausible. 
In Hussell*s own wordsi "Therefore, although i t I s i jgscaliy 
possible to Interprete the physical world In terms of ideal 
elementst I conclude that th is Interpretaticm Is unplansll^ei 
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and that I t has no positive grounds In l t « favour". 
OteJeetivltyin l^reeptlon 
A theory about the problem of perception cannot be 
ooffiplete unless i t takes into account the problem of 
I l lusion and er ror . There i s a separate chapter In h.» 
of Matter under the t i t l e " r»«rception and Objectivity" 
in which Hussell discusses dlf fer«i t kinds of e r ra t i c 
perceptions such as l l lusi^ws, hallueinaticm etc In the 
l i gh t of his causal theory of perception. But before 
discussing the error or subjectivity In perception, Is 
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necessary to discuss f i r s t the corresponding probleas of 
ob jec t iv i ty in perception I*©, the prot l^n tha t what makoi 
a given case of percept ion, ' r ea l* | » genuine* or ' ob j ec t i ve ' • 
Because I t I s I t s lacking In ob jec t iv i ty tha t makes a 
perceptlcm to be t reated by us as fa l se and fake . 
Objectivity in percept ion, according to Ruspell , i s 
a matter of degree, "Tbe more co r r ec t " , he says , "are the 
inference!? we can drav from a percept as to other events 
(vhether percepts or not) belonging to the same group, the 
34 
ro r e "object ive" i s the percept ion" . Let t h i s point be 
elaborated• 
I t has been se«i In the preceeding pages t h a t , from 
a given percept we can infer other perce*>t3 ^rhich are 
iseisbers of the same group to which the given percept 
belongs, and a lso the events wliioh are not percepts a t a l l . 
For t he i r cc^sparatively more cer ta in nature ^ the former are 
more impartant . But, for ccaivenience, l e t us take the 
l a t t e r f i r s t , 
Kant and subsequently many other philosophers have 
told t h a t the external cause of percept ion, the th ing - ln -
i t s e l f , i s always imkno -^m and unknowable. But Hussell says 
tha t i f ^fTQ accept " the usual can?»s of s c i e n t i f i c Infererjce", 
t h i s asser t ion i s only p a r t i a l l y tarue, ^!ls esmtentlon i s 
t h a t although I t I s t rue t h a t t*© I n t r i n s i c character of 
the cause r^nalns unknowi, wo c^ m know a great denl about 
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Its"structure9 «?« distinguish two pereapts and attribute 
their differences to the differences In their respective 
stimuli. This Implies that a percept Is in some respects 
similar to its stimulus, ^ may say roughly that there Is 
a one-cme relation between a stimulus and the percept It 
causes* This relation» sayt Russell, enables us to Infer 
certain mathematical properties ab">ut the stimulus when we 
know the percept, and conversly enables us to Infer the 
percepts when we know the mathematical properties of the 
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stimulus •** 
For example, I t can be said with near certainty that 
If Sim looks round, I t must be round l«e» i f I t I s round 
perceptually, I t I s also round pti^slcally* i e , however, 
cannot Infer ftrom the faet that I t looks bright , that I t I s 
actually bright , because the brightness I s not the a true** 
tural property of the sun. similarly. If a picture looks 
beautiful, I t cannot be said that I t I s actually beautiful. 
Brightness, beautlfulneas or blu«nes8 e t c . are not structural 
properties I . e . they are not parts of the physical consti-
tution of tJie objects of which they are qua l i t i e s . Rod 
they been so, thwi we could also say that when a music I s 
beautiful , the score which represents the music Is also 
beautiful . Russell further says that so far as physics 
Is concerned, the esswitlal and In t r ins ic character of 
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dvmits ar« not needod to ho necessarily knovm. ^9 can 
36 build physics merely by knO'-dng the structure of ^korcei^ts, 
Now about the inference of other percepts of a 
group fr(%i an actual percept, Russell says that i f the 
perceptions were perfectly regular and accurate, a few of 
the l a t t e r could suffice to infer the vhole of fcHrmer. 
This i s , however, found not to be infact the case. Percep-
tions are generally inaccurate, irregular and va^ue, A 
yersoD seen frots a far off place cannot be Icno^^ whethw? 
he i s handsoBje or ugly, Soraetiise ve hear a person speak-
ing but are not clear about what he i s speaking. Two 
things which appear to be similar frc^ a distance, look 
different when we are near to then. Ih this sense, the 
more distant percepts are vaguer than the nearer ones and , 
Russell says, we can form a general law acctwding to idiich 
the dis tant percepts are always inferable frcxTi the form&t 
but not the vlce-e-versa. 
This regular and general law i s api^licable to every 
Case of percept!»! except those In v»hieh s<»se external 
thing Intervenes between the observer and the object he i s 
seeing* Fog, nnoke, coloured glasses, opaque objects e t c , 
d i s to r t in th is way, the appearance of the objects. To 
take a concrete example, i t i s seen that a vis ible thing 
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tawards which I am moving b«co!r,es Invisible when I reach 
a t a ear tain place. This i s due to earning of s<^e opaque 
object between o^self and the object being seen. The 
effect of a near object upcm the api^earanoe of the 
farther object i s , as a ru le i gradual l«e . at f i r s t both 
are visible^ gradually their angular distance becomes 
lesser and In the l a s t only the naarer object remains 
visible* From this Russell concludes that while deter-
mining the appearances which a body would present at a 
given plaeef I t i s necessary to take into account the 
bodies which sure betwewi the p?»rcelver ar.d the object, 
besides I t s appearances a t other place. 
The law for the Inference of bodies betwe^i the 
observer and tlie object he i s perceiving can be stated 
In these words* " If we compare neighbouring raercber of 
a group of perceps, we find In a great many cases, that 
their f i r s t - order differences are In accordance with the 
laws of perspectiveI while their second order differences 
are functions of groups with other centres") or niore 
slmplyi "that the differences betwewi neighbouring positions 
are eocRpounded of the laws of p ;rspeetlve together with 
functl<»ia of groups with other centres".*" Cta the basis 
of this whenever the appearance of an object Is distorted 
or ceased, we would ass^uire the exlstwice of sojse 
•213-
lnt«rv«aing body wt-iethor or not i t I s vis ible • More 
formally, whenever the fact of distort ion or disappearance 
happens. I t woold be supposed i^at t^e laws of perspective 
In t^ ls ease have come to be compounded up by the laws 
which are the functions of group with other centre. A 
colourless glass s l ightly dlstogrts the appearances of the 
object althoui^ I t i s not visibly present. But, in this 
ease, we would Infer t^e presence of I t In order to Safe-
guard the regulari ty of the laws of perspective which has 
be«i Interfered a? the dlstoptlcais indicate . This infe-
rmice i s subsequently Justified when i t i s ascertained )yy 
touching i t . 
HussoU says that a glv«a perception would not be 
said to be fal l ing In objectivity only because i t i s vague. 
The defect in a vague perception Is not a quali tat ive 
defect; i t i s a quimtltatlve one. That i s , due to the 
vagumiess, the number of inferonees that can be drawn from 
a giveei percept diminishes but their correctness i s not 
vulnerated. A perception would be not objective only when 
there Is some radical distort ion in I t . For example, 
owing to l^e intervening «noke we may be mislead about the 
actual and shape of a thing which are fa i r ly 'knopm to other 
persons. 21ie differaico between these two kinds of ph«RO-
mena can be made clear by an example which Hus^sell himself 
has given. Suppose you are seeing a man who i s gradually 
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approaching yoo» The distance betveen you and the person 
I s such that yoa ar© not able to recognise who he i s . But 
yAien he gets s«ff ic l«i t ly near , ya^ recognise that he I s 
Jemes, The perception when you could not recognise Jones 
i s vague,* But i t I s lif no Eneans incorrect? i t I s objective 
and genuine. I t would have, however, not beai objective i f , 
due to the intervening Icsises, you saw the man up side doiim. 
Technically, i t would be said that a perception has 
no object ivi ty , i f i t i s not a member of any group. Besides 
the eases above mentltmed, the hallucinations and dreams 
are also the examples of purely f i c t i t ious and unreal 
perceptions* Because l ike tJie former, in l a t t e r a lso , the 
given percept does not belcmg to any group. That I s , we 
cannot infer other percepts frcmi the given pGrflKWt and 
canftot arrcmge thOTi into a group according to the laws of 
perspective* 
Probleia «f Sab jee t iv i^ mA Error 
That a given perceptlai Is subjective or e r ra t i c 
( l . e * i t i s lacking in objectivity) i s Itnown by our inabi-
l i t y to draw correct Inferoiee from i t . This i s detected 
wh«n two persons draw di f fer«i t and dissimilar Inferonees 
from p reepts which they think belong to our group. If the 
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infer«nees of two pers^is ap« same, both* s pereeptlcms 
vfill b« g<muln0« 'i'h« dlsagrdoKcnt vould mean that cme 
of thmti i s drawing false infeienees* Frois t h i s , i t also 
becomes clear that objectivity of a p©rcepti<»i does not 
depend uprni r^fhat the percept i s in i t s e l f , \mt also upon 
40 the experi^ee of the pereepieait* 
In a l l eases of e r ra t i c e3cperi«\ees, the erior i s 
alvays doe to the intervanticm of rome •physical object^ 
betveen the perceiver and the object perceived. This 
intervening physical object Is not necessarily a tnaterlal 
b ^ y ; the physiological and psychological, or be t t e r , 
the sensory and cerebral phenofBena are also ' phgrsical 
objects' inasmuch as they d i s to r t the experiences ar\d 
make th«E lacking in object ivi ty. There a re , thus, three 
sources of subjectivity in exp«flPlances» F i r s t is the 
physical subjectivity i^hich i s caused by the coming of 
scxne physical object betvreen l^e peorceiv^ and thing 
perceived* ^ean Uie physical object i s meant for our 
physiological or sensory c(»istituti<»i, the subjectivity 
caused would be sensory subjectivi ty. And ^ e n , in the 
l a s t , i t i s due to our brain, i t will be cerebral 
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subjectivity* 
The Tnost obvious example of physical liind of subject-
iv i ty i s found in the case of s t r a i ^ t s t ick appearing 
b«it wh«i i t I s half dipped Into vat«p. Here tbo water 
'^Ich Interferes the d i rec t experience causes d is tor t ion . 
Photographs I g^amogtonei records and different kinds of 
reflex!<^ and refractian are also examples of this sub-
j ec t iv i ty . The basic thing with this kind of sub^ectivllgr 
i s that the distort ion i s already present in events which 
(though external to the body of observer) belong to the 
group in question and are very near to the sense-organ 
concerned in the perception, l?hissell says that mistaken 
ir.ferwiees due to physical subjectivity can be corrected 
by the help of physics omlyi physiology or psychology are 
of no help in I t , 
The second i,e« physiological subject ivi ty, as i s 
sa id , i s caused by some defects in sense-organs or afferent 
nerves. Distortions due to drugs, jaundice or any other 
disease in sense-organs are examples of I t , I t i s dete-
cted whcffi different people make different inferences 
froffi a percept wtilcn i s supposed to belong to cme group* 
Fcxr examjr l^e, if , in a giv«n s i tuat ion, <me pers<m sees 
two colours, say, red and greaai, while another parson sees 
only one, there must be some defect in s«iso-organs of the 
second perscai. And the subjectivity here would be sensory 
E'ubjectivity* The underlying principle here i s that i f there 
are two st imuli , there must be two noticeably d i f fer^ i t 
•ffects eorresjiondlng to two stimuli* If sam9<»)« I s unable 
to p-rcelv© this difference In the e f fec t s | his tools of 
perceiving must be defective* 
I t may, hoveveri be observed that in th is resi^eot 
the In t r ins ic quality of the percept does not matter very 
much* For example i f one observer tees red wfiile another 
sees green or grecm iihen another sees r@dy i t could not be 
said ^ o s e perceptlco i s gectulne and \^ose not* Secondly, 
i f a persm, due to blindness or deafness, Is unable to 
laake inferences, he would not be called a victim of sensory 
subjectivity* Subjectivity consists In drawing false 
inference, not In inabi l i ty to drav Inferwiees* For 
example. If a person sees tvo candles, by pressing his eye 
bal ls and Infers that tactually also there are two candles, 
then his perception would be s®isory or physiological 
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subjectivity* 
The l a s t Idnd of subjectivity which i s cerebral or 
psychological arises due to past experl^ces* le find i t , 
for example, in reading books* Usually, wh«m we read 
something with a fast speed, we do not see a l l the l e t t e r s 
of tJje words. Most of the fanilllar words are seen Ineorop-
l e t e ly but are fa i r ly understood as our past experience of 
theas competes thew* % s«« for exaraplo the l e t t e r s " j 
u d g IE e " In congunctloii and read i t as * judgement* , 
because we have always in the past experienced then in 
the l a t t e r fopo« The omlrslon of l e t t e r s In th© books are 
explained by t h i s phen<»nena. S v ^ the proof readers who 
serutenlxe the vords very careful ly become a victim of t h i s . 
The p r inc ip le t h a t underl ies the cerebra l s u b j e c t i -
v i t y i s t^  a t wh«i two things a s p o c l a t ^ In a la rge niuaber 
of eases in p a s t | are sufManly, for sc«ne reason, d i s s o -
c i a t e d , the pas t experience mistakenly continues to 
aspoclate them, /e have seen the conjunction of l e t t e r s 
"judgone" ali^ays associated in pas t by the l e t t e r s "^ t" whan 
a t scHae occasion the l a t t e r i s n o t t h e r e , we continue tb&m 
assoc ia t ing unconsciously with the forsier conjunction* I t 
may be se@n tha t alsto-^t a l l of our i^erceptl^^s are 
subject ive In the psychological or cerebra l sense , because 
a l l of our Bxperlences are inccmiplete, but are completed 
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by mnemlc phentassena. 
Cki© way to d i s t ingu ish the object ive praceptlosns 
fr<»s subject ive or err<»i®ous ones I s , as j u s t seen, to 
say tha t while I r the former we are usual ly able to draw 
cor rec t Inferences , In the l a t t e r we always draw IneorrQct 
t r fo r enees . The other -^ ray to do the s^-.e I s to say tha t 
the objective perdeptlcms are governed by laws which have 
few or no exceptl<»i5 whereas the e r r a t i c ones are anaiso-
11 es to these laws or In other i/«>rds they are subject to 
laws which have coisparatlvely a la rge nuisber of @xceptl;:s3s« 
These laws are generally formed on consoKMrssense loveland 
perfected by sc ience . That I s to say, when In a number 
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of eases we find a cer ta in ev«i t associated ^ . th mother 
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event ve bel ieve one as Inferable frots tVie o t h e r . 
I t may be observed t^a t usually a s l n ^ o pareept 
suff ices to make us able to draw other percepts bel<»iglng 
to the group to ^ I c h th© glv«j percept belcwigs. But t h i s 
i s b&cause '#e are surrounded by things which are tsf famil iar 
k i n d s , ^e see a black patch of colour v i th a ce r t a in shape 
and s i ze and we say tha t i t i s a c a r . Or, #^e experience a 
ce r t a in tac tua l sensatioii and w© say that i t I s b a l l . This 
I s because ve do not face any d i f f i c u l t y to assoelat© the 
t ac tua l S'3nsatl<Mis with tije vi!?ual cm^s ^/hich feave b c « i | 
In our pas t experlencCi as?ociated vrlth t h « s . But i f '<re 
are suddenly t ransportaJ to a world with unfamiliar things 
we would have to exer t a cer ta in arount of labour to have 
su f f i c i en t ly cotaplcte knowi®dge of a th ing . This la sean 
when we are confronted with s-^ethlng '^ rtiich we have not 
h i t h e r t o coine ac ross . To Imov i t fu l ly we repeatedly 
turn i t from d i f fe ren t s i d e s , press i t , s^e l l i t e t c . 
This r.eans t h a t , in p r i nc tp l e i froK a s ingle p<3rcGpt, very 
l i t t l e can be Inferred with confldancei we need observa-
t ions fvov; d l f f e r a i t angles and points of view and for 
a considerable period of time. 
The Kature o£ f^reepts gnd t h e i r Location In 
Physical ^forld 
The dlscusslswi above made, completes, in a s a i s e , 
the account of Russell* s causal theory of perception 
-220-
whleh ho propoundod In the l a s t stage of his philosophical 
career. There rfflsalns however to b© discussed an Important 
question narselytwiiat 1« the nature of |i«0ree*»t3 aiid wfiat 
Is I t s physical status and also that 'i^ere can i t be 
placed In the general scheme of physical causal lavs? The 
question i s ef^ser.tlally ontological) but i t has also consi-
derable eplst^Kaologleal slgnlflcmee because I t Is t^ e^ 
oeeurrenee of percepts /hlch with I t s psychologicil aeeom-
panim®nts wlilch I t i t s e l f produces vhich constitute tY» 
oceurrenc*^ called knowledge. 
Russell* • theory of perception, as has bo©n seen, i s 
a dua l i s t i c , causal is t te theory. I t i s however different 
froin Locke's or C r i t i c ^ r e a l i s t ' s dualism. Locke held 
that perception consists in the mind's taking cognia«nee 
of physical objects through certain quailt ios vhlch dep^jd 
upon the former but are product of the l a t t e r , i^yslcal 
t ing comprise of primary quali t ies and these produce 
se^taidary quali t ies after coming in ccmtact \rith itind. 
There were thus in the whole process, threes terms,naiselys 
the mind, the physical things and secondary qua l i t i e s . 
The c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t s uphold the sarse three terr; with 
certain modi fi cat! iwis. 
Bus s e l l ' s theory i s also basically a three terns theory. 
I t i s ho^jfevoT different with the fonner in that ^ s s e l l does 
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not ballevd In the mind or body as subs tan cos which isake 
eon t a c t with @aeh other through cer ta in ' I d e a s * . Hussell* 8 
view of the w>rld I s such tha t there are in I t an I n f i n i t e 
number of physical e n t i t l e s (or ncm-onti t les) which he 
c a l l s * events ' . These events a^ e^ arranged In to groups. A 
group cons is t s of s t r u c t u r a l l y s imilar or semi-similar 
events which are arranged In a syBunetrleal order having a 
centre* iHien t h i s centre happens to f a l l with In the purview 
of a brain (or a camera, or a d le taphane) , the occurrence 
cal led ' pQrcep t l^* occures . The process i s crudely as 
follows t 
Suppose for examine tha t in dark n ight a norientary 
f lash I s experienced hy a person . If t^e p rson happens 
to be a ccxraaoner, he '* i l l c e r t Inly think tha t the f lash 
he experienced i s - ^a t occured a t the place where he thinks 
the l ightening took place• : ^ t what tn fac t happened I s th^ t 
a process: of l i g h t waves stemired from the »centre ' and 
reached the percelver*s eyn which i s the col lec t ion of 
ontological ly S'in?e centres* After reachin?; th eyes the 
process «nters I r t o a d f f e r e n t so r t of region which I s 
physiological eotaprising the opt ic nerves and a p a r t of 
b r a i n . In th i s phys io lo j lea l reglcwii the process observes 
and obeys d i f f e ren t so r t of law? and the event which c<:^es 
in the end of th i s process further modifies i t s character 
having been a l r e ^ y modified v .^en the process reached the 
eyes . 
Ther« are thus three fundamental terms In t h i s 
p rocess . F i r s t I s the event which occurred In the space 
outside the pereepl€Hnts* body and from ^Jhlch the process 
s t a r t e d . The second I s the event which occurred wh«ti the 
process reached perceplent* s eyes vblch may be cal led 
st imulus -event . The th i rd event which I s 'percept* I s 
the l a s t event which occurs In the brain when the p l ^ s i -
o loglca l cons t i tu t ion of pereelver i s st icsulated. Thus, 
to the psychological ©vent called •percept* correspond 
two other so r t s of events namely^ cerebral or physiological 
and the physical even t s . 
I t Kay be remarked by the way that although we said 
that the percept comes a t the end of causal chain s t a r t i n g 
froiB the outside ob jec t , In actual fac t , no causal chain 
has any beglnlng or an end, ihen the process stops a t the 
percept -event , there s t a r t s another p rocess . This i s the 
process of reaetlcm whldi t r ave l s through the sare physio-
l o g i c a l regl tm. The passage from stimulus to the percept 
I s through a f fe ren t nerves and the react lTo runs through 
ef ferent nerves . The percept i s thus an event which i s 
intermediate between the processes running the sd'ferent 
and efferent nerves* 
iha t holds in the case of «seeing* , holds a lso in 
* hearing" , ' touching* ard in other kinds of perce iv ing . 
In the case of »hearing a sovmd » , for exan-jple, a physical 
process s t a r t s from I t s source observing cer ta in laws in 
the a i r . I t reaches ears and observing d i f fe ren t kinds of 
laws t raverses the ef ferent nerves and reaches the b r a in . 
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From th«r« anotf»r process s t a r t s and running through 
efferent nerves produces react! ins In the percepltMit* s 
body. In the case of touch also, vhen scwethlng eomes In 
contact with a part of body, tbr> electroois and protons 
a t that place are disturbed and the e lec t r i ca l currants 
travel alcmg the afferent nerves ard reaches the proper 
part of brain producing corresponding disturbances there. 
There Is a nlnor dlfferwiee In the case of tactual 
pe reep t l^s vls-a-vls visual perception. I t Is thls i k 
printed l e t t e r or vord can be perceived a t a glancei 
t h rou^ eyes; but to read a vord ty touch, as blinds do, 
we are to move our fingers round the contours of the l e t t e r s . 
Thus , the shape of an object, In the case of touch Is 
Inferred by raeans of move^ient. tod being so, the Infer^ice 
can be justified only on the assumption that the object 
I s not changed meanwhile. 
I t I s clear that I^ssel l believed percepts to %e 
Inside the brain, to be parts of brain. This vas a 
radical view quite unprecedented In tbe whole hlstoapy of 
phllosojjHhiy. it^llosophers who hold a causal theory of 
perceptions, are almost unanimous upcm the point that things 
are in the time and space while the thoughts outside them. 
How ean Indeed thoughts be parts of brain as they are 
unse«3 and untouched. But Hussell re jects this view 
saying that I t Is based Ui»on two false assuinptl<aisi one 
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I s that of thinking the percepts to be located In the 
physical objects ana the other Is treating brain as 
substantial physical thlng# Russell 's positlcm, cm the 
other hand. Is that the physical object and brain both 
are events arranged Into groups, flien an event becoEies 
part of the group forming brain I t comes to be called a 
percept . . That a percept i s an essential ly physical 
events which can be easily f i t ted In the physic?il causal 
chain can be seen in the fol lT^ng way, 
'^ e have discussed in sofre preceding page the case of 
a person hideously perceiving the ac t iv i t i es of a nuisber 
of people In a room and of a camera simultaneously taking 
photographs of them. Now if we sl ight ly change the analogy 
by substituting the cairera by a dlctaph(»}e w© will have 
follo'^ng things to be compareds 
(a) the sounds heard by l is tener 
(b) the events just outside his ears when he hears, 
(c ) the events a t the dictaphone at the same time 
(d) the dictaphone record 
(e) the sounds heard by msui when he l i s tens to the 
dlctaph(xie. 
The slmilarltgr between (a) and ( e ) , Bussell says i s 
fundnpental, and "Is kno^ im by a eocsparlson of a percept 
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with a memory". The person l i s tens to the dletaphcme 
and finds tha t the sounds he I s now hearing are s imilar 
t o what he remegibers he had i t r e o t l y perceived* There 
i s thus Involved In to I t the question of r e l a t i -w of 
perceptions and ff^cmory, ^ s s e l l , howevery points out tha t 
the inference froe a reco l l ec t ion (which occurs now) to 
what i s r eco l l ec t ed , i s e s s e n t i a l l y s l i i i l a r to the Infererce 
which w© roake from an ac tua l percept to idea l percept and 
then to the physical thing* In m«3ory a l so we can cmly 
aff ina the s t r u c t u r a l s i i s i l a r l ty of the recol lec ted ^vent 
and grounds for i t a lso are the same as in pe rcep t s . 
Aside from the s imi l a r i t y of (a) with ( • ) , the 
s i m i l a r i t y between (a) and (b) i s a l so obvious* (b) i s the 
stimulus of which the (a) i s ac tual percept and t h e i r s imi-
l a r i t y has already been discussed* For the saoe reasc»is 
(d) and (•) can a lso be t rea ted as s imi lar ( t he sounds; which 
the l i s t e n e r hears while hearing the record are what reaches 
his ears)* Now i f (a) I s s imilar to (e) and (a) i s siisilf^r 
to ( b ) , i t follows tha t (b) I s s imilar to ( e )* And i f 
(b) i s s imilar to (e) and (e) i s s l iai lar to ( d ) , i t follows 
t ^a t (b) i s s imilar to (d)« Again since (d) i s iser®ly a 
reproduction of what the dictaphwie has recorded l,"-* (c) , 
the (c) w i l l a l so be sirailar to other processes* /hat 
follows friw! a l l t h i s i s tha t "a percept , considered 
phys ica l ly , I s not very d i f f e r en t fro© other physical 
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events*" 
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Chapter Tl 
coiiCLtraioH 
There hnve lieen in twentieth century, in the nain , 
two kinds of approaches to study the pOTbleri of perception. 
In one kind of approach, the concern was merely to laake the 
exis tence of phyaical world f ree and indepondont txom i t o 
experience. The r a d u c i h i l i t y of existmice of th ings in to 
t h e i r exi)eriences was one of the chief grounds upon which 
the i d e a l i s t i c philosophy hased i t s e l f , ' ^ e arci^ument \m.B 
enhodied in Berkeley's fatmuB dlctura esse eat Dercjrd. How 
a r e f i i t i t i on of t h i s pro posi t ion wa;j what so le ly rmd sinply 
i n t e r e s t ed the a n t i - i d e a l i s t philonophero of t h i s century. 
I ^ t there i s a pliysical world existin;^ independently of our 
experi =ncin£j i t wtas a laatter of f a i t h fo r the r e a l i a t o and 
t h e i r task yas merely to disprove a l l those philooophlea 
which did not adriit i t . \ t yp ica l re j j reseatat ivo of t h i s 
approach w i^s G.!3, loore in B r i t a i n who a l legedly eet himself 
to Moik for*refuting idealiara* and 'defendin;;; coi ion s e n s e ' . 
In imeii-ou, both the schools of Neo-iiealism and C r i t i c a l 
Eealisn were concerned to refute idealiara and e s t ab l i sh the 
pooa iMl i ty of the oxiotence of mi object ive physical world 
independent of experience, "^ho difference between the two 
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schools conalated only in t h e i r respect ive claims of the 
d i r ec t and ifio'llated knowledge of the world, 
^Q o ther appi\)ach of yfiich Aissel l hao be&n the 
chief repreaentat lTe cbeo no t , l i k e tho f i r a t , s t a r t with 
any prefixed aim. I t ' a aim ±G r a t h e r to reaolva the para-
dox which 13 iosued whon a lofjioal analyoia of the pjmblera 
i s made. I t f i r s t nx^ irres a cn . t iquc of cosimons^iae o r naXvQ 
r e a l i s t i c view of perception accorcHn^ to whi(^ perceptual 
knowledge cons is t s in a al?iple coiifrontation of niiiid with 
an outs ide physical object th rou j^ which the former cornea 
to Imow the l a t t e r and the l a t t e r beooneo known to the 
former. There a re a niiriber of co ro l l a r i e s which follow th io 
view which philosopher!} found reaaon to doubt i n . One 
corollar^r i s , for example, t h a t the perceived object i s 
soraethins public mid object ive and not raerely a p r iva te datun 
of an observer. The other one i s t ha t through perception 
the r e a l chajf ic tar is t lca of the object l a revealed. 
Philosophers on the other hand say what we ex|X33'i«nce i s 
always pr iva te to ua and t h a t perception alwaya gives a 
p a r t i a l and mi t i l a ted view of the object perceived. 
The chief reaaon upon which philoaophera r e j ec t coTonon-
t 
aense proposi t ions about perception, ateao froni what ia ca l led 
' t h e ar/jument from i l lus ion* which io a lso corroboi^nted by 
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elementxy 30i«ntifie facta. It is realised that things 
as they appear must be different and distinct from what 
they ar« really in theaselvea, A straight looking stick 
looks bent vAen it is half placed in water. How it cannot 
be said that the stick itself has undergone audi drastic 
modification when put in water. It is much laore natural to 
say that its appearance has changed* This change in appea-
rance due to changed condition is characteristic not only of 
illusive perceptions but of genuine perceptions as well. 
Because* the two are <|ualitatively quite a like. A table 
gives differont appearances to different persons or even 
to saae person in different positions and it is clear that 
neither of the appearances can be said as the real table. 
There is thus a duality between the appearances of a 
thing and its reality in each case of perception. What we 
directly come across are appearances and the real things are 
known, if at all, Ta^ vertue of their being inferred from 
the appearances. It is clear that if we adhere to eii^ iricist 
theory of knowledge strictly i.e. if we hold that only 
experienced things can be said to be existing, then the 
external physical things will be non^-existent* On siniilar 
grounds the minds or selves can also be shown to be non-
existent. Because, in our introspection we never experience 
our bare selves. We, instead, experience only bits of 
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senaatlorts which we suppose are inhered by mind, Rrtemal 
Biaterial things and minds are, thus, both non-oexistent in 
as ouch as they are not knowi to exist* What we can be 
sure of at a given aonent is the sensation oeourring to ae 
at that moment, Sensations of past ntonients or of moments 
to come are also not knowablo because they also involve 
infer^ices, 
The theory according to which our whole knowledge of 
universe is confined to the sensation occurring to ma at that 
laoment is called in philosophical terminology* 'solipaisis* 
and historically it was first upheld by British philosopher 
David Hus» in seventeenth oentuxy. As is olear, it rendered 
our whole knowledge of pastf present and future fallible and 
foundationless. This wast obviously, an odd and unpalatable 
theory and oany philosophers after Huae tried to reconstruct 
knowledge by providing it new bases. One such att«apt was 
oade 1^ Inmiuiwil Kant in eighteenth oenttAry who, in his own 
words, was awaken by Hume from his dogmatic slumber, Kant's 
reconstructive philosophy, althoui^ profound and sublime as 
it was, contained oany lacunae and was therefore considered 
implausible by the subse(|uent generation of i^iilosophers. In 
late nineteenth century this problem was again taken up by 
British philosopher John Stuart Mill, But as by that time 
Hogelianism has come to dominate the philosophical environment 
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Mill's theory, due also to some of its own inheirent defeote, 
could not receive ranch attention and the problem v»s throvm 
Into badcgrotmd. 
In twentieth century, aa just said, laost of the 
philosophers preoccupied themselves with refuting idealism 
taking for granted the realities of aind and material things, 
Theyt thus, did not come to the grip of the riddle which was 
rendered exposed 'tiy Huae. It was to the credit of Bertrand 
Hussell that he realised what was at stake* Like Kant, he 
also tried to overcome Huawan ohallen^ by developing a 
philosophy which could provide knowledge with new bases and 
founcbations. 
For about fifty years, he grapled with this problem. 
He developed successively a series of theories to anewer the 
Huaean challenge to knowledge. Barring his position in his 
first philosophical woik Probleg^ gg Philosophy in which, he 
was, like his other cont^aporary realists, an eplstenjological 
dualist, his alleged ala in philosophy waa to bridge the 
gulf between the world of sense (or of perception) and the 
world of physios. In physios we assume the existence of 
objective material things which we think cauoe their appear-
ances to huraan mind and it is this causation which ta^es our 
knovjledge of external world possible. But w!^t in fact 
hapi^ns Is other way about. In actual fact It is our mind 
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which becomes aware of appearances and then we Infer from 
thera on external world. The external physical world being 
Inexperienced and inferred is strictly not known to be 
existent. There Is thus created a gulf between the world 
of what we experience and the world of physics which, 
Bossell thoui^t, every philosophy of perception imist bridge. 
Bussell was pretty clear in his mind that if we 
wholly exclude the inferred things from the scope of 
genuine knowledge then we will inevitably be led to aolipaisia, 
which due to its "barrwa" and '•unpractical" nature was alto-
gether iaplausible* He never lost sight of the fact that 
a lo,^cal carrying out of the empiristic analjrsis of knowlef^e 
leads \xy necessity to the negation of the very possibility 
of knowledge* His endeavour then was to raake raininmm of 
assizmptions to dispwase as T^ uch as possible with the inferred 
entitles. The inferred entitles should be admitted only when 
t h ^ are Indispensable, Moreover when there is freedom to 
which 
choose between inferring something^ though unexperienced but 
±n experiencible and something which is wholly inexperienclble 
it is more vvo-ger to choose the former be<»u8e that would be 
a 'lesser evil'. 
I t i s important to note that SUSSQU'S in teres t in 
theory of perception —— or in philosophy in general ^® 
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not had any Independent source. He wis driven to djLacuaa 
this problem due to certain cr)nelde3Patloii3 of his logical 
th>'?ori93 whioh seemed to him to have direct bearing upon the 
prtiblara of knowledge, Hia early distinction betwemi knowledge 
by acquaintance and kiiowledge by description was resultant 
of a corresponding distinction that he made in the doaaln of 
logic between names and descriptive phrases. Generally we 
think that descriptive phrases stand for their objects in 
the same wise as the naaes. But Husaell found that this 
would Involve some great difficulties, George IV wished to 
know whether Scot was the author of Waverlsjir and if the phrase 
•author of \^ver3v* stood for the object Soot then what 
George IV wished to know becoraes whether Scot was Scot? 
Clearly this is absurd. Names and descriptive phrases, there-
foret must be dlatlnguiohed, ?or Bussellf the latter does not 
stand for an object but stand for certain chaxaeteriatios 
which we think apply to an object. 
Logically, a naae is what refers to an object which 
is purely existent. How in strict logical sense what is 
purely existent is what is given in our experience i.e. 
direct experience. Clearly, what is given in our direct 
experience are lenaible qualities like red, hardness, sweet-
ness etc, fltuasoll calls these sensible qualities sense-data 
and their knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge 
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of things wMoh are Inferred from these sense-data are 
knowledge by description as they are described by and 
analysable into 'naaes' (sliples or individuals) which 
stand for sense-data. It may be seen that according to 
these definitions raost of our words which we take as names 
are not names at all. The words like *'icot* or *table» or 
•horso* are not names aa they are known to exict only through 
S€zi8e-data i,e» the qualities which they supposedly inhere. 
Knowledge, in strict logical sensef is knowledge by 
acquaintance i.e. of sense-data. The datum occurring to me 
at present monent is all what I can be sure of kiiowing at 
present. The descriptive knowledge of material things is 
Inferred and therefore uncertain. When I say I see a table* 
what actually I know is a red patch of colour; ray knowledge 
of table to which I think the given datum belongs han giDunds 
other than experiential. I think that table must exist 
whether or not I see It, \5lhen the table Is covered by a 
clothf we do not see the table. 3ut as the cloth cannot 
rest miraculously in the air, we infer that theire is a table 
which the cloth covers. Similarly, If I reduce for exaraple 
the oat into the data that it gives to me, then our saying 
that cat is hungry would mean that sense-data are hungry 
v*iich Is preposterous, 4gain, I cannot say that the cat 
becomes non-existent when I shut ray eyes and comes a^ a^in 
In existence when I reopai them. It is ?iuch more natural 
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to otiy tiiat the rociaoas ot ly 3©eln;^ rmd not seQliv^ the 
ca t ara to be found in myself fmd not In the cat I t s e l f . 
iTiu9» our " ins t inc t 1.VP f a i t h " in the portsistence of 
iKiterlal thiii^ia to 0Mmn dix'i'erent ap^earrmcaa leads ua 
to aaaer t our laiowledj-je of them. 
In hla iTii^t i^hilosoohical work Pro deaa of ^hiloao JHY 
f^ssel l admitted the kno.ledi^e of mfiterial th ings as based 
upon i n s t i n c t i v e f a i t h , liut what about the ?iind whose 
conttict of sense-datti conatit tate* a case of knov/ledgeV 
I s i t kxiown ' l i r ec t ly l-f^. by acqi^intance o r ijidir-ectly 
i . e . by descri t innv -Jusaell i a heaitfmt to j^lve any c l ea r 
and categor ica l answer to i t . On the one ncmtl, i t i s clf»ar 
t ha t wheji I think introai ioct ively of tnysolf, wliat I corae 
across are bittj o ' thnu^rhts and uot the se l f diaembowelled 
oi" i t s conteata . ^^lio n-rmo tha t th'-- imre se l f io k;iovm 
only i n d i r e c t l y , :i«t on th'T oth r hand, '-an ia a i id to be 
r iv i l eged in hein^; se l ' -consc ious an a /p lns t the anliaals 
v/ho a r e only cpi^cignia. M aniroal only oeea the sun, but 
I laiow tha t I see the 3un« 'r^tia m -ina t h a t i n a caae of 
knowing the whole object of ny iaiowled^ie i s *I (or se l f ) -
acquainted -with-sun*, "'h= t^ isi to say, the oolf and datum 
both ore object a of m:^ acquaintance in a case of Iznouijif^, 
TJie kno dedge of bare selves or minds, whether d i rec t 
o r I nd i r ec t , 'aust be admitted, a» i t i s indisp nsAblo in 
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explainiiv^ the perceptual liiiowladgo. ' iusse l l , Indeed, refuses 
to beliove the raind aa knovm -ly acquaiiitaiiCQ i n h i s aybsoiuent 
philosophy of phenom^suillsm. He however yfttalned risa 'rtln;-: 
i t on the f^round t t o t i t i s a necoaairy ter?a in the occuz^Qnco 
of r e l a t i o n ca l l ed •imowiii/j'. iuiovaerl/;o» accord in/; to him* 
I s e s s e n t i a l l y a r e l a t i o n a l oocurrerice. ifnen lirid Gornmn in 
r e l a t i o n to «i'ata t h a t the k:iowiii(5 occurs. Both the atroject 
and object a re neoQsnaT^ mid aiiy attempt to reduce on© in to 
o t h e r i s , acoorfiinf^ to lusne l l , donmed to be a f a i l u r e whore 
the explanation of perceptufil kiiowled.'^o i s required, 
I d e a l i a t s reduce the objects iiito subject aaying t^?at 
i n every ease of knowledgef i t ia our taiowinf? of a thin,'^ tha t 
makes t h a t things lawvm, vJere the ratnd non-exi3tent , the 
knowledge mad for that reason known object a lso could not 
e x i s t . But for iiuasell t h i s was a feillacious roanoning. In 
a oaoe OIL experl'^nciii^?, tho object export.enoe laust be dlotinr?;-
uiBhed from the ac t of experiencing. The l a t t e r la aei i ta l , 
but the foiTier need not n0ces3an.ly be aentfil, e^ a r e oonacious 
of data; o r , in other v.'ord3, (iata i a vahat l a .i^veft o r oresffiitod 
to nj mind which meaxia tha t i t i s independent of 'isid external 
to 'alnd, 'Fhe Jcnowini? ia a aental occurrence while the object 
known i s something phyalcal , 
ausael l a lso r e j ec t s the content theory upheld hj 
Aiertcan c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t s aocnr^iagj to which the sensa bein^ 
- 2-^6 . 
dependent upon rsdnd are par t of i t . One s t i ck looks ati^iniht 
and bent i n two di f ferent condit ions and i t io arfjued t h a t the 
r l i s s i i i l a r i t y vmat oe i n th© ap-^earanees not i n the s t i ck i t -
s e l f . Thus, the appearances pe r ta in to ndnd and par t s of i t . 
I t i a not the s t i ck i t s e l f which has baco'no ta^it when dipped 
in to water, but our experiesicing i t has laade i t to apr>ear 
defec t ive ly , Aiase l l , however, denies the ar/^mf^nt by saying 
tha t the socall-id d???ectiv9 appearances are in fac t not defective. 
The Gtick, in as nuch as i t I s seen bentj I t tn hent. I t i s 
not a t a l l wrong to say tha t v i s u a l l y the ot ick i s bent. I t 
would how'Tver l>e wron,T to say tha t t a c t u a l l y also i t i'^ bent, 
A ^ o s t syiy also be r e a l in aa rauoh as i t i a seen, ?hu8, the 
fac t of a th ing a a appeartrii:; lu an unusual ciminer cannot make 
i t un eal o r a fancy of a lnd. The appearajice i » quite r e a l , 
objec t ive and external to miJ^ id, 
leaidea idealism and content t h a i r j there i s the Jamsean 
doctr ine of neu t ra l monism which stand's for the r dtjction of 
mind and trtikin^^ the ^ere seiisa su f f i c ien t to explaiii knowledfjr?, 
!5oth niind and ^laterial 3ui>atance a re inf'xperienc^d and t h e r e -
fore non-exj.stent, Onlj sena^i are known and i t i s t h e i r i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n tha t cons t i tu t e s knowing, iu t -lussell r e j e c t s t h i s 
doctiHne a l s o , Ja-ios said tha t one sensum cones in contact 
with o ther sensum and the ev^mt oall-^d knov;i.n^ occurs , t^rtm 
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t h to I t fbllowad thfit i f only otv^ d^tun occured In the 
'liofscuph,; of a pnruo.i, h*"; could iint lavn: {mythizXfu ^ t t h i s 
IS Ineor-ftct, ;,?«s3ell smys t ' la t In-tloally I t i-j pc-:rf8ctly 
Txmaible t h a t a raind batata ;i'or a fract ion ot Beooiid, experl^k* 
ce8 a d i t i n and ceases t'^ e:-:l:?t, loTeovev, uhmi I cxpf^rl^ice 
a fsensuii, thc i^ I3 a so r t of 5aiti"mcy and 1 nefiiacy licty^en 
riyself('?)ajirl the object (•thi3*># '^Ms l^Tiediacy oaaiiiot be 
explaljied by the nori-r*3lBtlonil theory of neutrt i l "lonis'a. 
'I'he aBT«»9i^t l a what ikis.jGll chills ar^tumcnt I'lrssi f-'nph-^tic prtiv 
t l c u l a r s , ...Ms.aell also atiye t^iat evm i f yr>u eyplati-i p<"rceptual 
l^nnwledt^e wl.t^v^ut liivoi:iii/; 'ilncl, j'^u otaiiiK>t -''Xplaln th© » V-l i s t s I 
•rs'Sfnberlii/i'f 'toiowledjie o*.' iion-t«yipoml o'oj^^cts* ^ t c . which 
a r e pur a y faoi.tal oceiii^moQs* l a a l l of these no ext©iwil 
presenta t ion io InTfjlved, yet we know tha t we i-mou something. 
P o s i t i v e l y , ^iu^.*ell aays tha t th« a'^^e fact t ha t -nind. in nr-t 
d i r e c t l y known does jMt itK i^e i t t o be noivexistoj i t , Tiat there 
i s a mind i s ahoyn by the fac t of x>rivacy ?md anbj '?ctivity tha t 
ch^ixncteTlQf' aji experlencinfr. i^ hon I ^^srijerionof? sonothiJag, 
vihat I experience i s s t r i c t l y qi^i^. l ie object I ?»xporl«2nc8 
T!*aj' *>*? expertOiiC'^d fsimtaltajic^uely uy 'jther people. But my 
ftxporl.f"ftciii/| of the exp^rierjood object i a ray Oi,^ arid c-irmot 
l:>e i'xpfjrionced hy mij^ther pom^ion. ' l ius , t'K>ii-h in«':-rpf^riQjicod, 
*ilnd n«3t 'be r/Allevcd becatj^^e in I tu tf5.»*33 alone w^  can 
e:K.-.laiii th.-' eo e n t i a l l y ro la t lor ia l o"viruct'?2* of pc-f*c-;-jtunl 
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In Our KnowledUto of the Bxtemal World which repreoento 
•ifeaaell'a second stt^je In the develojMaent oi h i s Ideas concern-
ing problem of parcept ion, x^saell f e l t I t necessary to aaaume 
the mind to render perceptual phenoofflia expllcaliLe. He how-
ever did not f e e l the aanie necess i ty in re,<^rd to mater ia l 
substance . Tlie p r inc ip le of Ocean's raaor made i t des i rab le 
to reduce, i f possible* the infer red e n t i t i e s in to t h e i r 
f tmctlons, l e s s e n , i n t h i s book, formed a construct ion of 
what he ca l led "senslbil la '* txnd showed i t doln/? a l l the 
funct ions thrtt were done by sul js tant la l mater ia l thinr^, 
i ienaib i l ia included ac tua l sensa plus those hypothet ical which 
were infer red from the fon?ier. This inference of hypothet ical 
sensa from ac tua l ones adui t ted l e s s e r r i sk an compared to the 
inference of s u t e t a n t l a l thlnn;s from them. I t was l e s s hazar-
dous to reduce from the sense-data the e n t i t i e s of same 
nature and s t a t u s than to deduce from them the thlrigs of 
r a d i c a l l y d i f ferent na tu re . Md tMa was the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
behind xtussell 's endeavour to replace the i & t e r i a l thin^^s by 
t h e i r sensisxle funct ions. The grea tes t advantage of i t wac 
t h a t i f i t was believed the re did not remain the gulf between 
the vKsrld of seruae and the world of physics which i s caused 
when we admit physical things on an a p r l o r i bae i s . 
But phenomenalism i s a hal f neu t ra l monism. The 
ana lys i s of knowledge tha t leads to phenomenalism, when 
car r ied fu r ther , leads to n^natral ft^snlsra. We r e j ec t the 
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i-saterial subBtaiice oji the ground oi I t s Inexperienced and 
infer red charac ter and we ofin do the same with refjird to 
jaental substance as well* The theory of neu t ra l monisra was, 
indeed, for many reasons, qui te lur?.ns for ' ^ s s e l l , ?or 
on© th ing i t involved rainimum of aaaunntion and be in i so 
conformed fu l ly to i^sse l l^a formula of Occara*s raaor , 
Moreover, i t was i n oonaonruice with the reuul to of some of 
new theor ies in physlcn and paychology, '[Quanta physics and 
theory of r e l a t i v i t y disembowelled matter of i t s Vr^ter ia l i ty* 
and behaviour is t ic psjcholor^y evl.screted nind of i t s 'men ta l i t y* 
I t \mB thou/^h tha t a synthesis can be f^ ade between these two 
opposi te t rends by treatin,^ the ultinjate s tuf f as metaphjrsi-
c a l l y neu tz^ l . In i i i s s e l l ' s own x>hilo3oi>hy, the sens ib les 
were a l ready doin/^ the function of mater ia l th ings and i f 
oind could be dispemJed with, they could a lso shown to be 
doinf; the ftmction of ^lind, 
ifeiosell wished he bel ieve in n e u t r a l monisn. But above 
s t a t e d objections prevented hits doin,'^ so . He, however, nride 
grea t e f fo r t s to overcome these object ions and vihen he wrote 
Analysis of ifind. he was a ful l - f ledged neu t ra l "lonist. He 
abondoned the object ion based upon ©aphatlo pa r t i cu l a r s 3a:/ln/5 
i t too abs t rac t and farfetched, The aesotal occurrences l i k e 
b e l i e f s , me-ioi^ e t c . were explained by sayin,rT tha t they a re 
iiot mental in t h e i r esaenoe. They a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y a l i ke 
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with aensatlono which a re phys-^.oloitlcal and n e u t r a l . Only 
they observe laws which are d i f ferent from the laws observed 
by sensatiojiB and physloal ob jec t s . Physical objects ar© 
f^ovemed by physical laws and arc s tudied by physics, l>clief3, 
raeraories and o ther auch ooourronoes ol:^erve psycholo^Tlcal 
laws and a re s tudied by psychology, liensations are neu t ra l 
in beln/^ subject to both ph^/sloal and paycholojjical laws, 
Perceptiont according to t h i s theory, consisted i n a 
sensa t ion couin/j i n r e l a t i o n to 'aneriic pheeiomena* to which 
i t i t s e l f f^ves r i s e . When, for example, I experience a prick 
due to the pinching of aoiae needle , the occurrence beooses 
asBociated with a s l n l l a r occurrence occurred i n ray Mo£!jraphy 
i n pas t . Photographic p la tee also experience the events 
i n as mich a s they record them, but they a r e not sa id to 
•perceive• thera, aa there does not a r i s e in t h e i r context 
the rancrtdc aaaocia t ion c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to men, ^ .pe r i inces 
do not only give r i s e to runeraic phenomena \mt a r e also 
inflUi^ced and aiodified "hy thea . Hy present experience of 
the words vAiich I see i n the books would have b^en di f ferent 
i f I had not already experienced thorn on riany occasions i n 
p a s t . 
This def in i t ion of perce>3tion was non- re la t iona l i n 
t h a t i t explained perception without brin^^in^ i n the notion 
of i l a d , 4 sensati'^n with i t s anemic asaooiates coxiatituted 
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perception. Hussell presented th i s theory in hia Aiial.vQia 
QX '^in'^ which was pu^lis^ed in 1921. But when again he came 
to write his ^nalvaia pf l latter (published in 1927) he abon-
doned th i s theory, i?ussell thou,<?ht that th i s theory, although 
logical ly unassailable, was a^^aljiat certain very strong 
assumptions of ooninionscstise and physios* In physios, for 
example, we believe in univei^al causal laws. We see on 
many oooasions a certain event producin-'i ^mother ev^it and 
postulate a law about the causal connection betw»sn the two 
events, Cta the basis of th i s law, we infer the presence of 
an unexperienced cause-everat when the effect-event i s experiexi-
ced. I t i s clear that i f in a <ase the effect-event i s actual , 
i t s cause-event aust also be actual whether or not experienced. 
But according; to non^-relational theory a cause-event, when 
unexperienced, existed only hypothetioaliy or ' ideal ly*, '''his 
implied that evai an ideally existing cause could produce an 
aotual effect . This i s clearly improbable? i t i s rmoh moTQ 
natural to say that an actual cause exists whether a r not 
experienced, whoa the effect i s experienced. 
Our belief in causal laws of physics, thus, leads to 
our b ^ i e f in the extenaal causation of our knowled^, a i s se l l 
in the l a s t phase of his philosophical development, cooraits to 
th i s belief and thereby nakes a re t rea t to his original dualis-
t i c theory. He ca l l s his new theoiy "causal theoi^ of 
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perception "and In th i s he reasserts the notions of senae-data 
(now called •percepts') and the relat ion oi knowin,?^  (teitaed 
here as •noticing')• He however, does not now believe in 
laind or niaterlal t h l n ^ aa substrmces aa he did in his early 
forraulation of the problem. He continues to be a neiita^al 
monist believing in the neutral i ty of world stuff. He 
develops here his event-ontolo^^ according to which our universe 
i s composed of a countless number of events, \ iz^nur) ot 
structural ly similar or semi-similar events arran/^ed about a 
centre consti tute a thing, fhe external things, the human 
organism and the brain are a l l oompo nit ions of Gv«mt8, i/hen 
an external event f a l l s within the experiential f ie ld of a 
hainan organism, thei^ s t a r t s a process of events whloh ends 
upon the body of person and from that place another nit?cess of 
events stems and reaches the brain in which the event called 
'percept ' occurs. The 'percept ' i s the knowledge of event 
outside the body of observer and I s s tructural ly similar to 
i t . From percept we can know only the s tructural properties 
of external event, but iiot the in t r ins ic properties of i t . 
'S'or example, i f our • seeing' of the sun i s 2»und then the sun 
i s physically also round; but what sun i s in i t s e l f cannot be 
known by the seeing. 
I t may not be misunderstood t l ^ t ^ S B O I I ' O retrent 
from non-relational eplotomolo^ to (^usal epistemolo/^ in 
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which Iwth mind and external ?aateriai cause were adndtted, 
araotinted a Iwtrayal of h is ovm log i ca l p r inc ip le of Qoonor^y 
aa Qrabodied i n vOocam*8 razor . i?or, as juat s a id , the ndnd 
and matter now believed bjr I ^ s a e l l were not auhatanoea which 
were ahondoned due to t h e i r being r ad i ca l l y d l a s ind la r in 
nature with percepts from which they were to be Infer red . 
What a i s a e l l ca l led laind and matter a t t h i s s tage were ojily 
events which were s imi la r i n t h e i r s t a tus and s t ruc tu re with 
t he percepte and therefore t h e i r inference frora percepts 
involved only tha t ai!K>unt of r i sk which was involved i n inf e r -
ing the idea l elements. The amount of r i sk in both theor ies 
was equal . "The l a t t e r theory had, however, an edge over the 
former in being raore in coiiforjuity with the assumption of 
science and t h i s was the ground for i i i s s e l l ' s preference of i t . 
Our statement of Susse l l ' s causal theory, by the way, 
c l a r i f i e s a confusion which \iixa featured the discussions of 
nany of L^ssell*s ooimaentators about h i s posi t ion in A. of 
*%tter v i s - a - v i s jL. gf riind. They have fa i l ed to resolve an 
apparent contradic t ion which a r i s e s due to HussellVg belicvin,'^ 
on the one hand a neu t ra l r ionlst ic theory of r e a l i t y and on 
the o ther a causal theory of knowled.^. I leutral nronisn TMan« 
a denial of the dual i ty of mind and raatter whereas for caujsal 
theory there tmist be a laaterial cause to produce percepts and 
the re nwst be a mind to receive then . The r idd le can be 
• 244 -
reaoved by aeein,! tha t Ihiasel l ' s present d i s t i n c t i o n of mind 
and matter waa epioteraological za ther t h in metaphysical, 
t te taphyslcal ly , hoth the percept and the external mater ial 
event causing; I t were same, ?orraer waa ca l led fiental because 
I t was known "otherwiae than by Inference" and the l a t t e r was 
ca l l ed raaterial because i t vKis Icnown only by inference. Thus, 
l ^ s s e l l became a cauaal ie t while being within the fraaework of 
neu t r a l nonisn. 
How aumming up the ei i t i re dlacusalon, i t may be sa id 
t h a t ^ s e e l l * in h i s philoaoohioal endeavours, had both h i s 
achievements and f a i l u r e , l^ iase l l ' s philosophy was, in a 
sense , a big f a i l u r e because he <K)uld not achieve what he 
was o r i g i n a l l y a f t e r . ^ 3 problem i^ ras a Kantian problem. 
Ttet i s , he wanted to r e b u i l t the ed i f i ce of knowled^^e by 
providln^ij i t vd.th new foundations which were shakeJied by Hume. 
Hume had ahown a l l fciowledge to be having inev i tab ly a subjec-
t i v e elenesit; ob j ec t iv i t y In knowledge, accordln*^ to him, was 
a myth, "he th ings which we think we know are infaot not known 
to u s ; t h e i r knowledi^e i s inferred from what comes in our 
d i r ec t experience. There i s thus a gap and {julf between our 
exper iencia l and non-exnerienclnl knowledge, '^his ^alf could 
be bridired only by el i - i lnat ing the element of inference and 
showing the knowled^je of world as heina (fPounded in puire 
exp3ri mce, iiiassell d i rected h i s e f fo r t s to t h i s end but 
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despi te pe r s i s t en t e f f o r t s , success eluded him. The l og ica l 
deat lay of esupiriclsm reTnained sol ips ism, Knowled(;c of the 
world could be es tabl ished only by assuming a p r i o r i the t r u t h 
of what i i s s e l l ca l l ed '^on-detaonstrative inferences" . 
Besides t h i s f a i l u r e which i i issel l was frank enough 
to adi-iit i n very c l ea r words, h i s successes a re also iimense, 
!^ o o ther philosopher of h is t i a e could clai '3 to have thou/;ht 
upon t h i s problera so :-3a33ionately and so 'd ispass ionate ly* as 
ausse l l d id . He was at lef is t able to s t a t e what v^s the nature 
of huiaan Jcnowledge and what were i t s scope and i t s li^^iits, 
The llTaltntions of l i i s s e l l ' s theor ies were not due to any 
f au l ty reasoning on h is par t ; they were the l i m i t a t i o n of 
huraan knowledge i t s e l f , Man could not transcend o r overcome 
these liraitvitions and l ^ s s e l l has the c red i t to brin^ t h i s 
fimdamental t r u t h bo^!ie, 
..e may conclude our discussion 1^ giving; here three 
passages frora what Bussell wrote by way of "bio/x^^^ohlcal notes 
which he contr ibuted to the l i b r a r y of l i v i n g philoaoyhers* 
ed i t ion on B, I b s s e l l ' s philosophy. We find in t h i s , i n 
i l u s se l l ' s own v/ords, wimt wao I ^ s s e l l ' s problera and what 
successes o r f a i l u r e he achieved and how. 
In some resraect-'j, ny ijublished work, outnide 
raathemitical l og i c , does not a t a l l coaplete ly 
represent rny b^^llefs o r ny g'^^e^al outlook, Theory 
of knowledge, with which I h*ive been l a rge ly concerned, 
haa a ce r t a in e s sen t i a l oub jec t i - i t y ; i t asks "how do 
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I know what I know?" and s t a r t s Inevi tably f3»m 
personal experience. I t s data are e ^ce i i t r i c* 
and so are the e a r l i e r staj^es of I t s argumenta-
t i o n , I have no t , so f a r , got Taeyond the e a r l i e r 
ata^^es, and have thereof ore seemed ?aore subject ive 
in outlook than In fact I am, I am not a s o l i p s l s t , 
nor an i d e a l i a t j I bellefve (though without good 
;<TC2?ound3) in the yorld of physics as well as in the 
world of psychology. But i t seems c l ea r t h a t 
wl^tever i a not experienced raust, i f known, he 
known by inference. I find tha t the f ea r of 
aollpsis!^ too x^revented philosophers from facing 
t h i s prolnlem, and Vr&t e i t h e r t ^ necesssary 
prii iciplea of inference have been l e f t vam^, or 
e l se the d i a t inc t lon lietween what i s known by 
exi>erlence and what I0 known by inference baa been 
deoiied. I f I ever have the l e i s u r e to undertake 
another ser ious inves t iga t ion of a philosophical 
problem, I s h a l l attempt to analyse the inferences 
from experience to the world of physics , assuming 
them capable of v a l i d i t y , and seeking to discover 
what p r inc ip les of inference, i f t r u e , would 
make thera v a l i d . Whether these p r i nc ip l e s , when 
discovered, a r e accepted as t r u e . I s a laatter of 
teiaperanent; what should not be a matter of tempera-
sient should be the proof tha t acceptance of thera 
l a necessary i f solipsism i s to be r e j e c t e d , " 
":1y i n t e l l e c t u a l jounieys have be®i, in sorae 
reapec ts , disappoint ing. When I was young I hoped 
to find relifjlous s a t i s f ac t i on in philoaophyj even 
a f t e r I had ab-mdoned Hegel, the e t e rna l d ia ton ic 
world gave me aomothing non->huigan to adnilre, I 
thou{ijht of nathetaatics with reveiwioe, raid suffered 
\jh^.n - i t tgena te in led me t o refjard i t a s nothing 
but tautoio{ri93« I have always a rdent ly desired to 
find aome jwat i f l ca t lon for the emotions inspi red 
by ce r t a in th ings t ha t seemed to stand outs ide hunjan 
l i f e and to deserve feell i igs of awe, I an thinking 
i n i>art of very o'tTvious th ings , such as the s taj 
heavens and a ator^iy sea on a rocky coast ; i n ma 
of the vas tness of the s c i e n t i f i c tmivez^e, both 
in space and t i a e , as compared to the l i f e of iMnkind, 
in part nf the edi f ice of i!ii>er3onal t r r i th , espec ia l ly 
t r u t h which, lil<:e tha t of mat hematics, does not "lerely 
describe the world t ha t hapi^ons to e x i s t . Those who 
attemot to 'lalr.e a rellgi'^ii of humanism, which recog-
nl:ie3 nothing grea ter than Hian, do not s a t i s fy my 
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etaotlons. tod yot T ara unable to bel ieve t h a t , 
in the v«5rld ao knovai, the re l a anything t h a t 
X can value outside human beln{T3, fmd, to a 
much l e a s e r ex ten t , an ina la . Hot the s t a r r y 
heavens, but t h e i r e f fec ts on huinan p e r c i p i p i t s , 
have excellenceJ to admire the universe for I t s 
9iae i s s l av i sh and absurd; i'^personal non-human 
t r u t h appoars to be a delusion. And 30 my 
i n t e l l e c t ^ e s vd,th the huiaanistg, though ajy 
esj^tlona v i o l e n t l y r e b e l . In t h i s r e spec t , the 
"consolations of philosophy" a re not fo r sie." 
"In aore purely i n t e l l e c t u a l \®y3, on the 
contrary , I have found as ?3uch sa t i s f ac t i on in 
philoso hy as any one could reasonably have 
expected, !Iany siat ters which, when I was young, 
baffled me by the vagueness of a l l t h a t had 
been said about thaa , a r e now amenable to an exact 
techiiique, which njakes possible the kind of 
-progress tha t i s custo'isiry JLn science, Where 
deflaiite knowled,^ i s una t t a inab le , i t i s some-
t i n e s ixjssible to prove t t e t i t i s una t t a inab le , 
and i t i s usual ly iJossiblQ to formulate a va r i e ty 
of exact hypotheses, a l l compatible with the 
ex i s t ing evidence. Those philosophers who have 
adopted the methods derived from log i ca l ana lys i s 
can a rp ie vdth each o the r , not i n the old aimless 
v«y, but coo lucratively, so t h a t both s ides can 
concur a s to the outcome. All t h i s i s new durinit 
ray l i f e t ime J the pioneer was 2*ef^, but he renjained 
8 o l i t a i 7 u n t i l h i s old age . This extension of the 
sphere of reason to new provinces i s something 
tha t I v.alue very h ighly . Philosophic r a t i o n a l i t y 
may be clicked in the shocks of war and the wel ter 
of new persecuting^ s u p e r s t i t i o n s , but one nay hoi^e 
t h a t i t wi l l not be l o s t u t t e r l y o r for more than 
a few centur iea . In t h i s resi iect , !!iy philosophic 
l i f e >sao been a happ-j one»^ 
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